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Summary
This dissertation presents three essays which represent my main work during the last
4 (3 and a half to be fair) years. All three address important issues in Economics from
a behavioral and experimental perspective. In fact, this dissertation makes use of the
three main tools for the study of behavioral economics: Economic modeling, labora-
tory experiments, and field data. In addition, all three essays are connected in that
they deal with important features of the labor market which are related to gender is-
sues and seek to understand the gender wage gap, which is found still to exist and to
be of a considerably size.
Chapter 1 explores how stereotypes affect self-selection into different tournaments,
an issue which lies at the heart of segregation. I first present a theoretical model in
which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and must self-select
into one of two tournaments: one high-paying and the other low-paying. The model
shows that the existence of negative (positive) stereotypes generates underrepresenta-
tion (overrepresentation) of stereotyped social groups in the high-paying tournament
even when the stereotype is false. Importantly, this model explicitly shows that the
main channel driving segregation is that of self-stereotyping, a phenomenon that has
already been documented in experimental work –mainly in social psychology– but for
which a formal formulation was lacking. The second part of this chapter is devoted to
experimentally testing the model’s predictions by transferring the theoretical setting
to the lab. To that end, I ran a lab experiment in which subjects first have to perform
a real effort task –which is novel in the literature– and must then choose whether to
participate in a high-paying tournament or a low-paying one in which the chances of
getting the prize depend on how well they performed in the real effort task. In addi-
tion subjects have to self-assess with regard to their performance in the real effort task
based on a noisy but informative signal. The key feature of this design is that the real
effort task shows a high degree of between-subjects heterogeneity as to its believed
gender nature. This enables me to look at the effects of the perceived gender nature of
the real effort task on self-assessment and on the tournament in which subjects finally
choose to participate. The results are closely in line with the predictions of the model,
and show that different perceptions as regard to the gender nature of the real effort
task yield different gender self-assessment gaps, which give shape to eventual gender-
based segregation between tournaments.
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It could be said that watching TV is a waste of time, especially given the general
low quality of the shows which are currently being broadcast. Most of the time I agree.1
However, from time to time watching TV provides an opportunity to gather very in-
teresting data that would otherwise be almost impossible to obtain. The outcome of
my spending time in front of the TV, usually after lunch, is presented in Chapter 2. In
this chapter I, along with N. Iriberri, study gender differences and gender interaction
effects in bargaining in a natural experiment. Data from the TV show “Negocia como
puedas” offers a unique opportunity to observe both bargaining outcomes and behav-
ior, with sizable stakes that we could hardly implement in the laboratory. We find that
the matching between male proposers (strong position) and female responders (weak
position) is different from all other matchings in that it is the matching in which the
strong party gets the most. No differences are observed in opening offers, but women
in the weak position demand less from men than from women. This differential be-
havior yields bargaining outcomes that are more favorable for men and less favorable
for women when male proposers encounter female responders.
In Chapter 3 N. Iriberri and I, inspired by the results in Chapter 2, dig deeper into
the issue of gender and gender interaction effects when bargaining. In particular, given
that the setting of the TV show in Chapter 2 is characterized by the existence of asym-
metries in empowerment, entitlement, and information, and that the results found
clearly indicate that gender and strength of bargaining position are interlinked, we
wondered whether the existence of different sources of asymmetries might have any
effect in the appearance of gender and/or gender interaction effects. Notice that most
real-life negotiations are characterized by some kind of asymmetry of the said types.
We believe that accounting for the effects of asymmetries therefore deserves attention
in its own right. Thus, we carried out a laboratory study to look at gender differences
and gender interaction effects in asymmetric bargaining situations. In a symmetric sit-
uation, used as benchmark, we find no gender differences or gender interaction effects,
and find that 50:50 split of the pie is the norm, as expected. In asymmetric situations,
when one bargaining party is made stronger than the other (through empowerment,
entitlement or information), we find that gender differences and gender interaction ef-
fects are substantial in the first half of the experiment (first 5 periods) but vanish in the
second half of the experiment (last 5 periods). Remarkably, we find substantial inter-
action effects in the informational asymmetry treatment, where only the strong party
knows the size of the pie, similar to those found in Chapter 2: the matching between
a male holding the strong position and a female holding the weak position is different
from all other matchings and is the matching in which the strong party gets the most.
Consistently with the results in Chapter 2, we also find that the main driver for this is
women in this treatment demanding less from men.
This study could be considered as a starting point for more ambitious projects be-
1As a personal disclaimer, notice that I refer here to TV shows and not to broadcasts in general. In
particular, there are some good films shown on TV that deserve to be watched. A recent good example is
Loreak by Goenaga and Garaño (2014).
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cause we not only show that gender and gender interaction effects are sensitive to the
existence of asymmetries but also find two intriguing results that should be looked at
closely. The first is the one mentioned above, which relates to the importance of ex-
perience/learning effects. Our results showed that this effect exists but do not explain
why. The second point is that, as usual in the literature, we find a substantial deadline
effect with many deals being reached close to the deadline. We show that this dead-
line effect is not free from consequences and in particular that the deals reached just
before the deadline have features similar to ultimatum games making them systemati-
cally different from those reached further from the deadline. As this seems more of an
artifact given by the design of the experiment, ideally we would like to get rid of it.

Resumen Extendido
Esta tesis presenta tres trabajos que abordan temas importantes en Economía desde el
punto de vista de la Economía del comportamiento y la Economía experimental. De
hecho, esta disertación hace uso de las tres herramientas principales para el estudio de
la economía del comportamiento: el modelaje económico, experimentos de laboratorio
y el uso de datos de campos. Adicionalmente, los tres ensayos están conectados entre
sí en que todos ellos tratan con facetas importantes del mercado de trabajo, relaciona-
dos con género y que pueden ser utilizados para entender la brecha salarial que aún a
día de hoy está presente y que representa una magnitud importante.
CAPÍTULO 1: STEREOTYPES AND TOURNAMENT SELF-SELECTION: A THE-
ORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
El capítulo 1, explora cómo los estereotipos afectan a la auto-selección en distintos tor-
neos perfectamente discriminatorios, un aspecto que se erige como uno de los aspectos
claves que dan forma a la segregación laboral y educativa.
Los psicólogos sociales han mostrado que los estereotipos juegan un papel impor-
tante a la hora de interpretar los resultados en distintas tareas así como en dar forma
a nuestras propias habilidades (véase Lenney (1977); Beyer (1990); Beyer and Bowden
(1997); Pomerantz et al. (2002); Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003)). La RAE, en su primera
aceptación define “estereotipo” cómo “Imagen o idea aceptada comúnmente por un grupo
o sociedad con carácter inmutable”. El periodista Walter Lippmann –quien primeramente
uso el término estereotipo en su uso moderno– captura esta idea de estereotipos como
puntos de referencia en su influencial libro Public Opinion (1922) cunado dice
“Las más sutiles y persuasivas de todas las influencias son las que crean y mantienen
el repertorio de los estereotipos. Se nos habla del mundo antes de verlo. Imaginamos
la mayoría de las cosas antes de experimentarlas”.
En un mundo incierto, evaluar las habilidades es un paso importante en procesos de
decisión en cuanto a elecciones educativas y laborales, los cuales representan dos ám-
bitos importantes en el estudio de la Economía. Desde edades tempranas los niños
deben elegir entre itinerarios de ciencias o letras basándose en señales imperfectas so-
bre sus habilidades, como lo son las notas, en un entorno social que presupone que los
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niños son mejores en ciencias y las niñas en letras. Esta elección ha mostrado que es un
determinante importante en la educación futura así como en los logros en el mercado
laboral (Paglin and Rufolo (1990)). Posteriormente, ya en el mercado de trabajo, siguen
existiendo ideas preconcebidas sobre diferencias de género incluso entre aquellos in-
dividuos que tienen una misma formación educativa (ej. toma de decisiones estratégi-
cas; Atwater et al. (2004)). Estas ideas preconcebidas, o estereotipos, se ha comprobado
que están relacionados con cómo hombres y mujeres se ordenan en el mercado de tra-
bajo (Cejka and Eagly (1999); Fernandez and Friedrich (2011); Barbulescu and Bidwell
(2013); Leslie et al. (2015)).
A pesar del impacto que los estereotipos tienen en decisiones del tipo mencionado
arriba en las que la auto-evaluación es la clave, muy poco trabajo se ha desarrollado en
integrar el concepto de estereotipo en el modelaje económico.2 Esta es la contribución
central del capítulo 1: modelar y evaluar los efectos de los estereotipos en situaciones
estratégicas que representen situaciones económicamente relevantes.
Para ello, en la primera parte del capítulo 1, presento un modelo teórico. Éste mod-
elo considera una masa de agentes que, simultáneamente, deben auto-seleccionarse en
uno de entre dos torneos mutuamente excluyentes. Estos torneos son perfectamente
discriminatorios, es decir, los ganadores en un torneo son nombrados únicamente en
base de sus habilidades reales en realizar una tarea y sólo pueden optar al premio
aquellos que deciden participar en ese torneo en concreto. Estos torneos difieren entre
sí en el premio que se otorga a los ganadores: uno paga más que el otro. Sin embargo,
los agentes tienen un conocimiento imperfecto de sí mismos tal que no conocen su ha-
bilidad real en la tarea a desarrollar sino que observan señales informativas (pero no
perfectamente correlacionadas) sobre su habilidad. Por tanto, los agentes realmente
encaran dos problemas distintos. Primero, los agentes deben evaluarse a sí mismos
basándose en la señal observada. Es decir, deben generar creencias sobre cómo de ap-
tos son en la tarea que les ocupa. Segundo, deben afrontar consideraciones estratégicas
pues deben de estimar el comportamiento del resto de agentes para así estimar cómo
de competitivo va a ser cada torneo y, por tanto, la habilidad mínima necesaria para
ganar un premio en cada uno de los torneos.
Los estereotipos son introducidos en el modelo asumiendo que la población entera
puede ser dividida en dos grupos sociales diferenciados (hombres/mujeres, negros/no
negros, . . . ). Unos de estos grupos sociales es objeto de un estereotipo negativo (posi-
tivo), el cuál dice que, en media, los agentes del grupo social estereotipado son menos
2Una notable excepción es la línea iniciada por Akerlof and Kranton (2000). El ensayo desarrollado
en este capítulo 1 se enfoca en el análisis de estereotipos descriptivos, en contra a los normativos los cuales
representan el núcleo delo trabajo de Akerlof and Kranton (2000). La literatura en discriminación estadística
(Phelps (1972); Arrow (1973); Coate and Loury (1993)), cómo en el presente ensayo, también usa la noción
de estereotipos descriptivos. Sin embargo, a diferencia del ensayo que nos ocupa, los estereotipos en
los modelos de discriminación estadística no afecta la evaluación propia sino la evaluación realizada por
terceras personas. En este capítulo de la tesis muestro que la existencia de estereotipos es suficiente para
generar segregación incluso si no hay discriminación de ningún tipo.
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(más) hábiles que los no estereotipados. Esta creencia sobre la existencia de una difer-
encia ex-ante, toma la forma de un desplazamiento en la distribución de habilidades
moviendo su valor medio. Importante, el estereotipo es conocimiento común. Este
supuesto, aunque fuerte, está dado por la propia definición del concepto de estereotipo
y respaldado por hallazgos empíricos en la psicología social (Frome and Eccles (1998);
Furnham and Gasson (1998); Furnham et al. (2002); Petrides et al. (2004); Nosek et al.
(2009))
La existencia de estereotipos en este entorno tiene dos efectos. Primero, afecta al ra-
zonamiento estratégico de todos los agentes al incorporar sus mensajes en sus creencias
(priors) sobre como la habilidad está distribuida en el conjunto de la población. Se-
gundo, y más importante, la existencia de estereotipos genera diferencias en cómo se
encara el problema de conocimiento imperfecto lo que resulta, a través de un proceso
de inferencia Bayesiana, en el surgimiento de auto-estereotipación: una gente estereoti-
pado y uno no estereotipado observando la misma señal sobre su habilidad, diferirán
en la estimación sobre sus habilidades reales en el sentido impuesto por el estereotipo.
Este efecto es altamente consistente con los hallazgos documentados principalmente
en psicología social (Lenney (1977); Chatard et al. (2007)) pero también en economía
(Coffman (2014)).
El modelo concluye que este efecto de auto-estereotipación tiene importantes efec-
tos en cómo los agentes se comportan cuando tienen que elegir en qué torneo competir
y las posibilidades de obtener un premio están determinadas únicamente por su rank-
ing dentro de cada torneo. En esta línea Lazear and Rosen (1981) ya avanzaban que,
“en el mundo real, donde hay población heterogénea, los participantes en el mercado se ordenan
en distintos tipos de torneos. Hay jugadores que se saben de mayor calidad a priori y partici-
parán en torneos con mayores premios en juego” (n. 5).
Cuando el juego Bayesiano descrito arriba es resuelto, las diferencias en auto-evalua-
ción se trasladan en diferencias en las estrategias de equilibrio seguidas por agentes
estereotipados y no estereotipados. En particular, habrá un conjunto de señales para
las cuales los agentes estereotipados y no estereotipados se comportarán de forma dis-
tinta: si el estereotipo es negativo (positivo), para ese conjunto de señales los agentes
estereotipados decidirán participar en el torneo de pagos bajos (altos) mientras que
los no estereotipados lo harán en el de pagos altos (bajos). Si el estereotipo resulta ser
falso –tal que las diferencias en comportamiento no pueden ser justificadas– el mod-
elo predice que existirá un segregación entre torneos que no será óptima, tal que los
agentes que ex-ante son percibidos como mejores estarán sobrerrepresentados en el tor-
neo de pagos altos. Es más, este problema de representatividad se dará tanto a nivel
de participación (quién participa en qué torneo), como a nivel de ganadores de los pre-
mios (en la distribución de premios entre grupos sociales). Una implicación directa de
todo esto es que, en el mundo real, donde muchas decisiones educativas y laborales
implican elegir entre distintos entornos competitivos con distintos pagos potenciales,
distintos grupos sociales se ordenarán en el mercado de forma diferente simplemente
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por la existencia de estereotipos. De particular interés en este aspecto resulta la seg-
regación laboral por sexos, puesto que numerosos estudios muestran que hombres y
mujeres se ordenan de forma muy diferente en el mercado laboral (Fernandez-Mateo
and Fernandez (2016); Card et al. (2016)) y que esta diferencia en el comportamiento
explica una parte substancial de la brecha salarial (Macpherson and Hirsch (1995); Blau
and Kahn (1997); Bertrand and Hallock (2001); Bayard et al. (2003); O’Neill (2003); Lud-
steck (2014)).
La segunda parte de este primer capítulo, está dedicada a testar las implicaciones
del modelo teórico en el laboratorio y, en particular, la existencia de la auto-estereotipa-
ción y de sus efectos sobre el comportamiento. Para ello, hago uso de una tarea de es-
fuerzo real que muestra ser neutral en cuanto al rendimiento de hombres y mujeres,
pero altamente heterogénea en cuanto a las creencias idiosincráticas de los partici-
pantes en el experimento con respecto a si en la tarea lo hacen, en media, mejor los
hombres o las mujeres. La estrategia de identificación pasa primordialmente por ex-
plotar la variación en estas creencias sobre qué género es mejor en la tarea de esfuerzo
real para ver como esas percepciones afectan a la auto-evaluación en la habilidad y en
la decisión de participar en un torneo con pagos altos o en otro con pagos bajos.
El grueso del experimento consiste en lo siguiente. Primero los sujetos realizan
una tarea de esfuerzo real 14 veces sin obtener, en ningún momento, ninguna infor-
mación sobre su rendimiento. Segundo, se le presenta a cada sujeto su puntuación
en una de las 14 repeticiones de la tarea así como un gráfico que muestra cómo se ha
distribuido la puntuación media durante las 14 repeticiones en esa sesión. Basándose
en esa información, los sujetos deben estimar cuál es su puntuación media durante las
14 repeticiones (su habilidad). Tercero, los agentes deben elegir entre participar en el
torneo A, que paga mucho a los ganadores, o en el torneo B, que paga menos. Am-
bos torneos tienen un número limitado de premios. Los premios se otorgan en base
al ranking de habilidades (puntuación media en la tarea de esfuerzo real) dentro de
cada torneo. Cuarto, se elicitan creencias individuales sobre la naturaleza de género
de la tarea: qué género lo ha hecho mejor en media durante la tarea de esfuerzo real y
cuánto mejor.
Los resultados experimentales están en línea con las predicciones del modelo teórico.
Las percepciones que cada sujeto tiene sobre la naturaleza de género de la tarea inicial
afecta directamente a la auto-evaluación: Para aquellos que afirman que la tarea es
neutral en género no hay diferencias en auto-evaluaciones, mientras que entre aquel-
los que afirman que la tarea es femenina (masculina) las mujeres (hombres), para una
misma señal observada, estiman mayores niveles de habilidad que los hombres (mu-
jeres). Si miramos al rol jugado por las percepciones en la elección entre torneos, no
se encuentran diferencias de género en la propensión a elegir el torneo de pagos altos
(A) entre aquellos que dicen que la tarea es neutral en género, pero desviaciones de
esta percepción de neutralidad lleva a la aparición de diferencias de género en la elec-
ción del torneo a participar. Más importante aún, y apoyando el principal canal de la
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auto-estereotipación propuesto por la teoría, estas diferencias en la elección de torneos
pueden ser explicadas por las diferencias en auto-evaluación. Por último, los resulta-
dos también muestran que estas diferencias en auto-evaluación tienen efectos directos
en la probabilidad de ganar el premio alto.
CAPÍTULO 2: WOMEN ASK FOR LESS (ONLY FROM MEN): EVIDENCE FROM
ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING IN THE FIELD
Aunque la brecha salarial entre hombres y mujeres ha sido un importante objeto de
estudio en economía, las aproximaciones clásicas al problema no han sido capaces de
explicarla satisfactoriamente (Blau and Kahn (2000)).
Las diferencias de género en negociación han sido planteadas como una alternativa.
Los salarios iniciales son, en muchos casos, el producto de negociaciones bilaterales. El
influencial libro de Linda Babcock y Sara Laschever “Women don’t Ask: Negotiation
and the gender divide" revela importantes diferencias de género en la propensión a
negociar. Un estudio mencionado en este libro indica que entre los graduados de la
Carnegie Mellon University, el 57% de los hombres negociaron sus salarios iniciales
mientras que entre las mujeres esta cifra caía al 8%. Además, los salarios también se
ven afectados por negociaciones que se van produciendo a lo largo de la vida laboral,
ej. incrementos salariales. Si las mujeres son menos propensas a negociar sus salarios,
esto iría claramente en el sentido de explicar la brecha salarial (Azmat and Petrongolo
(2014); Card et al. (2016)).
Un concurso de televisión nos proporciona una oportunidad única de observar los
resultados de negociaciones en una situación real con importantes pagos en juego. En
el concurso (Negocia como puedas, emitido en Cuatro durante el verano del 2013), se
le hace una pregunta al concursante (Proponente) y se le da una cantidad de dinero
que puede variar entre 100 euros y 1600 euros. Sin embargo, éste no puede dar una
respuesta a la pregunta directamente, sino que tiene tres minutos para encontrar a al-
guien que de la respuesta por él (Respondedor) y negociar un precio para esta respuesta
a través de una negociación de ofertas alternativas. En una ronda de negociación
típica, el proponente hace una oferta inicial, la cuál puede ser aceptada o rechazada
por el respondedor. Si el respondedor rechaza la oferta, entonces puede hacer una
demanda la cual puede ser aceptada o rechazada por el proponente. La negociación
puede alargarse cualquier número de rondas dentro del límite de los tres minutos. Si
la respuesta proporcionada por el respondedor es correcta, entonces la división del
dinero acordada en la negociación se lleva a cabo.
En este capítulo estudiamos tanto diferencias de género tanto efectos de interacción
de género en la negociación tanto en el resultado final obtenido, cómo en el compor-
tamiento durante la negociación.
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Con respecto a los resultados obtenidos de la negociación, encontramos que las
negociaciones entre un hombre proponente y una mujer respondedora es el único em-
parejamiento que se diferencia del resto de posibles emparejamientos: son el empare-
jamiento en el que el proponente obtiene mayores ganancias y en el que el responde-
dor obtiene menores ganancias. El resto de emparejamientos posibles (hombre con
hombre, mujer con mujer y mujer proponente con hombre respondedor), son indistin-
guibles entre sí. Al explicar los detalles de nuestro entorno de negociación, argumenta-
mos que los proponentes tienen una posición más fuerte que los respondedores, pues
pueden romper la negociación unilateralmente (empoderamiento), tienen más dere-
chos morales sobre el dinero a repartir (legitimidad), y sólo ellos conocen la cantidad
total de dinero disponible (información). En ese sentido, es precisamente cuando los
hombres ocupan la parte fuerte y las mujeres la débil que los hombres terminan con
mayores resultados de negociación.
Para entender estos efectos de interacción de género en los resultados de la nego-
ciación, miramos a los efectos de interacción de género en el comportamiento durante
la negociación. Analizamos ofertas de los proponentes, demandas de los responde-
dores, y las probabilidades de aceptar ofertas y demandas. No encontramos difer-
encias en las ofertas iniciales ni en las ofertas subsecuentes realizadas por hombres y
mujeres proponentes. Tampoco encontramos que hombres y mujeres respondedores
difieran en las ofertas recibidas. Más interesante, encontramos que son las mujeres las
que discriminan entre hombres y mujeres proponentes, lo cual explica por qué el em-
parejamiento entre un hombre proponente y una mujer respondedora da lugar a las
mayores ganancias para los proponentes. No es el caso de que los hombres ofrezcan
menos a las mujeres, sino que las mujeres demandan menos a los hombres cuando el
hombre ocupa la posición fuerte de la negociación.
Nuestros datos ofrecen múltiples ventajas sobre los experimentos de laboratorio
típicos en dónde también se han estudiado los efectos del género en la negociación
(por ejemplo, Eckel and Grossman (2001); Solnick (2001); Rigdon (2012); Andersen
et al. (2013); Dittrich et al. (2014); Exley et al. (2016)). Primero, el total de dinero sobre
el que se negocia es, de media, 345 euros lo que es muy superior a lo que típicamente
está en juego en un experimento de laboratorio. Segundo, excepto por el límite de los
tres minutos, la negociación no está estructurada y es libre, lo que acerca el marco a
una situación real. Nuestros datos también aportan ventajas sobre los experimentos
de campo típicos (por ejemplo Ayres (1991); Ayres and Siegelman (1995); Castillo et al.
(2013); Leibbrandt and List (2014)). Primero, todo el proceso queda grabado, por lo que
podemos estudiar el comportamiento de los sujetos y no limitarnos exclusivamente a
analizar los resultados finales. Segundo, tenemos una alta variación en los roles de
proponentes y respondedores lo que nos permite mirar no sólo efectos de género, sino
también efectos de interacción de género.
Sin embargo, la naturaleza de nuestros datos también presenta ciertos problemas.
En primer lugar, los individuos estudiados podrían no ser del todo representativos en
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cuanto están dispuestos a participar en un programa de televisión. Además, existe
la posibilidad de encontrar un efecto audiencia por el cuál el comportamiento podría
verse afectado. Estas dos limitaciones sin embargo, son comunes a todos aquellos es-
tudios que utilizan datos provenientes de programas de televisión (List (2006); Post
et al. (2008); van Dolder et al. (2015)).
A grandes rasgos, nuestros resultados están en línea con la literatura que encuen-
tra que las mujeres demanda menos y se les ofrece menos (a través del efecto de las
demandas sobre siguientes ofertas). Además, el trabajo añade tres contribuciones im-
portantes. Primero corrobora que las interacciones de género son cruciales para explica
las diferencias de género. Segundo, el trabajo ofrece evidencias basadas en datos de ne-
gociaciones no estructuradas recogidos en el campo con pagos importantes en juego,
complementando los resultados hallados anteriormente en el laboratorio. Por último,
mostramos que el elemento del comportamiento clave en las diferencias de resultados
en las negociaciones no radica en la propuestas iniciales de los proponentes, sino en
las demandas de los respondedores. En otras palabras, no encontramos signos de un
comportamiento discriminatorio en ofertas. Son las mujeres quienes demandas menos
a los proponentes hombres.
CAPÍTULO 3: THE ROLE OF GENDER AND ASYMMETRIES IN ALTERNATING-
OFFER BARGAINS
En el tercer capítulo, inspirados por los resultados en el capítulo 2, profundizamos
en el tema de diferencias de género y efectos de interacción de género en las nego-
ciaciones. En particular, dado que el entorno en el que se desarrolla el programa de
televisión presentado en el capítulo 2 está caracterizado por fuertes asimetrías entre
el rol de proponente y el de respondedor en empoderamiento, legitimidad, e infor-
mación y que los resultados hallados claramente muestran que los efectos de género
están interconectados con los roles asumidos, en este capítulo nos preguntamos si la
existencia de distintas fuentes de asimetría tienen impacto sobre la aparición de efectos
de género y/o interacciones de género. Nótese que la mayoría de las situaciones reales
de negociación están caracterizadas por la existencia de algún tipo de asimetría de las
mentadas anteriormente. Por tanto, creemos que el efecto de las asimetrías merecen
atención per se.
Para ello, llevamos a cabo un experimento de laboratorio. En él, usamos primero
como control un entorno de negociación simétrico en dónde los roles tienen la misma
fuerza tal que un reparto del dinero 50:50 es esperable, y en dónde no esperamos en-
contrar ni efectos de género ni interacciones. A continuación introducimos asimetrías,
haciendo un rol (proponente) más fuerte que el otro (respondedor). Hombres y mujeres
son, ex-ante, igualmente probables de ser asignados el rol de proponente o el de re-
spondedor. Es de esperar que la introducción de asimetrías rompa con el reparto
igualitario del 50:50, otorgando mayores beneficios al proponente. Estudiamos, de
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forma separada, tres tipos de asimetrías: empoderamiento (sólo el proponente tiene
un dinero garantizado si la negociación fracasa), legitimidad (el proponente tiene un
mayor derecho moral hacia la cantidad a repartir), e información (sólo el proponente
conoce el total de dinero a repartir). En estas cuatro situaciones estudiamos tanto el
resultado final de la negociación (la probabilidad de llegar aun acuerdo, el tiempo que
toma llegar a un acuerdo, y la división del dinero) como el comportamiento durante la
negociación (ofertas y demandas).
El experimento consiste de tres partes principales. Primero los sujetos deben re-
alizar una tarea de esfuerzo real, a través de la cuál obtienen una productividad. En
la segunda parte, los sujetos son emparejados aleatoriamente de dos en dos y tienen
tres minutos para llegar a un acuerdo en cómo repartir una cantidad de dinero que
está determinada por sus productividades en la parte anterior. Esta parte consiste en
10 períodos en los que se empareja, cada vez, con un participante distinto. En la úl-
tima parte del experimento, elicitamos creencias individuales con respecto a sus auto-
evaluaciones en la tarea de la primera parte y en sus habilidades negociadoras, así
como sus preferencias sociales y de riesgo.
En el tratamiento simétrico, como esperábamos, el reparto del 50:50 es la norma.
Asimismo, no encontramos diferencias de género ni efectos de interacción. Sin em-
bargo, cuando se introducen asimetrías encontramos tanto efectos de género como
efectos de interacción de género. Cuando el proponente está empoderado, en el rol
de respondedor los hombres obtienen menos que las mujeres (6 puntos porcentuales
menos), lo que es explicado por que los hombres respondedores reciben ofertas ini-
ciales menores. Esta es la única excepción, pues en el resto de tratamientos asimétri-
cos, las mujeres obtienen en media peores resultados. Cuando el proponente tiene
una mayor legitimidad, los hombres obtienen mejores resultados en ambos roles que
las mujeres (4 y 6 puntos porcentuales para proponentes y respondedores respectiva-
mente). Esto se explica por el hecho de que los hombres tienden a ofrecer menos y
a demandar más que las mujeres. Cuando el proponente tiene más información que
el respondedor, en línea con los resultados del capítulo 2, los proponentes hombres
negociando con mujeres respondedoras obtienen mejores resultados que en cualquier
otro tipo de emparejamiento (alrededor de 6 puntos porcentuales más), mostrando
que las interacciones de género en este caso son importantes. Este hecho, y de nuevo
en línea con los hallazgos en el capítulo 2, es explicado por el lado de las demandas,
puesto que son las mujeres respondedoras las que demandan menos a los hombres que
a otras mujeres. Muy interesante es el resultado de que todos estos efectos de género
e interacciones de género están presentes de una forma importante sólo en la primera
parte del experimento (primeros 5 períodos) pero desaparecen en su segunda parte (5
últimos períodos), de forma que cuando se consideran todos los períodos conjunta-
mente los efectos encontrados son mucho más débiles.
También es interesante, dados los 3 minutos de límite que tienen los sujetos para
cerrar un acuerdo, que encontramos un “deadline effect” muy importante, por el cuál
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casi el 25% de las negociaciones exitosas se cierran en los últimos 10 segundos. Esto
es consistente con los resultados típicamente reportados en este tipo de experimentos
(Roth et al. (1988) y Gneezy et al. (2003)). Además de mostrar su existencia, también
mostramos que aquellos acuerdos cerrados en los últimos 10 segundos (ultimatums)
son sistemáticamente diferentes de los demás acuerdos (acuerdos amigables).
Este trabajo por tanto ofrece tres contribuciones principales. Primero, es el primer
estudio que aborda los distintos tipos de asimetrías y los conecta con la existencia de
diferencias de género. Esto es importante pues la mayoría de los estudios realizados
incluyen uno o más tipos de asimetrías y, en muchas ocasiones, se confunden entre
ellos. Este trabajo pues, aísla cada una de las tres fuentes de asimetría para evaluar,
de forma separada, diferencias de género y efectos de interacciones en cada uno de
los casos. Los resultados señalan que la existencia y naturaleza de asimetrías en nego-
ciaciones no es irrelevante en este aspecto. Segundo, con este experimento podemos
estudiar en un entorno controlado, no sólo el resultado final de las negociaciones, sino
también el comportamiento durante la negociación. Tercero, los estudios que pueden
examinar efectos de interacción además de diferencias de género son escasos. Nuestro
estudio utiliza avatares del género del participante con el objetivo de poder separar
diferencias de género de los efectos de interacción.

Chapter 1
Stereotypes and Tournament
Self-Selection: A Theoretical and
Experimental Approach
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Social psychologists have shown that stereotypes play an important anchoring role
in interpreting private performance feedback and shaping beliefs about own abilities
(see Lenney (1977); Beyer (1990); Beyer and Bowden (1997); Pomerantz et al. (2002);
Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003)). The Oxford dictionary defines “stereotype” as “a
widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing”.
The journalist Walter Lippmann –who first coined the term “stereotype” in its modern
usage– captures the idea of stereotypes as reference points in his influential book Public
Opinion (1922) when he states that
“The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and main-
tain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We
imagine most things before we experience them”.
In an uncertain world, assessing one’s own ability is a key step in decisions pro-
cesses regarding educational and labor market choices, which are important settings
for study in Economics. From early ages, children choose between arts and science
itineraries based on imperfect signals, such as grades, under a social environment
that presupposes that boys are better at math and girls at arts. This choice has been
shown to be an important determinant in their later educational and labor market at-
tainments (Paglin and Rufolo (1990)). Later, in the labor market, preconceived gender
differences in skills still exist even among individuals who choose the same degree or
field (e.g. strategic decision-making; Atwater et al. (2004)). These have been shown
to be related to observed gender differences in sorting in the labor market (Cejka and
Eagly (1999); Fernandez and Friedrich (2011); Barbulescu and Bidwell (2013); Leslie
et al. (2015)). Despite the impact that stereotypes have on decisions of this type in
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which self-assessment is the key, little work has been done on integrating the concept
of stereotypes into the economic modeling.1 This is the central research question ad-
dressed in this paper.
We study how stereotypes affect self-selection into a high paying or a low paying
tournament. First, a game theoretical model is presented in which different effects of
stereotypes can be identified. Second, we move the setting of the theoretical model
into the laboratory in order to test its validity.
The theoretical model considers a mass of agents who have to simultaneously self-
select into one of two perfectly discriminatory tournaments, such that winners are
named based on their true ability at performing a particular task. These tournaments
differ in the prizes that they award: One pays more than (and is therefore preferred
to) the other.2 Agents suffer from imperfect self-knowledge as they do not know their
own real abilities but observe informative signals about them. Agents face two differ-
ent problems. First, agents have to cope with imperfect self-knowledge by assessing
their (subjective) probability distribution of abilities based on their privately observed
signals. Second, they face a strategic situation in which they must forecast others’ be-
havior to maximize the expected return on their participation decision.
Stereotypes are introduced in the model by assuming that the whole population is
split into two different social groups. One social group is targeted by a stereotype (pos-
itive or negative), which states that, on average, the stereotyped group is better/worse
than the non stereotyped one. This ex-ante difference takes the form of a displacement
of the ability distribution by shifting its mean. Importantly, the stereotype is common
knowledge. This assumption, although strong, is given by definition and supported
by empirical findings in social psychology.3
1A notable exception is the work begun by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Our paper focuses on the
analysis of descriptive stereotypes as opposed to normative ones which are at the core of identity economics.
This distinction is crucial. Descriptive stereotypes simply describe how different a social group is, but
normative stereotypes dictate how a particular social group should behave. Statistical discrimination, as in
our paper, also uses descriptive stereotypes. However, in contrast to our paper, stereotypes in statistical
discrimination do not affect own ability assessments but assessment of other individuals’ abilities. Our
approach shows that the existence of stereotypes suffices to generate segregation even in the absent of
discrimination of any kind.
2The setting presented here is based on Morgan et al. (in press). Important differences must be noted.
In the present model, in contrast to Morgan et al. (in press), agents are ignorant of their real abilities but
instead observe a signal. Also, we only consider the case in which the total number of vacancies is enough
to allocate the entire population. More importantly, guided by our research question, we consider de facto
two ex-ante different groups.
3For example, psychologists have found that both fathers and mothers consistently attribute higher
IQs to their sons than to their daughters (Furnham and Gasson (1998); Furnham et al. (2002)). It has also
been shown that people attribute higher IQs to their fathers than to their mothers (Petrides et al. (2004)).
In other areas, such as mathematics, there is also evidence that stereotypes are widely held (Frome and
Eccles (1998); Nosek et al. (2009)). Finally, it should also be noted that stereotypes are part of our cultural
inheritance, so it is not that hard to assume that everyone at least has some knowledge of their existence.
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The existence of stereotypes has two effects. First, affects the strategic reasoning
of all agents when incorporating their messages into their beliefs as to how abilities
are distributed across the whole population. Second, and more importantly, the ex-
istence of stereotypes generates differences in how agents cope with imperfect self-
knowledge which will result, through a Bayesian updating process, in the appearance
of self-stereotyping: a stereotyped and a non stereotyped agent observing the same abil-
ity signal will differ in the estimation of their abilities and that difference will be in
accordance with the stereotype. Consistent with this self-stereotyping mechanism, so-
cial psychologists have found important interactions between gender differences in
self-assessment and stereotypical perceptions of tasks (see Lenney (1977) for an early
review). Chatard et al. (2007) show that when asked to recall past grades in mathe-
matics and arts girls and boys overestimate or underestimate them in a way consis-
tent with existing stereotypes. Interestingly, the size of this effect is moderated by the
degree of endorsement of the stereotype. In economics, experimental studies have
also shown the importance of self-assessment of own abilities in decision-making. For
example, Coffman (2014) shows that when individuals are asked general knowledge
questions they display different degrees of confidence in their answers depending on
how gender-congruent the topic is, leading to inefficiencies in cooperative settings.
Gender differences in self-assessment have also been shown to be important in ex-
plaining gender differences when choosing between competitive and alternative pay-
ment schemes (Niederle and Vesterlund (2007); Dohmen and Falk (2011); Kamas and
Preston (2012)). Related to this, stereotypical perceptions behind tasks and cultural
differences have also proved to be important factors (Gneezy et al. (2009); Booth and
Nolen (2012); Shurchkov (2012); Dreber et al. (2014); Grosse et al. (2014)). The theoreti-
cal model proposed here provides an explanation for the findings in social psychology
and economics by explicitly modeling the interaction between existing stereotypes and
self-assessment.
After agents have estimated their own ability in light of their signal and the exist-
ing stereotype they choose between the high and low paying tournaments, where the
probability of succeeding in a given tournament is determined not only by own abil-
ity but also by the abilities of other competitors. This leads us to consider choices in
the context of rank-order tournaments. As noted by Lazear and Rosen (1981), “in the
real world, where there is population heterogeneity, market participants are sorted into different
contests. There players (and horses, for that matter) who are known to be of higher quality ex
ante may play in games with higher stakes” (n. 5).
When the game is solved the differences in self-assessment will generate differ-
ences in the signal-based equilibrium strategies followed by stereotyped and non stereo-
typed agents. In particular, there will be a set of signals for which stereotyped and non
stereotyped agents behave differently. If the stereotype is false –such that no behav-
ioral differences are justified– the model predicts that a non optimal group segregation
between tournaments will arise, such that the group assumed to be ex-ante better will
be overrepresented in the high paying tournament. Furthermore, this participation
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gap will be transferred to the set of winners. One straightforward implication of these
predictions is that in the real world, where many educational and labor choices in-
volve choosing between different competitive environments, social groups will sort
differently just because of the existence of stereotypes. Of special interest on this re-
gard is gender-based labor segregation, as several researches point out that men and
women sort into the market in very different ways. For example, Fernandez-Mateo and
Fernandez (2016) find that supply forces are crucial factors in explaining the low pro-
portion of women in top managerial jobs, providing evidences for “women self-steering
away from the active pursuit of top management jobs”. Related to this, Card et al. (2016) find
that women are less likely to work in firms offering higher wages to either gender than
comparable men. Similar results linking gender-based segregation with labor outcome
can be found in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995); Blau and Kahn (1997); Bertrand and
Hallock (2001); Bayard et al. (2003); O’Neill (2003); Ludsteck (2014). Understanding the
mechanisms through which stereotypes affect decisions about where to compete could
shed light on the problem of educational and labor segregation, especially the gender-
based segregation which is at the heart of the gender wage gap.4
In order to empirically test the implications of the theory, a lab experiment was
run in which the theoretical setting was transferred to the lab. Note that the model
predicts that there are two mechanisms through which stereotypes affect behavior:
self-stereotyping and beliefs about the distribution of abilities over the whole popula-
tion. However self-stereotyping is the crucial mechanism, so the experiment focuses
exclusively on it. In the experiment, we make use of a novel task that proves to be
gender neutral in performance but highly heterogeneous regarding the idiosyncratic
beliefs about its gender nature. We exploit this heterogeneity in beliefs to see how
those affect estimates of abilities and subsequent choices in self-selection into tourna-
ments. Note however that individually (and not commonly) held perceptions are the
only important aspect of stereotypes for identifying the self-stereotyping mechanism.
In the experiment we therefore refer to perceptions and stereotypes interchangeably as
they play the same role.
The bulk of the experiment consists of the following. First, subjects perform a real
effort task 14 times consisting of the following: subjects see a picture of a glass with
certain quantity of water in it for three seconds. After that time the picture disappears
and a picture of an empty glass appears in which they have to indicate the level of
water shown in the first picture. This task, which is novel in the literature, proves to
be simple to understand, gender neutral in performance, and without no clear nature
as to the ability required to perform it well, favoring the existence of heterogeneity as
to its gender nature. Second, subjects observe their score in one randomly chosen rep-
etition, which is their only feedback about their performance, and the distribution of
4In addition to a pure normative motivation concerned with fairness, recent studies have shown that
gender-based segregation has important effects at the aggregate level. In particular, a recent study by
Hsieh et al. (2013) estimates that between 16% and 20% of the growth that took place in the US between
1960 and 2008 can be attributed to a change in the labor market sorting of blacks and women.
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average scores in that session. Based on this information, they are asked to estimate
their average score over the 14 repetitions. This represents the self-assessment stage
of the theoretical model. Third, subjects face a decision matrix in which they have
to choose between two options (tournaments) –A and B– under different situations.
Those situations vary in regard to how many prizes each option offers and to the rel-
ative sizes of the prizes. In all situations, option A offers the highest prize and the
sum of prizes offered by option A and option B is equal to the number of participants
in that session. Fourth, after the main tournament decision part, beliefs about which
gender performs better at the real effort task are elicited. Designing the experiment in
this way enables us to link the perceived gender nature of the task with differences in
self-assessment and in tournament choices.
The experimental results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model.
The perceptions held by subjects about the gender nature of the task directly affect self-
assessment: for those who state that the task is gender neutral no gender differences on
self-assessment are detected, while for those who state that the task favors one gender
a self-assessment gap appears which is consistent with the stated perceptions. When
looking at the role played by perceptions as to the gender nature of the real effort task
when choosing between tournaments, no gender differences in the likelihood of choos-
ing the high paying tournament (A) are found among those who state that the task is
gender neutral, but deviations from gender neutrality in perceptions lead to gender
gaps in tournament choices. More importantly, supporting the main self-assessment
mechanism proposed by the theory, these differences in tournament choices can be ex-
plained by differences in self-assessment. Finally, we show that these differences in
self-assessment and tournament choices are passed on to the set of winners.
Two related strands of literature must be mentioned. First, Bordalo et al. (in press)
proposes a rationalization of the existence of stereotypes and their persistence over
time. By contrast, we take stereotypes as given and inherent to the social environ-
ment, and study their effect on individual decision-making. Second, Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) study gender difference in choosing between a tournament and a
piece-rate scheme. Our paper, by contrast, studies how stereotypical societal traits af-
fect agents’ decisions about where to compete. In addition, the setting used by Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) has no strategic component, but our setting does.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
model: Subsection 2.1 characterizes the equilibrium and subsection 2.2 analyzes the
equilibrium prediction in order to identify the effects of stereotypes on segregation,
and establishes our main hypotheses for experimental testing. Section 3 is devoted
to the experiment: Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 detail the design of the experiment and
5Another important difference with respect to the experimental setting used by Niederle and Vester-
lund (2007) is that agents have to perform the task after choosing the payment scheme, i.e. there is com-
petition on performance, while in our setting competition consists of submitting the completed real-effort
task to the high or low paying tournament.
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introduce basic descriptive analyses. Subsection 3.3 analyzes the experimental data in
depth. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 A MODEL OF SELF-SELECTION WITH STEREOTYPES
Consider a continuum of risk neutral agents of mass 1 (a cohort).6 Each agent is en-
dowed with ability at a task denoted by a.
The cohort is split into two different social groups {S,N}. The cohort consists of a
mass λ of S-agents and a mass 1 − λ of N -agents. Assume that there is a stereotype
about social group S which holds that the distribution of abilities of social group S
is equal to that of social group N except for a shift in the mean. If the stereotype is
positive (negative), the shift is positive (negative). In particular we assume that, with
MN > 0 being the average ability for social group N , according to the stereotype the
mean ability for social group S is MS = (1 + α)MN , where the parameter α captures
the strength and direction of the stereotype. We restrict our attention to the case in
which α 6= 0, as having α = 0 means de facto that there are no stereotypes. Therefore, a
negative stereotype is modeled through α ∈ [−1, 0), while a positive one is consistent
with α ∈ (0,∞). The stereotype is common knowledge.
Let the distribution for social group N be distributed as (a˜|N) ∼ N (MN , σ2a) with
associated CDF and PDF, FN (.) and fN (.), respectively. Thus, according to the stereo-
type, abilities in social group S are supposedly distributed as (a˜|S) ∼ N (MS , σ2a)
whose CDF and PDF are represented by the functions FS(.) and fS(.), respectively.
It is immediately evident that the existence of the stereotype translates into a first or-
der stochastic dominance for the distribution of abilities such that if the stereotype is
negative then FS(a) > FN (a), ∀a, and the other way around if the stereotype is posi-
tive.
There are two perfectly discriminating and mutually exclusive tournaments, t ∈
{A,B}.7 Tournament t awards a prize Wt ≥ 0 to, at most, a mass δt < 1 of those
participants with the greatest abilities. Note that the assumption about tournaments
naming their winners based on abilities saves us from any effort-related consideration.
Two final assumptions are considered. First δA + δB ≥ 1, which means that there is
no scarcity of prizes, i.e. if coordination occurs everyone could get a prize. Second,
without loss of generality, tournament A is more attractive than B, i.e. WA > WB .
6The assumption of risk neutrality plays no role in the model’s conclusions but it is made for the sake of
clarity. In particular all the results in subsection 1.2.2 remain qualitatively the same under (homogeneous)
non-neutral risk preferences.
7We could alternatively assume that tournaments are not perfectly discriminating but there is noise in
measuring the real ability of agents. Given the characterization of the equilibria (proposition 1.2.1) this
would not change the results. This change would just imply a common, higher degree of uncertainty. In
particular, it would imply that the self-assessed probability of winning has greater variance which would
not bring any additional insight under the risk neutrality assumption.
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In this setting, agents have to self-select into one of the two tournaments. However,
agents make this choice under imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities. In particu-
lar, agents are ignorant of their real abilities, but instead they observe a noisy signal
about them, ri, which is given by the following expression:
ri = ai + µi
where ai is the real ability with which the agent is endowed and µi is a realization
of a random shock distributed as a zero-mean normal with variance σ2µ which is i.i.d.
across agents and abilities. Let Φ(.) and φ(.) denote the CDF and PDF of this random
shock. When interpreting received signals, agents therefore have two thoughts: How
good am I? and how (un)lucky have I been?.8
Note that once the agent observes ri, there is an infinite sequence of pairs of abilities
and shocks compatible with that signal, given by the set Lri = {(a, µ) : ri = a + µ}.
Given the distributional assumptions, an agent from social group g ∈ {S,N} receiving
a signal of his/her ability of ri can set a probability distribution for his/her abilities.9
Therefore, agents will compute the conditional distribution of a given ri given by
(a|ri, F g) ∼ N
(
(1− γ)Mg + γri, (1− γ)σ2a
)
(1.1)
with γ = σ2a/(σ2a + σ2µ). This expression simply represents a Bayesian updating pro-
cess which actually depends on the agent’s social group through the distributional as-
sumptions (the prior) that are assumed to apply, F g. The extent to which the updated
distribution of beliefs will differ from the prior distribution depends on the quality of
the signal, which is captured by the parameter γ: if the signal is very noisy (i.e. is not
informative, large σ2µ) the updating will have a very low impact and the updated mean
and the updated variance will be very close to the one of the prior.10
Denote by Fˆ (a|ri, F g) and fˆ(a|ri, F g) the CDF and PDF of this updated distribution
of beliefs over abilities. Notice that Fˆ (a|ri, F g) accounts for the subjective probability
that an agent from social group g ∈ {S,N} observing signal ri attaches to the event
of having a real ability lower than or equal to some level a. It is easy to see that if the
8For example, consider a student observing his/her grade in Mathematics. One observation –or any fi-
nite sequence of observations– cannot account perfectly for real ability in Mathematics, although it surely
conveys valuable information about it. It may be the case that the student was lucky that day (and was
asked what he/she knew most about) or had an especially bright day. Thus, the student, who is aware
that there are factors outside his/her control, cannot say with certainty whether that A+ in Mathematics
is representative of his/her real ability or is just the product of a positive shock.
9The exceptions are given by the degenerate cases in which σ2a → 0 or σ2µ → 0, in which agents know
their real abilities with probability one.
10This estimation process yields that agents observing r ≷ Mg will estimate E(a|r, F g) ≶ r. This
is implied by the fact that agents observing high (low) signals undervalue (overvalue) their abilities by
attaching the signal to having had good (bad) luck. This is consistent with the impostor effect (see Clance
and Imes (1978)) and the Dunning–Kruger effect (see Kruger and Dunning (1999)).
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stereotype is negative (α < 0), Fˆ (a|ri, FS) > Fˆ (a|ri, FN ) ∀a, ri, i.e. an S-agent observ-
ing signal ri will estimate a higher likelihood of having a real ability below a given level
than an N -agent observing the same signal. This Bayesian updating process thus ends
up with S-agents self-stereotyping themselves by transferring the prevailing stereotype
from their social group to their self-assessment.11 Obviously, the opposite occurs if the
stereotype is positive.
1.2.1 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
The setting described represents a Bayesian game. Formal definitions including the
derivation of generic expected utilities are given in Appendix A.1.1. The equilibrium is
characterized by a strategy profile that maps types (signal×social group) into actions,
such that no agent has an individual incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy
given the common prior (beliefs) and type.12
Proposition 1.2.1. Given the competitive environment defined by the tuple
(WA,WB, δA, δB, F
N (.),Φ(.), λ, α) the equilibrium of the game is represented by a tuple
(aα, rαN , r
α
S), such that all agents from social group g ∈ {S,N} who observes a signal higher
(lower) than a threshold signal rαg choose to participate in tournament A (B). The tuple
(aα, rαN , r
α
S) must hold simultaneously
1.
∫∞
aα λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]fS(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]fN (y)dy = δA
2. 1− Fˆ (aα|rαg , F g) = WBWA , ∀g ∈ {S,N}
The above proposition formally characterizes the equilibria (a formal derivation
can be found in Appendix A.1.2). The first condition represents a “prize clearing con-
dition” for tournament A that can be interpreted as follows: Given the behavior rule
summarized by the pair (rαN , r
α
S), the mass of prizes of tournament A should be cleared,
given the beliefs, by those who self-select into tournament A who have real abilities
higher than aα. Importantly, notice that this real ability threshold is estimated to be the
same for both social groups, leading them to coincide in the perceived competitiveness
of tournamentA. Interestingly, the more negative (positive) the stereotype is, the lower
(higher) the required believed standard aα is, i.e. ∂aα/∂α > 0. In other words, the ex-
istence of negative (positive) stereotypes has an encouragement (deterrent) effect that
applies to all agents by making them believe that the overall degree of competition is
lower (higher).
It is also worth commenting that the first condition implies that tournament A is
going to be overcrowded while tournament B shows vacancies, leading to an ineffi-
cient outcome. This is because, given imperfect self-knowledge, the probability of an
11This seems consistent with evidence of stereotype threat. Although this concept has been mostly stud-
ied as affecting performance directly, there is some research which shows that it can also affect expecta-
tions and ultimately choices (see for example Davies et al. (2002) or Davies et al. (2005)).
12It is important to note that the common knowledge assumption of the stereotype is crucial for the
equilibrium solution but not for the self-stereotyping in the self-assessment process.
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agent from social group g ∈ {S,N} with real ability a getting a signal higher than the
required ability threshold rαg , and thus participating in tournament A, is
Prob(r > rαg |a) = Prob(a+ µ > rαg ) = 1− Φ(rαg − a)
On the one hand, this means that not everyone with abilities higher than the believed
real ability threshold, aα, is going to self-select into tournament A, although the proba-
bility increases with the real ability of each agent. On the other hand, this also implies
that some low-ability agents self-select into the high-paying tournament, mistakenly
believing that they are high-skilled. These two effects –crowding out of high-skilled
agents and crowding in of low ones– result in over-entry in tournament A.13 Implic-
itly from the over-entry in tournament A, agents expect a mass strictly lower than δB
entering tournament B with the expectation of getting WB with probability one.14
The second condition of the proposition defines marginal types: Given the believed
real ability threshold needed to win the prize in tournament A (aα), there is a sig-
nal level for each social group that makes agents indifferent between the two tourna-
ments. Notice that within each social group the expected returns from tournament A
are strictly increasing on the signal, while the expected returns from tournament B are
constant. The signal level rαg thus works as a cutoff point, where agents from social
group g ∈ {S,N} observing ri < rαg self-select into tournament B, and agents observ-
ing ri > rαg choose tournament A.15
Importantly, proposition 1.2.1 implicitly establishes the existence of a mapping
from real ability thresholds to signal thresholds and vice versa, enabling us to check
that a unique equilibrium always exists (see Appendix A.1.3 for the proof).
Proposition 1.2.2. There is a real ability threshold signal level, aα, such that its uniquely
induced behavioral rules, rS(aα), rN (aα), induce simultaneously aα as a real ability threshold,
i.e.
a(rN (a
α), rS(a
α)) = aα
Moreover, given the properties of the mappings a : (rN , rS) → a and rg : a → r stated in
lemmas A.1.1 and A.1.2, this element aα exists and is uniquely determined given the setting
(WA,WB, δA, δB, F
N (.),Φ(.), λ, α) in which the game takes place.
Having characterized the equilibrium and shown its existence, we can now ana-
lyze the resulting equilibrium strategy profiles for addressing the particular effects of
13This result is closely related to the experimental findings in Camerer and Lovallo (1999). The model
predicts that agents self-select into the risky activity even when they expect that there will not be prizes
for everyone.
14This implies that the equilibrium displayed is robust for some environments in which δA + δB < 1.
In particular the lower bound for δB in order to maintain the structure of the equilibria described above
is
∫∞
−∞ λΦ(r
α
S − y)fS(y) + (1 − λ)Φ(rαN − y)fN (y)dy, which is clearly lower than 1 − δA. This extreme
case corresponds to the case in which all slots in tournament B are filled at equilibrium.
15Agents observing exactly this threshold signal are indifferent between the two tournaments but they
represent a mass of measure 0.
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stereotypes on behavior. From the characterization of the equilibrium in proposition
1.2.1 it should be clear that the cutoff strategy is different for each social group. Given
that the real ability threshold for winning the prize in tournament A is common to
both types of agents –as both types perceive the same overall distribution of abilities–
and given that imperfect self-knowledge generates self-stereotyping, the agent defined
as marginal for each social group will necessarily observe different signals. In other
words, the minimum signal required for S-agents differs from the one required by N -
agents, generating behavioral differences between social groups based on signals.
The characterization of the equilibria in proposition 1.2.1 further implies that
Fˆ (aα|rαS , FS) = Fˆ (aα|rαN , FN ). Additionally, the signal is perceived to be equally in-
formative for both groups (same γ). These two features mean that
fˆ(a|rαS , FS) = fˆ(a|rαN , FN ),∀a
so the threshold signals for the two social groups are belief-equivalent. In words, the
marginal S-agent entering tournament A and the marginal N -agent entering tourna-
ment A hold exactly the same beliefs about the distribution of their abilities.
Corollary 1.2.3. For any environment (WA,WB, δA, δB, FN (.),Φ(.), λ, α) the equilibrium
signal thresholds are related such that
rαS = r
α
N − αMN
[
(1− γ)
γ
]
This implies that under the existence of a negative (positive) stereotype, the social group tar-
get of the stereotype requires that higher (lower) signals be observed in order to participate in
tournament A.
This corollary summarizes the effect of self-stereotyping on determining signal-based
behavioral differences between social groups. In order for an S-agent to hold the same
beliefs about his/her ability as an N -agent observing a signal r, he/she needs to ob-
serve a signal r − αMN [(1 − γ)/γ], which means in essence that S-agents are self-
stereotyping. Therefore, since this also applies to marginal agents, there is a set of
signals for which the behavior of N -agents and S-agents will differ, even though all
agents agree on the minimum ability required to win the prize in tournament A.16
Corollary 1.2.3 sheds light on the factors that influence asymmetry into the be-
havior of the two social groups. First, if the stereotype is very strong (large |α|) the
16This is very important when looking at empirical data. An external observer who fails to take into
account the effect of self-stereotyping could mistakenly conclude that the two social groups differ in their
self-confidence. In particular, under the existence of a negative (positive) stereotype, the external observer
could conclude that S-agents are underconfident (overconfident). However, this difference in confidence
may not be a universal trait but rather task-specific and related to the existence of stereotypes on each
particular task. Controlling for self-assessment of ability will determine whether the explanation lies in
differences in confidence or differences in self-assessment.
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asymmetry intuitively increases. Second, and more interestingly, the size of the self-
stereotyping effect is highly dependent on the quality of the signal, γ. If the signal is
very noisy about the real ability (not informative, low γ) the asymmetry in behavior
between the two social groups increases, as the effect of self-stereotyping becomes very
prominent. By contrast, if the signal is very precise about the real ability agents face a
setting which approximates perfect self-knowledge (γ close to 1), where the effect of self-
stereotyping becomes negligible. This makes it clear that the stereotype is just a piece
of information that agents take into account only when they do not have other sources
of information. This result concurs with previous experimental research on attitude to-
ward competition which indicates that providing feedback – which in our model could
be interpreted as increasing γ– is a good policy for dealing with gender differences in
competition entry (see Ertac and Szentes (2011), Ewers (2012), Wozniak et al. (2014)).
Third, related to the previous point, according to the Bayesian process through which
agents update their beliefs about their abilities, the more signals an agent receives,
the less he/she is likely to rely on distributional assumptions and the more on the set
of signals received. Therefore, the effects of stereotypes are likely to vanish as agents
become more experienced in the task itself. Note, however, that acquiring more experi-
ence might not be trivial. If an agent persists in an activity in which he/she is believed
to be at disadvantage, he/she could realize that he/she is really not, but given that
he/she believes from the very beginning that he/she is at a disadvantage, his/her in-
centives to persist in that activity might be low and he/she may well drop out before
collecting enough observations. In short, stereotypes could be a vicious circle. This has
clear policy implications, as any intervention providing more and more precise infor-
mation on agents’ abilities would lower the impact of stereotypes. Previous research
shows that such interventions can be successful.17
1.2.2 REPRESENTATIVITY AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
The ultimate aim of this model is to identify potential channels through which the ex-
istence of stereotypes may affect the decision of whether to compete in the high or low-
paying tournament. Up to now, we have concluded that the existence of a stereotype
has two main effects; first it encourages/deters participation in the best tournament
for the whole population by reducing/increasing the perception of the abilities of the
17In the lab, Brandts et al. (2014) find that the gender gap on entry into a real effort tournament de-
creases significantly when subjects have a better informed advisor. In particular, this decrease is driven
by high-ability women being more likely to enter and by low-performing men being less likely. Interest-
ingly, the effects of advice are found to have no effect on the gender gap among those with intermediate
performance levels. Interpreting these results in light of our model, the effect of advice could be seen
as a reduction of the magnitude of the α [(1− γ)/γ] term from corollary 1.2.3 generated by an improve-
ment in the signal through the advice received, so that the set of signals for which stereotyped and non
stereotyped agents’ behavior differs is decreased. Also, Joensen and Nielsen (2015) find that reducing
the opportunity cost of taking advanced Math courses at high school increases the enrollment rate on
such courses. Note that taking these extra courses can be seen in light of our model as receiving extra
signals about mathematical/quantitative skills. This increases the college enrollment rate of women in
male-dominated fields. It also increases women’s probability of building a professional career in more
competitive itineraries and of climbing towards the top of the earnings distribution.
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rest of the population (condition one from 1.2.1). This affects both stereotyped and
non stereotyped agents equally, so it cannot be seen as a source for explaining behav-
ioral differences between the two social groups. Second, the existence of a stereotype
impairs self-assessment between non stereotyped and stereotyped agents in what is
referred to as self-stereotyping.
The combination of these two effects enables us to predict that N -agents will enter
tournament A under a different set of signals from S-agents. We now address the
question of how this sorting affects the representativity of each social group in each
tournament. All proofs of results in this section are provided in Appendix A.1.4. We
start by defining what we mean by representativity.
Definition We say that a social group is underrepresented (overrepresented) in tournamentA
if the proportion of agents from that social group in tournament A is lower (higher) than would
be expected under perfect information.
In order to manage the concept of overrepresentation and underrepresentation pre-
sented in the above definition we focus solely on the S group. Furthermore, from
now on we restrict the analysis to the case in which the stereotype is false.18 If the
stereotype is false, the distribution of abilities for both social groups is the same and
equal to a˜ ∼ FN (.). To avoid confusion, denote the CDF for the common distribution
when the stereotype is false as F (a) with associated PDF f(a). To account for effects of
over/underrepresentation we construct the following index:
λαA
λ
=
∫∞
−∞[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y)dy∫∞
−∞ λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]f(y)dy
(1.2)
where λαA is the proportion of agents in tournamentAwho come from social group S as
predicted by the equilibrium of the model and λ is the proportion of agents from social
group S in society. Notice that under the assumptions that the stereotype is false and
that agents have perfect information about their real abilities the proportion of agents
in tournament A from social group S should be exactly λ.19 Therefore, social group
S will be underrepresented when λαA/λ < 1 and overrepresented when λ
α
A/λ > 1.
Thus when the stereotype is false any deviation from λαA/λ = 1 is undesirable as it
indicates the existence of representativity problems. More interestingly, the reading of
the expression |1− λαA/λ| provides us with a measure of the representativity gap.
18The case in which the stereotype is true is hard to manage, as whether it causes
over/underrepresentation depends not only on whether the stereotype is positive or negative but also
on the joint values of the magnitude of the stereotype, the spread of prizes and the actual variance of
abilities. For this reason no clear conclusion can be drawn, so we stick to the case in which the stereotype
is false.
19Under perfect information (when real abilities are perfectly known to the agents) the decision rule for
both social groups would be the same (to chooseA if ability exceeds a certain threshold) independently of
whether a stereotype exists or not. Therefore the social composition in each tournament would replicate
that of the whole population. The role of stereotypes in this setting would be just to decrease/increase
the believed required minimum ability for obtaining WA.
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Proposition 1.2.4 (Segregation). If the stereotype is false, agents from social group S are
underrepresented (overrepresented) when the stereotype is negative (positive).
This proposition implies that when the stereotype is false there is always a repre-
sentativity gap in the pool of participants in tournament A independently of the par-
ticular environment in which the choice takes place. However, given that there is an
excess of entries in tournament A, not all agents will obtain a prize, so this imbalance
in participation may not translate into an imbalance in the set of winners. This is of
great concern, especially taking into account corollary 1.2.3, which implies that if the
stereotype is false then S-agents participating in tournamentAwill have a higher aver-
age rate of success when the stereotype is negative as on average they will have higher
ability levels than those from social group N , and vice versa when the stereotype is
positive. However a look at how the mass δA of prizes is split between the two social
groups reveals that these differences in winning rates do not cancel out the imbalance
in participation.
Proposition 1.2.5 (Wage gap). If the stereotype is false, agents from social group S are under-
represented (overrepresented) among the set of winners from tournamentAwhen the stereotype
is negative (positive).
This is because lower signal thresholds increase the chances of high-ability agents
who receive low signals correctly choosing tournament A. Thus, when the stereo-
type is negative N -agents have a lower signal threshold than S-agents –sustained by
the belief that the stereotype is true–, so high-ability S-agents are less likely to enter
tournament A than equally skilled N -agents. If the stereotype is positive the opposite
reasoning applies. Notice that this implies the existence of a wage gap at social group
level. Among those who win any prize (get a job, for example), S-agents are more
likely to get the position in which less is paid than equally skilled N -agents and vice
versa if the stereotype is positive. It is important to remark that this result is found
in the absence of any kind of discrimination arising naturally from the existence of a
stereotype in which all agents believe.
These two results show that representativity issues in the high-paying tournament
are present both in participation in the high-paying tournament and among the win-
ners. Moreover, the model enable us to conduct a comparative statics exercise to fur-
ther understand the effects by addressing the issue of under which competitive envi-
ronments the effects are more severe.
Proposition 1.2.6. If the stereotype is false, the representativity problem measured through
|1− λαA/λ| is
1. higher the higher the ratio WB/WA is
2. higher the lower δA is
3. higher the lower λ is
4. higher the higher γ is
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Several interesting issues are worth mentioning. First, in regard to the spread
of prizes (WB/WA) comparative statics show that representativity problems increase
when tournaments are balanced in terms of the amount of prizes. In other words,
competitive structures in which one tournament is clearly superior in terms of po-
tential outcomes tend to make differences in behavior disappear. Second, regarding
the mass of prizes offered by tournament A (δA), participation gaps become greater
as the number of prizes offered by the high-paying tournament become smaller, i.e.
the more elitist tournament A is. These two results are related in the sense that both
lower WB/WA and higher δA encourage agents observing low signals to participate
in tournament A, thus lowering the representativity gap. This is implied because, in
general, the higher the signal threshold that needs to be observed to participate in tour-
nament A is (the higher rαS and r
α
N are), the bigger the representativity gap becomes.
20
Third, the result regarding the proportion of the whole population accounted for by
the stereotyped social group (λ) is very interesting as it posits that stereotype-related
participation gaps are negatively related to that proportion. This point is noteworthy
because it implies that representativity issues will be greater when stereotyped social
groups account for a minority. Finally, the representativity gap becomes greater as
the signal becomes less informative (lower γ). This last result reinforces the idea men-
tioned above that stereotypes have behavioral consequences because there is imperfect
self-knowledge.
1.3 EXPERIMENTAL TEST
A laboratory experiment was run to test the relevance for the theoretical model on ex-
plaining self-selection into tournaments under the existence of stereotypes. The exper-
iment explicitly tests for the self-stereotyping mechanism described in the theoretical
model as it represents the main source for differences in self-selection.21
The experiment took place at the Bilbao Laboratory of Experimental Analysis (Bil-
bao Labean) at the University of the Basque Country on a computer based form using
z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher (2007)). Subjects were recruited through
ORSEE (Greiner (2015)), which resulted in 140 participants –69 (49.29%) men and 71
(50.81%) women– split into four different sessions that took place on two consecutive
days. Recruiting was carried out such that the gender balance in each session could be
assured but in such a way that subjects were unaware of this at the time of recruiting.22
At the beginning of each session, subjects were provided with written general in-
20 See equation (A.7) in Appendix A.1.4.
21As will be made clear in the presentation of the design, the encouragement/deterrent effect which
affects both social groups is canceled out. This is further reflected in the data that we collected.
22The number of participants in each session and the percentage of women were 36 (47.2%), 37 (54%),
33 (57.6%) and 34 (44.1%) respectively. All sessions were statistically gender balanced as intended. Since
subjects could see each other at the beginning and during the experiment, it is assumed that they were
aware of this gender balance.
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structions which were read aloud to guarantee that they were public knowledge. In
particular, these general instructions informed them that the experiment consisted of
5 different stages whose instructions would be displayed on their computer screen
immediately before the start of each stage. A translation of all the instructions can be
found in Appendix A.2. All subjects took all decisions simultaneously, so all agents en-
tered all stages at the same time. Each session lasted for around one and a half hours,
including payment. Average earnings were 16.03 euro (s.d. 3.51) including a show-up
fee of 3 euro, and total earnings ranged from 7.3 euro to 24.3 euro.
1.3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was designed to follow closely the theoretical framework presented in
Section 2. In particular, in stages 1, 2 and 3 the setting from the theoretical model is
transferred to the lab.23 At the end of stage 3, subjects’ beliefs about the gender nature
of the task and beliefs about other participants’ behavior are collected. Stage 4 repeats
stage 2 and 3 but in a single sex setting. Stage 5 consists of a lottery choice intended
to elicit risk preferences (Eckel and Grossman (2002)). The experiment ended with
a non-incentivized questionnaire in which subjects were asked about demographics,
their taste for competition, social risk preferences (Weber et al. (2002)), and the big five
personality traits (Gosling et al. (2003)). For a graphical summary of the experiment
see Figure 1.1, which is explained in detail below.
FIGURE 1.1– ROADMAP OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Notes: All incentivized tasks are shown in yellow.
The first stage of the experiment consisted of a real effort task. In this part, subjects
saw a glass with some water in it for 3 seconds (Figure 1.2, picture on the left). The
picture then disappeared and an empty glass appeared with a blue slider at the bot-
tom (Figure 1.2, picture on the right). Subjects were asked to drag the slider and locate
it as close as possible to the level of water shown in the previous picture. In order to
prevent cheating, the first picture was displayed in the top half of their screens while
the picture of the empty glass was in the bottom half. Subjects had to repeat this task
fourteen times for different initial pictures. The only thing that changed between one
picture to another was the level of water shown. All subjects saw the same pictures
in the same order. Before starting the task, subjects had a practice trial to get used to
23To avoid framing effects, instead of referring to choices as “tournaments” the instructions during the
experiment referred to them simply as “options”.
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how the task worked and to settle any potential doubts. No feedback was given to the
subjects on how well they did on this trial and it was made clear that this had no effect
on the rest of the experiment.
FIGURE 1.2– PICTURES SHOWN TO SUBJECTS DURING THE REAL EFFORT TASK.
The score awarded to each subject in each repetition was inversely proportional
to the distance between the actual level of water in the first picture and their guess.
Subjects were told that for payment only one of the fourteen repetitions would be ran-
domly selected.24
This particular task, which is novel in the literature, was selected for several rea-
sons. First, participants were very unlikely to have any prior experience with this or
any related task. This means that they had no expectations about their own perfor-
mance or that of others prior to participating in the experiment. Second, the nature of
the actual ability required to perform well is not clear. This helps to ensure heterogene-
ity in the beliefs of subjects as to what ability is important to perform well and therefore
as to the gender nature of the task. To further check this point, a pre-experimental sur-
vey was run on a similar subject pool. This confirmed that without performance the
task is perceived on average as gender neutral but that there is a significant degree of
heterogeneity in beliefs as to its gender nature.25 Third, it is very complicated to figure
out how well one has performed on the task without feedback. Fourth, the task is ex-
tremely simple to understand and no gender differences in performance were expected
24Specifically, the score in each repetition was computed as 100 − 5 ×
Distance|Real_Water_Level, Slider_Location| such that the maximum score attainable was 100.
Notice that the minimum score varies from picture to picture. Negative scores were extremely unusual
and only represent 8 out of the 1960 times that the task was performed in total (0.41%). In terms of
signals only 1 out of the 140 subjects received a negative one. The rule for payment was the following:
Paymentstage_1 = max(5× score_selected/100, 0).
25The survey was conducted at the Public University of Navarre to gather information about beliefs
held by undergraduate students about the task. Once the task was described in the same way as during
the experiment, participants were asked which gender they thought would perform better at it. Im-
mediately afterwards they were asked to explain their choice in an open form question. Most subjects
reasoned their choice by linking the task to a particular ability. These abilities were extremely heteroge-
neous in nature, which indicates that unanimity in this regard is far from being the case. The required
abilities reported included intuition, precision, logic, visual memory, spatial vision, and others.
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FIGURE 1.3– SELF-ASSESSMENT TASK
which was indeed corroborated in the data (t-statistic=-0.069, two-sided p-value=0.74).
In stage 2, participants were asked to estimate their average score over the fourteen
repetitions at stage 1 task. Instructions emphasized that this average score represented
their ability on that particular task. Participants were asked to select where in a ranking
of 11 possible levels they thought their ability lay. These ranks ranged from “<70” to
“97-100” in intervals of 3. Subjects were informed that if their estimation was correct
they would be paid an additional 1.5 euro. In this stage, we used two different instruc-
tion sets.
In the first two sessions before entering the estimation subjects were shown their
score in one randomly chosen repetition out of the fourteen times that they performed
the real effort task in stage 1, i.e. they were presented with an informative but not
perfectly correlated signal of their ability levels.26 They were also presented with the
distribution of the abilities of all participants in the session. This information was pre-
sented as a chart and as a histogram (see Figure 1.3).27
In the last two experimental sessions, before subjects were shown their signal a
brief description of the task was provided in which the task was framed as being re-
lated to spatial vision and manipulation of visual information, and it was stated that
such skills were essential for engineering. Note that the worst case scenario for this ex-
periment is the case in which the general perception is gender neutrality or the absence
of gender-based perceptions as the model would predict no behavioral differences. The
26The actual correlation between signals and abilities for the full sample was 0.43 (p-value<0.001).
27This feature of the experimental design makes it impossible to test the mechanism addressed in the
model by which stereotypes have an encouraging/deterrent effect. When the real distribution of abilities
is provided there is no way in which stereotypes can affect perceptions about the skillfulness of the whole
population. We decided to provide this information in order to gain power in the estimation stage, as
failing to provide the distribution of abilities during the session would probably result in a high degree
of randomness in estimations which would greatly reduce the power of the econometric analysis.
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purpose of this additional information was to increase the proportion of subjects who
reported that the task was male. This manipulation did indeed increase the perception
of the task as being male by 20% (p-value<0.05) but it had no other noticeable effect, so
we pooled the data in all sessions.28 The rest of the instructions were exactly the same
as in the two previous sessions.
After entering their estimations, subjects were asked to enter their level of confi-
dence concerning that estimation through a non-incentivized question. Confidence
was measured through a 7 level Likert scale with 1 standing for “not sure at all” and 7
for “completely sure”.
Stage 3 involved three different parts. In the first part subjects were presented
with a decision matrix that showed 9 different situations. In each situation they were
asked to choose between optionA and optionB, each of which offered different prizes.
Subjects were informed that if they chose an option in which the number of partici-
pants choosing that same option was lower than the number of prizes available under
that option, they would get the option’s prize for sure. When the number of partici-
pants opting for that option exceeded the number of prizes available for that option
in that situation, only those with the highest abilities in the stage 1 task would get
prizes. Thus, these “options” resemble the tournament choice presented in the theo-
retical framework shown in Section 2.
The 9 situations differed in the number of prizes offered by option A and option
B and in the value of the prize in option A. Importantly for this part of stage 3, in all
situations the sum of the number of slots in optionA and optionB was always equal to
the number of participants in that session of the experiment. This means that the only
way in which everyone could get a prize was by perfectly coordinating on choices.
Option B always offered prizes worth one euro while option A’s prizes could be 1.5
euro, 2 euro or 3 euro. Similarly, the number of prizes offered in option A (B) were
1/4 (3/4), 1/2 (1/2) or 3/4 (1/4) the number of subjects participating in each session.
The combination of these 3 spreads of prizes and the 3 possible allocations of prizes
gives the 9 situations observed by subjects (see Figure 1.4).29 Subjects were told that
at the end of the experiment one of the 9 situations would be taken randomly and the
amount resulting from their choice and that of the other participants in that situation
would be paid. While choosing between option A and option B subjects could see at
all times the number of participants in the session, their signals obtained from their
performance in stage 1, their estimated ranking of their ability levels from stage 2, and
28Results go in the same direction if all the analyses are conducted on either the manipulated or the
non manipulated group. See tables A.1 and A.3 in Appendix A.3. Moreover, all the analyses performed
in this paper include session fixed effects and thus control for this manipulation. Excluding session fixed
effects and including instead a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the session was manipulated and 0
otherwise and the interaction effect of this variable with the Female dummy show that the manipulation
itself has no noteworthy effect on the variables studied apart from modifying perceptions.
29After the reading aloud of the instructions for this stage, subjects had to answer a test with control
questions to guarantee that they had understood correctly how winners were chosen.
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FIGURE 1.4– TOURNAMENT SELF-SELECTION
the distribution of abilities in the session.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth saying that the second part of stage 3 was
identical to the first except that this time in all 9 situations option B offered the same
number of prizes as there were subjects in the session. Decisions in this setting how-
ever are not really about where to compete but about whether to compete or not. Given that
we use gender as social groups this distinction seems to be important.30 Consequently,
results from this setting are analyzed in a companion paper.
Stage 3 concluded with 5 questions –which were displayed one after another on
different screens– related to the session. At the end of the experiment the computer se-
lected one of them and subjects received 1.5 euro if the answer provided was correct. A
translation of the exact wording can be found in Appendix A.2. Questions 1 and 2 were
intended to measure potential heterogeneity in forecasting others’ behaviors by asking
for subjects’ forecasts about the minimum ability required in order to obtain a prize in
tournament A at the first and the second part of stage 3 respectively. In terms of the
theoretical model, we were asking subjects to forecast the real ability threshold. Subjects’
answers to these questions showed us that the vast majority of them correctly expected
that tournament A was going to be overcrowded in both parts of stage 3.31
30In particular, under this setting we find a large, significant gender gap in entry into tournament A
that is absent in the setting analyzed in this paper. However, for this setting perceptions do not appear to
play a significant role in explaining behavior, although coefficients always go in the direction predicted by
the theory and even become significant at the 5% level when looking at the subsample given by marginal
agents (see subsection 1.3.3) and when extra controls are included. Results are available upon request.
The consistency of coefficients with the theory suggests that the aforementioned gender difference in
behavior may be hindering our analyses when we look at perception-related behavior.
31In the instructions for this question, subjects were informed that if they believed tournament A was
going to be uncrowded –so that there was no minimum ability–, they should choose ability “<70”. Only
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Questions 3, 4 and 5 were intended to measure subjects’ perception of the gender
nature of the task performed in stage 1. Question 3 was introduced to directly elicit
beliefs about stereotypes by asking subjects to guess who had performed better on
average in the real effort task: men/no differences/women. Questions 4 and 5 were
asked to gauge subjects’ perceptions as to the average performance of men and women
respectively by using an eleven-option item ranging from “<70” to “97-100” in inter-
vals of 3.
Stage 4 resembles stages 2 and 3 except that subjects only interacted with those of their
same sex. We refer to this stage as the single-sex setting, and to the previous one as mixed-
sex. In this single-sex setting, subjects again had to estimate their ability levels. The only
difference with respect to stage 2 was that this time we showed them the distribution
of abilities within their own gender instead of the distribution of the whole session.
They were told that if their estimation was correct, they would be paid an additional 1
euro. Next they again had to choose between tournament A and B. The rules were the
same as in stage 3, but this time subjects only interacted with their own gender. This
meant that at all levels the session was split into two gender-homogeneous groups and
subjects played stages 2 and 3 within their corresponding group.
Stage 5 consisted of a lottery choice to elicit risk attitudes. The elicitation method
used resembles the one in Eckel and Grossman (2002), enabling 8 different degrees of
risk attitude to be differentiated.32
Finally, subjects also completed a non-incentivized questionnaire which collected
data on some sociodemographic variables and self-reported measures of taste for com-
petition, social risk attitude (Weber et al. (2002)), and the big five personality traits
(Gosling et al. (2003)). Given the sample size and its low impact on the main results,
social risk, personality traits scores and some socio-demographic variables were not
included on the main analyses of the paper. A robustness check of the main results
including these set of control variables can be found in Appendix A.3.
HYPOTHESES AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS
The experimental design described above enable us to directly test the following claims
established by the theoretical model presented in section 1.2.
C1: Perceptions held about the gender nature of the real effort task bias subjects’ ability esti-
mations in a consistent way.
This claim captures the self-stereotyping mechanism. Results with respect to this claim
(section 1.3.3, Table 1.4) support the theoretical predictions.
6 subjects (4.2%) made this choice.
32Lotteries were chosen in order to distinguish risk neutrality, 4 different levels of risk aversion, and 3
of risk loving according to a constant relative risk aversion utility function of the form µ(x) = x1−r .
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C2: Perceptions held about the gender nature of the real effort task affect self-selection into
tournament A.
C3: Perceptions held about the gender nature of the real effort task affect the ex-ante probabil-
ity of obtaining the prize in tournament A.
C2 and C3 describe the consequences that perceptions have on behavior and outcomes
according to the theoretical model. In particular, C2 refers to corollary 1.2.3 in the
theory and this is supported by experimental evidence (section 1.3.3, Table 1.5). C3
contains the theoretical prediction regarding the impact of perceptions on subjects’
outcomes which is also supported by the experimental data (Table 1.6).
C4: The effects of perceptions in C2 and C3 can be explained by C1.
According to the theoretical model, two agents with the same ability estimation should
behave identically. Thus, claimC4 states that controlling for differences in self-assessment
should cancel out the direct effect of perceptions on both self-selection (C2) and win-
ning rates (C3). The data shows that this is indeed the case as controlling for self-
assessment leads to perceptions no longer affecting behavior or winning rates (Tables
1.5 and 1.6).
As a robustness check to enable us to underpin the previous results, we also add
the following claim:33
C5: In the single-sex environment perceptions held about the gender nature of the real effort
task play no role in self-assessment or self-selection into tournament A.
This last issue is addressed in section 1.3.3, Table 1.8. This claim is supported by our
data, reinforcing the premise that results in C1, C2, and C3 come from the effects of
subjects’ perceptions and not from unobserved factors and/or self-selection issues.
1.3.2 PERCEPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We gather information about subjects’ perception as to the gender nature of the task
using the answers provided at the end of stage 3 (questions 3, 4, and 5). In particular,
question 3 provides us with a discrete variable on whether subjects perceived the task
in stage 1 as male, female or gender neutral. We refer to this variable as Perception of
the task. Meanwhile, questions 4 and 5 ask about the perceived average performance
for men and women, respectively.
Based on subjects’ answers to these two questions we construct two variables:
Maleness and Relative Maleness. The former is just the difference between the reported
averages in abilities for men and for women. Relative Maleness is computed as the dif-
ference between the reported relative averages in abilities for men and for women, so
33Although it is not explicitly addressed in the theoretical model, this prediction follows immediately
because by design only the self-stereotyping mechanism is in play in the experiment. So during stage 4 of
the experiment, in which we provide subjects with the distribution of abilities within their own gender,
we should not observe any effect related to perceptions as there is no way to suffer from self-stereotyping.
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it captures not only the absolute but also the relative difference between the believed
average of men’s and women’s performance by taking into account distributional in-
formation.34
Notice that both Maleness and Relative Maleness provide continuum measures of
the perceived maleness of the task, while the variable Perception offers a discrete mea-
sure. However all three should be consistent one with another such that if a subject
claims that men have a higher ability level than women (Maleness, Relative Maleness>0)
his/her associated Perception of the task should be male. In the subsequent analysis
we therefore consider only those subjects who are consistent in these measures. This
leaves us with 120 out of the total sample of 140 subjects (85% of the original sample).
See Table 1.1.
Although all three variables (Perceptions, Maleness, and Relative Maleness) return
similar results, in the rest of the paper we show only the analyses for Relative Male-
ness as it proves to be much more powerful in terms of both answering our research
question and statistical power. Supplementary analyses making use of the variables
Perceptions and Maleness are available upon request.
TABLE 1.1– CONSISTENCY BETWEEN RELATIVE MALENESS AND PERCEPTION
Perception Perception
Male Neutral Female Total Male Neutral Female Total
R
el
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al
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s
<-60% 0 0 3 3
R
el
at
iv
e
M
al
en
es
s
<-60% 0 0 3 3
[-60%,-40%) 0 0 4 4 [-60%,-40%) 0 0 4 4
[-40%,-20%) 0 5 18 23 [-40%,-20%) 0 0 18 18
[-20%,0%) 2 7 6 15 [-20%,0%) 0 0 6 6
0% 10 31 6 47 0% 10 31 6 47
(0%,20%] 10 1 0 11 (0%,20%] 10 0 0 10
(20%,40%] 25 4 0 29 (20%,40%] 25 0 0 25
(40%,60%] 6 1 0 7 (40%,60%] 6 0 0 6
>60% 1 0 0 1 >60% 1 0 0 1
Total 54 49 37 140 Total 52 31 37 120
Note: Relationship between Relative Maleness (rows) and Perception (columns) of the task for the original sample (left)
and for the final sample (right). Inconsistencies are displayed in red.
34In particular, Relative Maleness is computed as follows: suppose that in a session with N subjects one
of them claims that men’s average ability lies in the interval X , for which the observed frequency is NX .
Then we count the number of subjects whose ability is strictly below that interval, and denote this byN−X .
Thus we can argue that this agent believes that men, on average, are better than [N−X+(NX/2)]/N percent
of the subjects participating in that session. By computing this percentage for the relative position of
women and computing its difference relative to men, we get the Relative Maleness variable. For example,
using the distribution of abilities displayed in Figure 1.4, a subject claiming that men’s average is in
the interval 91-94 and women’s in the interval 85-88 would be translated into relative positions of 89%
([27+(5/2)]/33) for men and 33% ([8+(6/2)]/33) for women, thus returning a Relative Maleness of 56%. If
instead these claims were 85-88 for men and 79-82 for women, then the Relative Maleness would be 21%.
Notice that in both cases though, the variable Maleness would be the same at 2. These examples illustrate
that accounting for the underlying distribution conveys important information that should be taken into
account in the analyses.
1.3. EXPERIMENTAL TEST 23
Thus, this Relative Maleness is taken as our variable for assessing the impact of the
gender-based perception of the task, so it deserves a closer look. In particular, although
this variable is constructed based on incentivized elicitation, it is of crucial importance
to rule out potential endogeneity and self-selection issues. Given that beliefs about
the gender nature of the task are not randomly allocated, there may be important id-
iosyncratic factors that affect subjects’ perceptions. However, our main concern for the
purpose of econometric analysis is to address whether there is any systematic bias in
the way in which these beliefs are set. We now assess the potential existence of biases
in this Relative Maleness variable with respect to other key control variables.
We first compare the distribution of beliefs across genders as regards Relative Male-
ness (see Figure 1.5). We find an own-gender bias in these beliefs such that both men
and women are more likely, on average, to state that their gender performs better (al-
though it is only significant for men, p-value<0.1). Moreover, this own-gender bias
translates into a small gender difference in beliefs (p-value<0.1). This seems to be a
pure gender effect and should not be problematic when it comes to analyzing the data.
FIGURE 1.5– DISTRIBUTION OF THE RELATIVE MALENESS VARIABLE WITHIN GENDERS
Second and more importantly, we should check whether subjects used perceptions
to self-justify their performances. It is plausible that men (women) observing high
(low) signals could justify their performance by reporting the task as male and vice
versa if the signals observed are low (high). That is, the reported Relative Maleness
of the task might be correlated with the observed signal.35 In that case, our analysis
would suffer from a strong identification problem as we would not be able to properly
identify the effect of perceptions about the gender nature of the task on the outcome
variables of interest. The regression analysis shown in Table 1.2 checks for and rules
out this possibility.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.2, analyses are run separately for men and women.
35According to cognitive dissonance, the signal observed could affect the belief formation process such
that, within genders, beliefs and signals could be correlated.
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Regressions show no significant effects in either gender, as can be checked through
the statistical insignificance of the coefficient for the variable Signal. Analysis on col-
umn (3) checks for whether the size of the effect of the signal in determining Relative
Maleness differs for men and women. The statistically insignificant coefficients for the
interaction effect Signal∗Female further confirms that the size of the impact of signals
does not differ for men and women. These analyses enable us to reject the hypothesis
that a self-selection problem driven by observed signals could be affecting the reported
Relative Maleness of the real effort task.
TABLE 1.2– OLS REGRESSION FOR RELATIVE MALENESS
Dep. Variable: Rel. Maleness Rel. Maleness Rel. Maleness
Sample: Men Women All
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.0313
(0.263)
Signal 0.0223 -0.0379 0.0223
(0.199) (0.215) (0.200)
Signal∗Female -0.0602
(0.294)
Constant 0.0398 0.00849 0.0398
(0.183) (0.190) (0.183)
Observations 62 58 120
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.024
Notes: Female takes value 1 when the subject is a woman and 0 otherwise. Signal is a continuous measure accounting
for the performance signal observed by the subject during the experiment. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel A of Table 1.3 looks at potential self-selection patterns based on other poten-
tially relevant control variables by showing the correlations within each gender with
the Relative Maleness variable. As was expected, within each gender the only variables
significantly correlated with Relative Maleness are those related to beliefs themselves:
believed relative average ability for men (Bel.Ab.Men) and the equivalent for women
(Bel.Ab.Women). Thus, Panel A rules out the existence of self-selection issues in observ-
ables, validating the use of Relative Maleness as our treatment variable.
Panel B of Table 1.3 presents an overview of the results by looking at the raw
data of the main variables os interest: Relative Assessment, Prob(A) and, Prob(WA).36
36Notice that we talk about the Relative Assessment instead of referring to the assessment measure col-
lected directly during the experiment. This is because the original assessment variable collected during
the experiment conveys only cardinal information, but this Relative Assessment variable captures the rel-
ative assessment within the pool of subjects, which is actually the relevant assessment when choosing
between tournaments. This Relative Assessment variable is computed as follows: suppose that in a ses-
sion with N subjects one of them claims that his/her ability lies in the interval X for which the observed
frequency is NX . Then we count the number of subjects whose ability is strictly below that interval and
denote this byN−X . Thus we can argue that this agent believes that he/she is better than [N
−
X+(NX/2)]/N
percent of the subjects participating in that session. For example, using the distribution of abilities dis-
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TABLE 1.3– CORRELATIONS FOR MAIN CONTROL AND OUTPUT VARIABLES WITH RELATIVE MALENESS
PANEL A: CONTROL VARIABLES
Men Women Men Women
Obs. 62 58 Obs. 62 58
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Signal 0.0151 -0.0187 Risk Pref. 0.1726 -0.1472
(0.907) (0.889) (0.180) (0.270)
Ability 0.1333 -0.0181 Age 0.0872 0.1547
(0.301) (0.893) (0.500) (0.246)
Conf.Est. 0.0871 -0.1592 Difficulty -0.0007 -0.1546
(0.501) (0.233) (0.996) (0.246)
Min.Ab.Win 0.1498 -0.0046 Taste Comp. 0.1413 -0.1941
(0.245) (0.973) (0.273) (0.144)
Bel.Ab.Men 0.7736*** 0.7192*** Bel.Ab.Women -0.7230*** -0.6284***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PANEL B: OUTCOME VARIABLES
Mixed-Sex Single-Sex
Men Women Men Women
Obs. 62 58 Obs. 62 58
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Rel. Assessment 0.3322*** -0.1961 Rel. Assessmentss 0.1859 0.0345
(0.008) (0.140) (0.148) (0.797)
Prob(A) 0.1599*** -0.0646 Prob(A)ss 0.0647 -0.0473
(0.000) (0.141) (0.127) (0.281)
Prob(WA) 0.3088** -0.0622 Prob(WA)ss -0.0490 -0.0388
(0.015) (0.643) (0.7053) (0.772)
Notes: Signal is the random draw observed by the subject in the real effort task. Ability is the average score on the real
effort task. Conf.Est. is a discrete variable between 1 and 7 denoting the confidence with which subjects make their
estimation of ability. Min.Ab.Win is an 11-level discrete variables accounting for beliefs about the minimum ability
required to win the prize in tournament A. Risk Pref is an 8-level variable measuring subjects’ risk attitude. Age is
subjects’ age in years. Difficulty is a 5-level item measuring subjects’ perceptions on task difficulty. Taste Comp. is a 5-
level item accounting for self-reported taste for competition. Bel.Ab.Men and Bel.Ab.Women are the relative assessment
for men’s and women’s average abilities. Rel. Assessment is subjects’ relative self-assessment. Prob(A) is a situation
specific dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a subject enters tournament A. Prob(WA) is a situation specific
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a subject gets the prize at tournament A. Rel. Assessmentss, Prob(A)ss and
Prob(WA)ss are the corresponding variables for the single-sex setting. Significance levels in parentheses.
First, it shows an important link between subjects’ perceived maleness of the task
and subjects’ self-assessment (Relative Assessment) which is consistent with the self-
stereotyping hypothesis: the more male the task is perceived as being, the higher men’s
self-assessment is and the lower women’s is. Second, this pattern seems to be repli-
cated in the entry rate into tournament A (Prob(A)), with men entering more often as
the task is perceived to be more male. As regards gender gaps, Figure 1.6 suggests that
the behaviors of the gender gap in both variables across perceptions are related to each
played in Figure 1.4, a subject claiming that his/her ability is in the interval 91-94 would be assigned a
self-assessed relative position of 89% ([27+(5/2)]/33). All results are robust to the analysis of the original
self-assessment provided by subjects. Results available are upon request.
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other. Finally, Panel B of Table 1.3 also shows that the perceived maleness of the real
effort task has an impact on men’s and women’s probability of obtaining the top prize
WA (Prob(WA)), suggesting that the aforementioned behavioral differences impact the
final outcomes of men and women.
FIGURE 1.6– GENDER GAP IN RELATIVE SELF-ASSESSMENT AND IN ENTRY RATE FOR TOURNAMENT A
Notes: Average gap in relative self-assessment (blue bars) and in entry rate for tournament A (red bars) for the mixed-
sex environment relative to women’s average values. A positive (negative) score means that there is a gender gap
“favoring” men (women).
Panel B of Table 1.3 also shows the correlation between the perceived relative male-
ness of the task and the main outcome variables in the single-sex setting. Notice that
in this setting the self-stereotyping mechanism is, by design, canceled out. Raw data
suggest this is actually the case as the variable Relative Maleness is uncorrelated with
self-assessments, behaviors and outcomes. This suggests that the correlations found in
the mixed-sex setting are the result of perceptions and not of unobserved characteristics
which correlate with perceptions.
Overall, Panel B of Table 1.3 provides some important insights from the raw data
that fully support the theoretical model. In the rest of this section, regression analyses
are performed to test these insights formally and bring to light the mechanisms that lie
behind them.
1.3.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In this section we carry out formal regression analyses to establish the relationship be-
tween perceptions as to the gender nature of the task and the three main outcome vari-
ables: self-assessment of ability (Relative Assessment), entry rate into the high-paying
tournament (Prob(A)) and winning the high-tournament prize (Prob(WA)). In partic-
ular, we take yi as the outcome observed for subject i of any dependent variable of
interest y and we perform the following analysis:
yi = β0+β1Femalei+β2Rel.Malenessi+β3Rel.Malenessi∗Femalei+θT1 xi+θT2 xy+εiy
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where xi is a vector of individual-specific control variables for subject i and xy is a
vector of variable-specific controls for the outcome variable y. The main indepen-
dent variables are Female, Relative Maleness, and more importantly the interaction effect
Rel.Maleness∗Female. This interaction effect captures how the gender gap in different
dependent variables changes when the perceived maleness of the task increases. This
specification enables us to separate pure gender effects (summarized by the parameter
β1) from gender differences arising from perceptions (coefficient β3). It also enables us
to compare men and women with the same perception and perception strength, and to
check whether the impact of perceptions comes from men’s reactions, women’s reac-
tions or a combination of the two.
SELF-ASSESSMENT
The estimation of their abilities that subjects draw up from the signal observed, and
in particular their relative self-assessment, is a key variable for explaining behavior in
later stages of the experiment. Here we are primarily interested in whether subjects’
beliefs about the maleness of the task have any impact on the ability estimation pro-
cess and, more importantly, whether they generate self-assessment gaps. In short, this
subsection tests the self-stereotyping hypothesis posed by the theoretical model.
Table 1.4 shows the effect of perceptions concerning relative self-assessment through
the coefficients of the Rel.Maleness and Rel.Maleness∗Female variables.
TABLE 1.4– OLS FOR RELATIVE (SELF) ASSESSMENT
Sample: All All Men Men Women Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Signal 1.059*** 0.958*** 0.916*** 0.785*** 1.280*** 1.299***
(0.212) (0.216) (0.210) (0.240) (0.333) (0.330)
Female 0.00543 0.0337
(0.0411) (0.0421)
Rel.Maleness 0.341*** 0.303*** 0.343*** 0.337*** -0.192* -0.230**
(0.120) (0.113) (0.118) (0.111) (0.103) (0.110)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.559*** -0.535***
(0.158) (0.151)
Constant -0.297 -0.497 -0.199 -0.295 -0.509* -1.090**
(0.201) (0.346) (0.190) (0.504) (0.298) (0.462)
Other Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 120 120 62 62 58 58
R-squared 0.429 0.489 0.451 0.563 0.408 0.519
Notes: OLS for Relative Assessment. Other controls include taste for competition, risk aversion, age and difficulty of the
task. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In column (1), without controls, and in column (2), with controls, a look at the co-
efficient of the interaction effect Rel.Maleness∗Female shows that how male the task is
perceived to be affects estimations by men and women differently, and that this ac-
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tually determines the size and direction of the gender gap in relative self-assessment
(p-value<0.01). In particular, this negative coefficient, taken together with the insignifi-
cant coefficient for Female, which tells us that under neutral perceptions (Rel.Maleness=0)
men and women make comparable estimations, illustrates that when the task was per-
ceived as male (Rel.Maleness>0) men relative self-assessment was significantly higher
than that of comparable women, but when the task was perceived as female
(Rel.Maleness<0) the opposite happened. Moreover, it also reveals that the size of these
gender gaps is moderated by the believed size of the gender differences. This result is
robust to the inclusion of other covariates and the use of different samples (see Table
A.1 in Appendix A.3).
In an attempt to bring to light the reason for this behavior in the self-assessment
gap, separate regressions for men (columns (3) and (4)) and women (columns (5) and
(6)) are displayed in Table 1.4. This reveals that the average effect of Rel.Maleness is
positive on men but negative on women, suggesting that actual perceptions simultane-
ously trigger the effects of positive and negative stereotypes, each targeting a different
gender.37
SELF-SELECTION AND SET OF WINNERS
Subjects had to self-select into one of two tournaments labeled A and B under 9 differ-
ent situations. In all them the prize offered to the winner in tournament A was strictly
higher than the one offered in tournament B. In this section we look at whether beliefs
about which gender is perceived to be ex-ante better at the real effort task can ex-
plain gender segregation across tournaments. In other words, we analyze whether the
perceptions held by subjects affect their signal-contingent behavior and whether this
effect of perceptions on behavior is different for men and women. The main dependent
variables are the probability of entering tournament A (Prob(A)) and the probability of
obtaining a prize in it (Prob(WA)).
In the absence of the effects of stereotypes and perceptions, if subjects had followed
an optimal decision rule during the experiment the rate at which men and women won
the prize from tournamentA should be the same (see Table A.4 in Appendix A.3). This
immediately means that the optimal signal-based behavior should be the same for men
and women and unrelated to their perceptions regarding the maleness of the task. In
other words, neither Relative Maleness nor Rel.Maleness∗Female reflect differences in the
characteristics of the subjects’ pool that could explain any perception-contingent be-
37A natural follow up is to see what happens to the confidence level with what ability estimations
are reported, as this could be crucial for decisions involving a ranking of abilities. An analysis of the
self-reported confidence level (see Table A.2 in Appendix A.3) shows that confidence in estimation is
not affected by how gendered the task is perceived but by the actual estimation. This is consistent with
the existence of a self-serving attribution bias as those with higher estimations are more confident in their
accuracy. That said, Table A.2 in Appendix A.3 illustrates the existence of a marginal pure gender effect
on the level of confidence with which estimations are made.
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TABLE 1.5– PROBIT MODEL FOR THE PROBABILITY OF ENTERING TOURNAMENT A
Sample: All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative Assessment 0.355*** 0.518*** 0.231**
(0.0827) (0.112) (0.105)
Signal 0.471*** 0.391** 0.582*** 0.103 -0.0355 0.263
(0.174) (0.193) (0.205) (0.139) (0.132) (0.187)
Female -0.0204 -0.0261
(0.0405) (0.0354)
Rel.Maleness 0.197* 0.222** -0.139* 0.0859 0.0337 -0.0809
(0.115) (0.111) (0.0796) (0.0973) (0.0968) (0.0773)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.309** -0.112
(0.142) (0.129)
Tournament Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Clusters 120 62 58 120 62 58
Observations 1,080 558 522 1,080 558 522
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Other controls include risk preferences and believed minimum ability for winning
at tournament A. Tournament controls include prize awarded by tournament A and allocation of prizes. Clustered
standard errors at subject level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 1.5 the actual probability of entering tournament A is regressed as a func-
tion of the observed signal, the gender of the subject and his/her stated perception as
to the maleness of the task. The analysis also includes the main control variables (risk
aversion and belief as to minimum ability require to win the prize in tournament A)
and tournament fixed effects.39 As suggested by the descriptive statistics in Table 1.3
and Figure 1.6, there is a clear pattern in the gender gap on entry rate that seems to be
driven by the actual perception of the task. Column (1) shows that there are no pure
gender differences and that men and women who hold a neutral gender perception
regarding the task (Relative Maleness=0) behave identically based on signal observed.
This means that in the absence of any biased preconception as to which sex perform
better on average, men and women enter tournament A at the same rate. However,
the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction effect between
gender and perceived maleness (Rel.Maleness∗Female) indicates behavioral differences
when perception departs from gender neutrality. In particular, it confirms that men
(women) enter more often than women (men) if the task is perceived as male (female)
38When this same analysis is performed within the sample of marginal subjects (see Section 1.3.3), the
variable Relative Maleness is marginally significant (p-value<0.1) but, importantly, the interaction effect
Rel.Maleness∗Female is still far from being so. This implies that although Relative Maleness correlates to
some extent with real ability in this subsample, its correlation is the same for men and women such no
gender differences in the signal-contingent strategy should be expected.
39Results throughout this section are robust to the inclusion of other covariates and to the use of other
statistical techniques and samples (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.3).
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and that the size of this gap depends on the actual size of the gender bias perceived by
the subjects.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.5, look at the effect that the perceived maleness of
the task has for each gender, separately. These two regressions suggest that Relative
Maleness affects the entry rate of men positively and that of women negatively.
All this together reinforces the idea that the perceived gender nature of the task
affects the threshold signal level required by subjects to participate in tournament A
in the way suggested by the theoretical model: When the task is perceived as male
(female), women (men) need to observe higher signals in order to self-select into the
high-paying, more competitive tournament so they end up entering less often.
The patterns found at columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 1.5 suggest that the effect
of Relative Maleness on the behavior of agents is related to the behavior of the self-
assessment gap shown in Table 1.4. In columns (4), (5), and (6) we perform the same
analysis as in columns (1), (2), and (3) but including the relative estimation of abilities
as an extra control. Importantly, in these cases the effect of maleness on determining
the gender participation gap disappears. This strongly suggests that men and women
who estimate the same ability are behaving similarly. Moreover this supports the claim
that perceptions as to the maleness of the task have very little impact on participation
decisions on their own, but most of the effect of perceptions on behavior is due rather
to their effects on self-assessment (see Table 1.4).
Explaining participation gaps is important in understanding segregation, but the
most relevant question for welfare analysis is probably whether the behavioral differ-
ences addressed above translate into gender representativity gaps in the set of winners.
Notice that gender participation gaps should not necessarily translate into gender rep-
resentativity gaps in the set of winners: there could be a participation gap favoring
men, i.e. men enter more often, but one which is driven by men with very low ability
entering tournament A too often. In that case, we would expect no gender representa-
tivity gaps in the set of winners as the gender differences in behavior would have no
implications for the final outcomes.
Table 1.6 shows the effect of perceptions on the probability of finally obtaining the
big prize. In column (1) it can be seen that when we only control for Signal the inter-
action effect Rel.Maleness∗Female is negative and significant, suggesting that the more
male (female) the task is perceived as being, the more likely men (women) are than
women (men) to end up winning the top prize. However, although based on signals
both genders should win the high prize at the same rate independently of the percep-
tions held (see Table A.4 in Appendix A.3), winners are named based on real abilities,
not on signals. So in column (2), we control for the real ranking of abilities within each
session (Ability Rank), with ranking 1 being the worst performer, in addition to sig-
nals in order to test for any unbalancedness between genders in this regard that may
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TABLE 1.6– PROBIT MODEL FOR THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING THE PRIZE AT TOURNAMENT A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Signal 1.336*** 0.561*** 0.854*** 0.284**
(0.190) (0.119) (0.233) (0.118)
Ability Rank 0.0197*** 0.0192***
(0.00119) (0.00112)
Relative Assessment 0.308*** 0.190***
(0.102) (0.0581)
Female 0.00394 -0.00534 -0.00298 -0.00798
(0.0477) (0.0306) (0.0461) (0.0296)
Rel.Maleness 0.223** 0.180** 0.129 0.122*
(0.112) (0.0789) (0.118) (0.0738)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.328** -0.202* -0.178 -0.108
(0.159) (0.116) (0.171) (0.113)
Tournament Controls YES YES YES YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES
Number of Clusters 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Tournament controls include prize awarded in tournament A and allocation of
prizes. Clustered standard errors at subject level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
be correlated with the interaction effect Rel.Maleness∗Female. Our results show that al-
though including this control reduces their effect, perceptions still have a significant
and sizable impact on generating gender gaps. It is also worth mentioning that, as in
all previous analyses, the dummy Female is not significant, which shows that when the
task is perceived as gender neutral both genders win the top prize at the same rate –as
would be expected– but once gender neutrality is broken, asymmetries arise in regard
to the winning rate.
Finally, the role played by the self-stereotyping mechanism remains to be con-
sidered. Not surprisingly in view of the previous results, columns (3) and (4) show
that once individual self-assessment is accounted for, perceptions held by subjects do
not contribute to generating gender differences in the winning rate, independently of
whether we control for the real ability rank or not. Notice that the only effect of Rela-
tive Assessment on the probability of winning the prize in tournament A is in shaping
participation decisions. Thus, the results in Table 1.6 suggest that the interaction effect
Rel.Maleness∗Female is found to be significant in columns (1) and (2) because it is actu-
ally evidencing the effect of perceptions in self-assessment (Table 1.4) and its impact
on behaviors when choosing between tournaments (Table 1.5).40
40This is related, though in a completely different context, to the findings on Reuben et al. (2012). They
find that women are less likely to be appointed as group leaders when the task to be performed relates
to mathematical skills, but that this underrepresentation can be almost explained by differences in self-
assessment. This enables the authors to conclude that in their experiment discrimination against women
plays no part, but that lower self-assessment by women relative to men does.
32 CHAPTER 1. STEREOTYPES AND TOURNAMENT SELF-SELECTION
MARGINAL SUBJECTS
The above results are fully in line with the model. However, the model makes a
stronger prediction: although self-stereotyping affects self-assessment for the full sam-
ple, its behavioral consequences should show up only in a given subset of subjects.
In other words, according to the self-stereotyping mechanism displayed by the theo-
retical model, the effects from Tables 1.5 and 1.6 should be driven by those subjects
who are borderlines as regards being winners in tournament A. This excludes those
with very high/low signals, who are almost sure they will/will not obtain a prize in
tournament A, so their decision to participate/not participate should not be affected
by their particular perception about the gender affinity of the task. To address this
issue, we construct a dummy variable called Marginal which takes a value of 1 when
the subject in any particular situation can be considered to be reasonably uncertain of
his/her chances of winning in tournament A and 0 otherwise.41
TABLE 1.7– PROBIT FOR THE PROBABILITY OF ENTERING TOURNAMENT A FOR MARGINAL AGENTS
Sample: Marginal Nonmarginal High Signal Low Signal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Signal 1.259 0.380** -2.135** 0.205
(0.782) (0.163) (0.952) (0.178)
Female 0.00193 -0.0386 -0.0606 -0.0451
(0.0570) (0.0435) (0.0500) (0.0667)
Rel.Maleness 0.343* 0.113 0.0269 0.274
(0.197) (0.120) (0.115) (0.191)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.598** -0.166 -0.131 -0.266
(0.242) (0.156) (0.182) (0.242)
Tournament Controls YES YES YES YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Number of Clusters 97 120 71 72
Observations 342 738 354 384
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Other controls include risk preferences and believed minimum ability for winning
at tournament A. Tournament controls include prize awarded by tournament A and allocation of prizes. Clustered
standard errors at subject’s level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
By performing this classification and replicating the analysis in column (1) of Ta-
ble 1.5 separately for subjects considered as marginal and for those who are not, we
find that the effect of maleness in explaining the gender participation gap is only sig-
nificant for the marginal individuals (Table 1.7, columns (1) and (2)). It can be also
checked that the coefficient in this subsample of marginal subjects is greater (β: -0.60
41As a rule of thumb, we consider 30% of the sample as marginal. This subsample was identified as
follows: We sorted all subjects within each session by their observed signals. Then, for a situation in
which tournament A offers a fraction of prizes δA, we considered that those who observed a signal above
(below) the percentile [1−δA]+15 ([1−δA]−15) of the signal distribution would behave in the same way
independently of the perception held. The results remain quite similar when different interval amplitudes
are used. Lastly, notice that there are agents who are considered as marginal under several δA’s.
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vs -0.33) and more significant (p-value: 0.01 vs 0.03) than for the whole sample. As a
final test, notice that among those who are not considered marginal a distinction can
be drawn between those with high and low observed signals. Separate analyses for
these two groups (columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.7), reveal that Relative Maleness has
no significant effect either. The results shown in Table 1.7 show that, as predicted by
the model, stereotypes affect the whole population but their behavioral consequences
in this particular setting show up only locally, in some particular parts of the sample.
Similar results hold when the probability of winning the prize in tournament A is con-
sidered. Results are available upon request.42
ROBUSTNESS: TOURNAMENT SELF-SELECTION IN A SINGLE-SEX ENVIRONMENT
In the fourth stage of the experiment, subjects go through the exact same choices (self-
assessment and choice of tournament) but in a single-sex environment. The difference
with respect to the previous situation is that subjects now interact with and see the
information for their own gender only. Importantly, except for the fact that subjects
now observe the distribution of abilities of those of their own gender, the information
that they hold in terms of their own and others’ abilities is the same. In particular, they
observe the same signal provided in stage 2 of the experiment and no information is
provided about their payoff at stage 3.
According to the theory, in this environment perceptions should not play any role
in affecting subjects’ decisions: Subjects observe the ability distribution only for their
own gender, so whether a subject believes the task to be male/neutral/female is com-
pletely irrelevant as in all cases he/she sees him/herself in an ex-ante homogeneous
group in which perceptions of this type cannot play any role. Consequently, under
this single-sex environment there is no scope for self-stereotyping.
The contribution of this treatment to the general picture of the experiment is that
it enables us to further reject other potential selection biases regarding perceptions or,
on the contrary, to admit that there are important unobserved characteristics which
play a role in agents’ decisions. For example, men who claim that the task is male and
men who claim that it is female could differ in key aspects such as general optimism or
self-esteem. If so, we should still observe an effect of perceptions on the new estimates
of ability and on signal-based behavior. On the other hand, the loss of the effect of
perceptions in this single-sex environment would be further evidence in support of the
initial premise that the channel driving the results in subsections 1.3.3 and 1.3.3 is ac-
tually self-stereotyping rather than unobserved differences in subjects’ characteristics
across perceptions.
42Dohmen and Falk (2011) also apply this idea of marginal subjects. In their paper subjects have to self-
select into either a fixed or a variable payment scheme. They find, consistently with our findings, that
personal characteristics are stronger predictors of behavior for marginal subjects than for nonmarginal
ones.
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TABLE 1.8– RESULTS FOR THE SINGLE-SEX ENVIRONMENT
Dep. Variable: Rel. Assessmentss Prob(A)ss Prob(A)ss Prob(WA)ss Prob(WA)ss
Sample: All All Marginal All Marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signal 0.993*** 0.537*** 1.505* 1.144*** 1.687*
(0.210) (0.153) (0.788) (0.278) (0.951)
Female 0.0482 -0.00878 -0.0712 0.0449 0.0675
(0.0382) (0.0420) (0.0680) (0.0522) (0.0839)
Rel.Maleness 0.150* 0.0590 -0.0645 0.158 -0.0855
(0.0876) (0.126) (0.206) (0.158) (0.249)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.0849 -0.136 -0.128 -0.149 -0.174
(0.124) (0.146) (0.248) (0.194) (0.310)
Tournament Controls – YES YES YES YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES NO NO
Number of Clusters – 120 97 120 97
Observations 120 1,080 342 1,080 342
R-squared 0.555
Notes: Column (1) shows the OLS estimates for the subject’s relative self-assessment. Columns (2)–(3) and (4)–(5) show
the marginal effects of the probit model for the probability of choosing tournament A and the probability of getting
WA for the full sample and the subsample of agents classified as marginal, respectively. Other controls include taste
for competition, risk aversion, age and difficulty of the task for column (1) and risk preferences together with believed
minimum ability for winning in tournamentA for columns (2) and (3). Tournament controls include prize awarded by
tournament A and allocation of prizes. Robust standard errors for column (1) and clustered standard errors at subject
level for columns (2)–(5) displayed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.8 shows the main analyses performed in Tables 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 for the
data from this single-sex environment. The first noteworthy finding is that having in-
formation about the distribution of abilities of their own sex cancels out the effects of
subjects’ perceptions on self-assessment (column (1)). Notice that the coefficient for the
interaction Rel.Maleness∗Female switches from being strongly significant (p-value<0.01)
to statistically insignificant (p-value=0.49).
Since in this setting no differences of any kind are observed in self-assessment, the
natural expected result would be to find no differences in behavior or outcomes. Es-
timation results confirm that this is the case. In column (2) it can be confirmed that
for the same observed signal men and women have the same probability of entering
tournament A in the single-sex environment. Furthermore, column (3) shows that this
is also the case for those agents classified as marginal. Columns (4) and (5) show that
perceptions do not affect subjects’ probabilities of winning the top prize either for the
full sample or for the sample of marginal subjects.
These findings reinforce the initial premise that differences in behavior and out-
comes are driven largely by differences in self-assessment and that perceptions affect
self-assessment significantly, but only when the information can be accommodated to
preset perceptions. In other words, data from this stage supports the initial hypothe-
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sis that perceptions –and by extension stereotypes– are critical when comparing social
groups, with confidence not being affected directly but by means of social compar-
isons.
However, despite the great consistency shown with the hypothesis put forward,
several caveats regarding the design of the experiment lead us to take data from this
stage with a grain of salt. Firstly, subjects may be influenced by past decisions and
may thus show some degree of inertia in behavior which pushes them to replicate past
decisions at this stage. Notice that this point is contrary to our findings as it implies
that perception-related behavior must be still present through this inertia. The second
caveat is that the aim of the experiment has been partially disclosed to subjects, given
that in stage 3 they were asked about perceptions. They could then react to that knowl-
edge by changing their behavior. The last concern is that subjects may learn more ac-
curately what their real ability levels are as we provide them with new information.
This may make the signal more informative, so the role of perceptions will diminish.
However, this learning argument seems to be only weakly supported by data. First,
for all experimental sessions a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that
the distributions of abilities of men and women are different. Therefore the picture of
the distribution of abilities in the first part of the experimental session and the picture
observed in this single-sex stage should be similar. Consequently, switching from the
mixed-sex stage to the single-sex one should not greatly improve the quality of the signal
received. In addition, subjects’ guess rates for Rel.Assessment and Rel.Assessmentss are
32% and 38%, figures that are not statistically different (p-value>0.1). The drawback
is that since the mixed-sex and single-sex distributions of abilities shown to subjects
are very similar, subjects who hold non-neutral perceptions may learn that there are
no gender differences and thus behave in the same way as agents who hold neutral
perceptions. Although we cannot rule out this last possibility, this alternative inter-
pretation of the results of this section still confirms that the findings in the mixed-sex
environment are driven by perceptions and not by unobserved characteristics.43
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we present a simple yet natural way of introducing stereotypes into eco-
nomic modeling. Given the large amount of research, especially in social psychology,
43We have two major competing explanations for the results on this section. On the one hand, according
to the theory in Section 2, subjects who observe the distribution of abilities of an ex-ante homogeneous
group will not self-stereotype independently of their beliefs about the gender nature of the task. On the
other hand, it may be the case that all agents learn that there are no gender differences in performance so
they update their priors regarding the gender nature of the task and conclude that it is gender neutral.
In both cases, the result for the single-sex environment is the same: Maleness∗Female is not significant. In
the first case, this would be because perceptions do not play any role in this particular setting. In the
second case it is because at this stage of the experiment all agents perceive the task as neutral. In short,
both explanations conclude that, one way or another, perceptions are no longer relevant in this single-sex
setting. Thus, the single-sex setting is identical to the mixed-sex one but free of perception effects, so any
variable other than perception that lies behind the results in the mixed-sex setting should still be in play.
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which suggests that stereotypes have important effects on self-assessment, we believe
there is a need to explore more deeply when and how stereotypes matter in relevant
economic situations.
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the relevant literature by applying the above
model dealing with stereotypes and self-assessment in a strategic situation which rep-
resents economically relevant settings. In particular, we look at how stereotypes af-
fect self-selection into different tournaments offering different prizes. The theoreti-
cal model identifies the channels through which stereotypes may affect agents’ de-
cisions. In short, the model predicts that the existence of a stereotype will generate
self-stereotyping which ultimately affects agents’ decisions as to where to compete in a
self-fulfilled way. These predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data
collected.
The setting studied in this paper concerning the way in which stereotypes affect
decisions on where to compete may be of great interest in explaining the gender-
based segregation observed in education and labor choices.44 In particular, the model
presents a novel approach explaining gender-based segregation through the impact of
stereotypes on the supply side of the labor market. This idea is supported by the ob-
servation that, in many cases, the segregation observed in the data is consistent with
existing gender stereotypes (Cejka and Eagly (1999); Barbulescu and Bidwell (2013);
Haveman and Beresford (2012)).
Understanding whether gender-based segregation in the labor market can be ex-
plained through existing stereotypes is an extremely important issue because women
are the targets of negative stereotypes in at least three areas strongly related to wage
levels: quantitative skills (Frome and Eccles (1998); Nosek et al. (2009)), leadership
(Schein (2001); Atwater et al. (2004)), and general IQ (Furnham and Gasson (1998);
Furnham et al. (2002); Petrides et al. (2004); Bian et al. (2017)). According to the model
proposed in this paper those stereotypes hurt women’s self-assessment and there-
fore undermine their professional goals, leading them to self-select into lower paying
itineraries than men.
In addition, as discussed on Section 2, the model also provides interesting insights
into how stereotypes affect choices, and suggests directions for policies dealing with
them (see corollary 1.2.3 and the discussion therein). In particular, a promising result
is that increasing the quantity and quality of the feedback received by those who are
the target of a stereotype may alleviate its effects.
44Although the model developed in this paper presents a setting that deals with horizontal segregation,
it can be extended straightforwardly to a vertical segregation setting. Notice that in a setting where agents
have to self-select into competing in tournaments that involve different abilities (e.g. science and arts)
and in which one social group is stereotyped in the skill relevant to the high paying tournament (say
quantitative skills at science), the results found here will also apply.
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Overall, this paper shows strong evidence that stereotypes are very likely to be
playing an important role in shaping segregation –particularly gender-based
segregation– at the labor market through self-selection. Needless to say, we do not
posit that all the gender segregation observed in the market is generated through this
mechanisms. Obviously there are other factors that are very likely to play a role in
shaping it on both the demand and supply sides. For example, continuing with stereo-
types, segregation could be due to gender roles. According to the theory put forward
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), it may well be the case that women choose different
jobs than men because they are supposed to do so. In this setting stereotypes play the
role of social norms. Another important component of segregation can be discrimina-
tion. On the demand side discrimination –both taste-based and statistical– can explain
the segregation observed in the labor market by restricting the access of women to
high-paying positions. On the supply side, expectations about discrimination may also
deter women from applying for some positions. Moreover, differences in risk aversion
could also generate sorting differences as less competitive itineraries usually involve
lower degrees of uncertainty. Lastly, it may be also the case that men and women sim-
ply differ in their choices because of differences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy
(2009)).
Considering the above, the extent to which this self-stereotyping mechanism is
playing a role is thus open to argument. However, in light of the experimental re-
sults presented in the paper, it cannot be denied that the self-stereotyping mechanism
has potential for explaining gender differences in the real world. Notice that the ex-
periment involves a setting which is free from discrimination and in which tastes and
social norms should not play any role. The case of risk aversion deserves further dis-
cussion. In our sample, as usual, women are more risk averse than men. Thus, it could
be argued that this explains why women choose tournament A less often than men.
However, this same argument would lead us to expect women to also choose tour-
nament A in the single-sex environment less often than men, which is not the case.45
Therefore, the results obtained in the experiment cannot be attributed to any of the
above alternative explanations. Thus, the experimental evidence presented in this pa-
per lead us to believe that the interaction between stereotypes and self-assessment
plays an important role in shaping the labor decisions of agents both previously and
in the labor market, and thus contributes to our understanding of education and labor
segregation.
Finally, we would like to point out a methodological caveat. The data collected in
our experiment shows that perceptions about real effort tasks can be critical in explain-
ing subsequent behavior related to that task. Notice further that the consequences of
45In addition there is no an intuitive way in which risk aversion should matter in determining subjects’
self-assessment, which we show explains differences in entry rates, as subjects must enter a point esti-
mate, which means that this thus is independent of the degree of risk aversion. This is confirmed by the
observation that risk aversion is found not to be significant in determining subjects’ self assessment (see
Table A.1 in Appendix A.3).
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those perceptions manifest themselves in the data before we collect them, so it is not
a priming issue but something that subjects have in mind during the experiment (see
also Grosse et al. (2014); Bian et al. (2017) or Iriberri and Rey-Biel (in press) for similar
findings). We therefore think that in studies dealing with real effort tasks in which un-
certainty of the kind covered on this paper –i.e. self-assessment– plays a role, it may be
important to elicit perceptions as to the gender nature of the task to obtain a potentially
important control for subsequent econometric analysis.
Chapter 2
Women ask for less (only from men):
Evidence from alternating-offer
bargaining in the field
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The gender wage gap has long been an important object of study in economics. Al-
though it has shown a decreasing trend over time, its persistence in developed coun-
tries challenges the classical explanations based on differences in human capital, pref-
erences or statistical discrimination (Blau and Kahn (2000)).
Gender differences in negotiation have been put forward as an alternative explana-
tion for the gender gap. Starting wages are often the result of bilateral negotiation. The
influential book by Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever “Women don’t Ask: Negotia-
tion and the gender divide" reveals important gender differences in the likelihood of
negotiating. A study mentioned in the book shows that among graduates of Carnegie
Mellon University 57% of men negotiated the starting salary offered, while only 8%
of women did so. Moreover, wages are also affected by negotiations that come later
during one’s career, e.g. for pay increases. If women are less likely to negotiate start-
ing salaries, and/or if women are less likely to ask for a pay increase, this will clearly
go some way towards explaining the gender wage gap (Azmat and Petrongolo (2014);
Card et al. (2016)).
Alternating-offer bargaining at a TV show offers a unique opportunity to observe
bargaining outcomes and behavior in a real-life situation with sizable stakes. In the
show a contestant who plays the role of the proposer in the bargaining, is asked a
question. The contestant cannot provide the answer herself/himself but has three
minutes to find someone, who plays the role of responder, from whom the answer
can be bought in an alternating-offer setting. In a typical bargaining round, the pro-
poser makes an initial offer which may be accepted or rejected by the responder. If the
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responder rejects it then he/she can post a demand, which may be accepted or rejected
by the proposer. Bargaining can extend over any number of rounds within the three
minute limit. If the answer is correct, the pie is divided up as agreed in the bargaining.
In the paper we study two main research questions. First, are male and female
contestants equally likely to choose male and female responders to bargain with? We
study gender differences when choosing the gender of the bargaining partner. Sec-
ond, is bargaining between male-male, male-female, female-male and female-female
matchings different? We study both gender differences and gender interaction effects
in bargaining.
We find that although both male and female proposers are more likely to choose
male responders, male proposers show a stronger preference for male bargaining part-
ners. This is consistent with taste-based discrimination but also with gender differ-
ences in beliefs.
With respect to bargaining outcomes, we find that negotiations between male pro-
posers and female responders stand out from negotiations between all other gender
combinations: they are the most favorable for men and the least favorable for women
in terms of earnings. In explaining the details of our bargaining setting, we argue that
proposers hold a stronger position than responders. In that sense, it is precisely when
the proposers are male and the responders are female that men are found to end up
with higher bargaining outcomes.
To understand the gender interaction effects in bargaining outcomes, we then look
at gender interaction effects in bargaining behavior. We analyze offers, demands and
probabilities of accepting by responders and proposers. We find no differences in open-
ing offers between male and female proposers, or in opening offers to male and female
responders. More interestingly, we find that it is women who discriminate between
male and female proposers, demanding less from men than from women, which ex-
plains why the matching between male proposers and female responders end up with
the highest earnings for the proposer. It is not the case that men offer less to women
but it is women who demand less to men, when men hold the role of the proposer and
women hold the role of the responders.
Male proposers who choose female responders are not of a particular type and fe-
male responders who are chosen by male proposers are not of a particular type. Based
on important observable characteristics of both proposers and responders, we show
that male proposers who choose male responders do not significantly differ from male
proposers who choose female responders. Similarly, female responders who are cho-
sen by male proposers do not significantly differ from female responders who are cho-
sen by female proposers. In addition, using the probability score matching technique,
we find that our results are not driven by selection problems. On the downside, we
cannot rule out selection based on characteristics that are unobservable, such as beliefs.
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Gender differences in bargaining have been studied by economists. For example,
male proposers’ behavior has been analyzed in studying discrimination by carrying
out field experiments in which the gender of potential scripted buyers is varied (Ayres
(1991); Ayres and Siegelman (1995); Castillo et al. (2013)). To study gender differences
in wage negotiation, Säve-Söderbergh (2007) uses wage bids and wage offers of recent
graduates and finds that women post lower wage bids, and receive lower offers. More
recently, Leibbrandt and List (2014) find, using a field experiment, that women are less
likely to negotiate their salary when wages are not described explicitly as negotiable,
but that the difference disappears when they are described as negotiable. Closer to our
setting, using also data from a TV-show, van Dolder et al. (2015) find gender to be an
insignificant determinant of contestants’ initial claims, their hardball announcements
and concessions, and the shares they end up with. There are however, important dif-
ferences between our setting and theirs. First, bargaining is between three parties in
their setting, while it is between two parties in ours. Second, bargaining in their setting
consists of an allocation problem, where the pie is split into three unequal shares and
contestants have to decide who gets which, while in ours it consists of an alternating-
offer bargaining. Most importantly, they study only gender differences and not gender
interaction effects. Economists have also studied gender differences in controlled set-
tings such as the laboratory, mostly using the ultimatum game, which represents a
reduced-form bargaining setting, as it allows for a single offer (or demand) and the
response to it. Rigdon (2012) finds that women demand less than men in a demand-
ultimatum-game in the laboratory, and Andersen et al. (2013) find that gender differ-
ences in bargaining depend on culture. More recently, Exley et al. (2016) study gender
differences in the choice to negotiate, and in their baseline treatment, where subjects
are forced to negotiate, they find that men and women achieve similar returns.
Gender interaction effects in bargaining have received less attention. Given that
bargaining requires interaction between two agents, gender differences in one role may
crucially depend on the gender of the interlocutor. Existing studies based on field data
or field experiments do not study gender interaction effects, either because the gender
of the person in one role is not known (e.g. Leibbrandt and List (2014)), or because
there is not enough variation (e.g. Castillo et al., 2013). Economists are thus limited to
the use of laboratory experiments. Using mostly face-to-face ultimatum games, Eckel
and Grossman (2001); Solnick (2001) show that offers to women are lower than offers
to men, and that women are more likely to accept offers.1 Sutter et al. (2009) find
more competition and retaliation between same gender matchings than mixed gen-
der matchings using the power-to-take game. Eriksson and Sandberg (2012) find that
women are less likely to initiate a negotiation if they are matched with a female partner.
More closely related to our setting, Dittrich et al. (2014), using a laboratory face-to-face
alternating-offer wage-bargaining game, find that starting salaries offered by men to
1To be precise, Eckel and Grossman (2001) find that women are more likely to accept offers, while
Solnick (2001) finds that women are more likely to accept offers from male proposers than from female
proposers.
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women are lower than those offered by women to men, resulting in significant gender
interaction effects on wage-bargaining outcomes. This line of research shows that ob-
served gender differences depend crucially on the gender of the interacting individual,
so such interactions deserve equal attention.
Our setting offers multiple advantages over laboratory experiments. First, the pie
to be divided is worth an average of 345 Euro, so the stakes are sizable and significantly
bigger than in a typical laboratory experiment. Please, see van Dolder et al. (2015) for
similar arguments on the importance of stakes. Second, except for the three minute
limitation the bargaining is not structured, so the observed negotiations in the tv-show
are closer to the type of bargaining that happens in real-life than the structured nego-
tiations in the laboratory. The setting also offers some advantages over standard field
data given that the bargaining process is recorded. First, the setting allows not only
bargaining outcomes, such as whether the negotiation was successful, proposers’ and
responders’ bargaining outcomes or the duration of the negotiation but also bargain-
ing strategies and bargaining behavior itself to be observed, such as round by round
offers, demands and probabilities of accepting. Second, there is gender variation in
the roles of both proposers and responders, so it is possible to study not only gender
differences but most importantly, also gender interaction effects within different bar-
gaining matchings.
Our setting also presents limitations that can affect external validity. One limitation
that should be kept in mind is the extent to which the individuals studied are represen-
tative, as they are willing to, and indeed do, participate in a TV show. In that respect,
the participation bias might be lower than in other shows as the show in question is
recorded in the main streets of major cities in Spain and not in a studio. The recruit-
ment process is therefore somewhat non-standard, as the contestants are picked on the
spot. Second, audience effect must be taken into account, as the observed behavior
might be influenced by it. These two limitations are common to all studies that use be-
havior at a TV show (List (2006); Post et al. (2008); van Dolder et al. (2015)). Finally, the
interactions we observe are one-shot, while reputation built in repeated-interactions is
important when bargaining in the labor market.
Overall, our findings are consistent with the literature that finds that women de-
mand less and are offered less. In addition, the paper makes three important contri-
butions. First, in line with the few papers that look at gender interactions (Eckel and
Grossman (2001); Solnick (2001); Dittrich et al. (2014)) it confirms that gender interac-
tions are crucial in understanding gender differences. When looking at both gender
differences and gender interaction effects, we show that looking at only gender dif-
ferences can show a misleading interpretation of results. As an example, the findings
in this paper are consistent with findings by Säve-Söderbergh (2007) in the sense that
women demand less. However, we show that this is only the case when the interaction
is with men, i.e. women demand less only from men. Second, the paper offers evidence
based on unstructured bargaining behavior observed in the field with sizable stakes,
2.2. THE DATA 43
supplementary to the bargaining behavior observed in the laboratory. Finally, and in
sharp contrast with Dittrich et al. (2014), we find that in our setting the determinant
behavior that results in gender interaction effects does not reside in proposers’ initial
offers but in responders’ demands.2 In other words, no evidence of such discrimina-
tory behavior is found in initial offers. It is female responders who demand less from
male proposers, both in initial demands and subsequent demands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the TV show, the
data and the identification strategy. Section 2.3 contains the analysis and results. We
first analyze gender differences in the choice of the gender of the bargaining partner
(Section 2.3.1). Then we study gender differences and gender interaction effects in
bargaining outcomes (Section 2.3.2). Thirdly, we analyze bargaining behavior studying
actual offers, demands and probabilities of accepting (Section 2.3.3). Section 2.4 shows
the results of three robustness tests that address both the selection and unbalancedness
problems in our data. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 THE DATA
2.2.1 THE SETTING: ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING IN A TV SHOW
We use the bargaining behavior from the Spanish TV show Negocia como puedas.3 This
was a quiz-show that took place in the streets of major cities in Spain in the summer of
2013.
In a typical episode, the presenters pick a contestant, who is endowed with 100
Euro. He/she is then asked a question whose answer he/she cannot provide him/herself,
independently of whether he/she knows the answer, and has three minutes to find
someone on the street and negotiate a prize for the right answer via an alternating-
offer bargaining. The contestant searches for a potential responder. The contestant can
approach as many potential responders as he/she wants, and only when the potential
responder provides an answer that is considered satisfactory to the contestant, he/she
starts bargaining. In the bargaining, if an agreement is reached and the answer is cor-
rect then the 100 Euro is divided up as agreed. If the contestant does not reach an
agreement within the three minutes, the game ends and he/she wins nothing. Nego-
tiations may end with no agreement for two reasons: The time limit may be reached
with no agreement, though this occurs very rarely (in 4% of the breakdowns), or (in the
remaining 96% of the breakdowns) the contestant may decide to break off the negotia-
tion and look for someone else to start a new negotiation. This is allowed as long as it
occurs within the three minute time limit. The game is repeated up to 4 different times
2Although the setting in Dittrich et al. (2014) is closest to ours in that the negotiation occurs as in an
alternating-offer game, there are also important differences. The most important one is that, contrary to
our setting, proposers do not choose to break the negotiation, but the matching and breaking of negotia-
tion is done randomly and exogenously.
3The show’s name translates as "Bargain How You Can". It was shown on national TV channel Cuatro.
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with different bargaining partners, as long as the questions are answered correctly. The
answers to the questions are quite easy and trivial, and correct answers were given on
87% of occasions.4 We refer here to the four potential repetitions as stages. In the sec-
ond stage the contestant is endowed with a further 200 Euro in addition to the money
kept from the first stage, so the maximum size of the pie to be divided up in the second
stage is 300 Euro. In the third stage there is an extra endowment of 300 Euro, so the
maximum size of the pie is 600 Euro. The fourth and final stage is optional, but if the
contestant decides to continue the extra endowment is 1000 Euro, such that the max-
imum size of the pie to be divided up is 1600 Euro. The amount of the pie is known
only to the contestant. Note that the stakes are real and sizable.
We refer to the contestant as the proposer and to the person selected on the street as
the responder. In a typical round of bargaining, the proposer starts with an offer, which
the responder either accepts or rejects. If the responder rejects, then he/she can post
a demand, which may be accepted or rejected by the proposer. We refer to the combi-
nation of proposer’s offer, responder’s response, responder’s demand and proposer’s
response to the demand as a round. Note that a round does not need to be complete as
one of the bargaining partners can remain silent in a specific round. However, in each
round at least one of the bargainers must make an active move by posting an offer or a
demand, and responding to an offer or to a demand. The bargaining process can take
any number of rounds within the three minute limit. In the data used here the shortest
bargaining process lasted for one round while the longest lasted for 15.
Given our setting, we argue that the proposer’s position is strong while the re-
sponder’s position is weak. First, it is the proposer who starts the negotiation with
an opening offer (95% of the time). Research into bargaining has shown that the start-
ing offer is an important determinant of outcomes (see for example Van Poucke and
Buelens (2002)). Second, proposers know with certainty the actual size of the pie to be
divided, while responders do not. Finally, and more importantly, while the proposer
can break off the negotiation and look for another responder at any time, the responder
has no such option. These three characteristics make the positions of the proposer and
responder asymmetric, giving the former a strong role and the latter a weak one.
4If the contestant reaches an agreement but the answer is incorrect, the amount negotiated is deducted.
He/she is then allowed to use the wildcard, which consists of a phone call to a friend who must provide
the correct answer, while the contestant is allowed to help but not to use any word from a list of forbidden
words. The wildcard therefore, enables contestants to continue in the game even though the answer to
the question is incorrect. There is only one wildcard. Most importantly, to use the wildcard an agreement
must have been reached, such that the bargaining behavior is equally valid regardless of whether the
contestant starts bargaining because he/she thinks the answer is correct or because he/she is running out
of time and is doing so only to be able to use the wildcard.
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2.2.2 THE DATABASE
We have created a panel database that records the bargaining behavior in the TV show.5
For the analysis, we use bargaining behavior from 428 matchings between 134 pro-
posers and 428 different responders.6 There are 73 female proposers (54%) and 61 male
proposers (46%), and 157 female responders (37%) and 271 male responders (63%). The
sample of proposers is balanced in terms of gender composition, but the sample of re-
sponders contains more men than women.7
The proposers introduce themselves briefly, providing their names, ages and oc-
cupations. In terms of occupation we identify those who are students, retired, and
unemployed. We also classify proposers as having a low-level or high-level occupa-
tion.8 The responders only reveal their names, so we have no information on their
ages and occupations. However, given that we have footage from the TV show, we
have elicited subjective perceptions of the ages of both proposers and responders (a
scale from 1 (below 30) to 6 (above 70)), socio-economic status (0 for medium-low, and
1 for medium-high) and attractiveness (using a scale between 0 (very unattractive) and
8 (very attractive)). We showed snapshots of all participants - both proposers and re-
sponders - to 10 different raters and averaged them.9 The instructions given to these
raters are available upon request.
We also recorded the pie to be shared, Pie, the stage at which the contestant is,
Stage, and the deviation from the mean pie at each stage, (Pie-Mean) by stage.10 Bargain-
5We have saved all the original TV shows so the database can be replicated and recoded.
6There is a total of 437 matchings. Information from 9 bargaining matchings was dropped because
the presenter made comments about the proposer’s behavior, for example accusing the proposer of being
stingy, which influenced both the bargaining outcome and behavior.
7A Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test does not reject the null hypothesis that the sample of proposers is
representative in terms of gender (p-value 0.30), but it does reject it for the sample of responders (p-value
0.00).
8We follow the 2 digit classification used by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INS) and
consider as low-level those occupations whose digits are strictly above 49, along with occupations in the
armed forces. The low-level occupation variable includes occupations such as waiters and hairdressers.
Accordingly, we consider as high-level those occupations whose digits are below 49. The high-level
occupation variable includes occupations such as engineers and clerical jobs.
9Each rater evaluated 125 participants in about an hour and was rewarded with a fixed amount of
15 Euro. For proposers, five men and five women were recruited. For responders, if the responder was
chosen by a male proposer then all 10 raters were male, while if the responder was chosen by a female
proposer then all 10 raters were female. Since we have the proposers’ real ages, we have computed the
correlation between the real age and the perceived one. The result is 0.94, which confirms the validity
of these ratings. In addition, given that we are using the average of the ratings, we have calculated
the interim reliability scale (Cronbach’s alpha), which gives a score of 0.99 for perceived age, 0.94 for
socio-economic status and and 0.85 for attractiveness, confirming the alignment of raters on each of the
variables.
10As is clear from the description of the TV show, the size of the pie increases proportionally from stage
to stage, so these two variables are highly correlated (over 0.9). As we can not include both, pie and stage,
we decided to control for the stage, which ranges from 1 to 4, and also for the deviation from the mean
pie at each stage.
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ing Time refers to the time in seconds left for bargaining, where the maximum is three
minutes. Finally, we classify each bargaining matching according to whether the ques-
tion asked is perceived to be male, neutral or female (Male Question, Neutral Question,
and Female Question). Remember that the contestant is asked a question whose answer
he/she needs to buy in an alternating-offer bargaining. So the choice of the bargaining
partner, and in particular the gender of the chosen bargaining partner, is influenced
by whether the question is male or female. We gave the questions and answers to two
different people, one a man and the other a woman, separately and asked them to clas-
sify the questions as male, neutral or female, in terms of how likely men and women
are to give a correct answer.11 Instructions received by these raters are available upon
request.
Table 2.1 presents the mean values and standard deviations for all the demographic
and control variables for the proposers and the demographic variables for responders,
overall (column 1), and for female (column 2) and male (column 3) participants, sep-
arately. Column 4 reports the p-values for the F -Test of equality of variable means
across genders. As the data show, the only significant difference between male and
female proposers is that men are less attractive and more likely to hold a low-level
occupation, while women are more likely to hold a high-level occupation. We control
for all these characteristics when analyzing the behavior of proposers. For responders,
the only significant difference is that female responders are more attractive than male
responders.
The rest of the columns in Table 2.1 compare the characteristics separated by the
gender combinations of the bargaining matches. With 73 female and 61 male pro-
posers, and 157 female and 271 male responders, we end up with 139 female-male,
92 female-female, 65 male-female, and 132 male-male bargaining matchings. For pro-
posers, this enables us to see whether male/female proposers who choose a male re-
sponder differ in their characteristics from male/female proposers who choose a fe-
male responder. Similarly, for responders, this enables us to see whether male/female
responders who are chosen by male proposers differ in their characteristics from male/
female responders who are chosen by female proposers. The most important variable
is that of the male/neutral/female nature of the question. Around 70% of questions
are classified as neutral, 16% as male and 16% as female. Male and female proposers do
not show significant differences in being asked male or female questions, see p-values
in column 4. More importantly, as expected, the male or female nature of the question
significantly affects the gender choice of the bargaining partner. When asked a male
question, contestants look for a male responder, but when faced with a female question
they look for a female responder, see p-values in columns 7 and 10. We find no evidence
of important differences in the rest of the variables, with two minor exceptions: female
11The raters initially agreed on their classification in 70% of questions. Among the questions over which
they disagreed, all but 5 were questions that one rater classified as neutral but the other classified as male
or female. After the initial perceptions of each rater were collected, they discussed the questions over
which they disagreed face to face and reached an agreement on all of them.
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TABLE 2.1– DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: PROPOSERS AND RESPONDERS
Proposers Overall Female Male p-value Female-Male Female-Female p-value Male-Male Male-Female p-value
Obs. 134 73 (54%) 61 (46%) 139 92 132 65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age 34.37 33.08 35.90 0.23 31.55 33.24 0.30 34.63 35.88 0.52
(13.45) (13.12) (13.8) (11.97) (12.49) (12.07) (13.73)
Student 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.62
(0.39) (0.42) (0.34) (0.46) (0.37) (0.32) (0.35)
Retired 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.36 0.06 0.05 0.92 0.02 0.06 0.08
(0.22) (0.25) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.12) (0.24)
Unemployed 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.35 0.08 0.07 0.69 0.14 0.08 0.18
(0.29) (0.25) (0.32) (0.27) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27)
Low-Level Occupation 0.35 0.23 0.49 0.00 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.45 0.45 0.99
(0.48) (0.42) (0.5) (0.4) (0.45) (0.5) (0.5)
High-Level Occupation 0.32 0.40 0.23 0.04 0.36 0.45 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.96
(0.47) (0.49) (0.42) (0.48) (0.5) (0.45) (0.45)
Perceived Age 2.41 2.32 2.51 0.34 2.15 2.35 0.17 2.35 2.63 0.08
(1.13) (1.16) (1.09) (1.06) (1.12) (1.02) (1.02)
Perceived Status 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.47 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.41 0.10
(0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.24)
Perceived Attractiveness 3.44 3.92 2.87 0.00 4.14 3.91 0.19 3.01 2.77 0.18
(1.37) (1.35) (1.18) (1.32) (1.32) (1.2) (1.05)
Pie 345.84 337.39 355.95 0.57 421.05 366.68 0.33 385.46 445.75 0.33
(186.23) (189.45) (183.35) (425.52) (387.49) (397.67) (429.45)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage -0.80 0.16 -1.96 0.51 -0.83 3.74 0.26 -1.20 -1.08 0.97
(18.58) (19.90) (16.96) (36.45) (17.58) (22.07) (25.93)
Stage 1.93 1.90 1.97 0.42 2.14 1.98 0.25 2.05 2.25 0.21
(0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (1.02) (0.99) (1) (1.02)
Bargaining Time 103.82 104.34 103.20 0.81 110.96 107.34 0.57 105.05 100.82 0.55
(27.54) (31.52) (22.08) (47.09) (47.52) (48.18) (44.2)
Male Question 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.55 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.44) (0.18) (0.41) (0.21)
Neutral Question 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.40 0.68 0.62 0.36
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33 (0.47) (0.45) (0.47) (0.49)
Female Question 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.34 0.00
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.43) (0.31) (0.48)
Responders Overall Female Male p-value Male-Female Female-Female p-value Male-Male Female-Male p-value
Obs. 428 157 (37%) 271 (63%) 65 92 132 139
Perceived Age 2.80 2.70 2.86 0.20 2.75 2.67 0.65 2.96 2.76 0.17
(1.17) (1.15) (1.18) (1.14) (1.16) (1.19) (1.18)
Perceived Status 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.81 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.55
(0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.27)
Perceived Attractiveness 3.17 3.63 2.90 0.00 3.54 3.69 0.47 3.05 2.76 0.02
(1.19) (1.26) (1.07) (1.5) (1.07) (1.07) (1.05)
Notes The table shows the mean values and the standard deviations of the main outcome and control variables. Age describes the age in years. Student, Retired , Unemployed,
Low-Level Occupation and High-Level Occupation take the value of 1 when the proposer is a student, retired, unemployed and holding a low and high occupation, respectively.
Perceived Age, Perceived Status and Perceived Attractiveness are elicited measures of age, status and attractiveness, in a scales between, 1 (below 30) to 6 (above 70), 0 (medium-
low) and 1 (medium high), and 0 (very unattractive) to 8 (very attractive), respectively. Pie refers to the amount in euro to bargain over. Stage refers to the number of stage
and can take values between 1 and 4. (Pie-Mean) by stage shows the deviation of the pie by stage. Bargaining Time summarizes the time left in seconds for the bargaining.
Finally, Male/Neutral/Female question take the value of 1 when the question is classified as male, neutral and female. The p-value are for the F-Test of equality of variable
means across gender.
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TABLE 2.2– DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: OUTCOMES VARIABLES
Obs. Overall Female-Male Female-Female Male-Female Male-Male p-value
139 (32%) 92 (21%) 65 (15%) 132 (31%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bargaining Outcomes:
Prob. of No Agreement 428 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.24
(0.32) (0.30) (0.36) (0.24) (0.35)
Proposer’s Outcome 377 367.14 378.29 325.31 403.59 364.02 0.68
(394.09) (404.99) (354.89) (418.33) (396.69)
No. of Rounds 377 3.58 3.72 3.81 3.77 3.16 0.09
(when agreement) (2.12) (2.31) (2.06) (2.2) (1.86)
No. of Rounds 51 2.71 2.57 2.71 2.75 2.79 0.96
(when no agreement) (1.12) (0.94 ) (1.33) (1.50) (1.08)
Bargaining Behavior when agreement:
Offers 1283 (376) 34.11 35.62 33.25 29.90 35.63 0.23
(36.96) (38.53) (34.05) (23.05) (43.88)
Prob. Responder Accepts 1283 (376) 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.16
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.30) (0.37)
Demands 871 (321) 105.31 127.64 112.96 60.23 100.99 0.00
(182.85) (200.86) (247.37) (40.09) (142.11)
Prob. Proposer Accepts 871 (321) 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.62
(0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.43) (0.44)
Notes The table shows the mean values and the standard deviations of the main outcome variables. Prob. of No Agree-
ment takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise. Proposer’s Outcome
refers to the amount in euro agreed for the proposer and No. of Rounds summarizes the duration of the bargaining
process. Offer and Demand refer to the offers and demands in euro by the proposer and responder, respectively, and
Prob. Responder(Proposer) Accepts take the value of 1 when an offer(demand) is accepted and 0 otherwise. The p-value
are for the F-Test of equality of variable means across gender combinations.
proposers who are students are more likely to choose male responders, and male re-
sponders who are chosen by male proposers are more attractive than those who are
chosen by female proposers.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the outcome variables we analyze,
overall (column 1) and for the gender combinations of the bargaining matches, respec-
tively. The last column in Table 2.2 reports the p-values for the F -Test of equality of
variable means across all four gender matchings. We distinguish between variables
that describe bargaining outcomes and bargaining behavior.
The main bargaining outcome variables of interest are Prob. of No Agreement, Pro-
poser’s Outcome and No. of Rounds.12 Prob. of No Agreement is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the proposer and the responder do not reach an agreement and
0 otherwise.13 Overall, only 12% of the negotiations failed (51 out of 428), while 88%
of the time proposers and responders reached an agreement (377 out of 428). For the
rest of the outcome variables, we restrict the sample to successful bargaining match-
ings (377 matchings). Proposers on average earn 367 Euro. Given that the size of the
12We have also considered an alternative measure for number of rounds, such as time elapsed since
bargaining started. Results remain unchanged.
13As explained in Section 2.2.1, there are 2 possible cases in which bargaining partners do not reach an
agreement. Either the proposer drops the negotiation to look for another possible responder, or the three-
minute limit is reached while negotiating. The former is the most common case (96% of breakdowns),
while the latter is very rare (4% of breakdowns).
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pie to be shared in successful negotiations averages 417 Euro, proposers take 88% of
it.14 On average, successful negotiations take longer (about 4 rounds) than unsuccess-
ful ones (about 3 rounds). The final column shows the p-value for the comparison
between the four cases of different gender pairings. The matchings that prove most
beneficial for the proposer are those between a male proposer and a female responder
(404 Euro), while the lowest outcome for the proposer is in bargaining between two
women (325 Euro). These differences, however, are not significant. Interestingly, only
the number of rounds when the negotiation did not fail shows significant differences,
with negotiations between male contestants being the fastest. Notice however that a
priori important variables can differ significantly from one matching to another, e.g.
the size of the pie. Regression analysis shows that controls are important to identify
gender differences and gender interaction effects.
When analyzing bargaining behavior in successful negotiations, taking into ac-
count the panel structure of the database, we look at the offers made by the proposers
(Offers), the demands made by the responders (Demands), and their respective proba-
bilities of accepting (Prob. Responder Accepts, Prob. Proposer Accepts). Note that these
are round by round data, so there are several observations per bargaining matching,
as long as the negotiation took more than one round. Moreover, there are matchings
that have no demands or offers, so one bargaining role remained silent. Therefore,
the column for the number of observations includes both the round by round obser-
vations and, in parenthesis, the number of bargaining matchings. The average offer
by proposers is 34 Euro and the average demand is 105 Euro, with the probabilities of
accepting being 14% by responders and 23% by proposers. Demands among different
matchings show significant differences, demands from female responders to male pro-
posers being the lowest, of about 60 Euro.
2.2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The database from the TV show enables us to answer two interesting research ques-
tions. First, we test whether male and female proposers differ in their choice of the
gender of their bargaining partners. Second, we test for gender differences and gender
interaction effects in bargaining. In other words, we do not only show the effect of
the gender of the proposer and the responder on bargaining, but we also compare the
four different gender combinations (male-female, female-male, male-male and female-
female) to test for gender interaction effects in bargaining.15 Here, we distinguish be-
tween bargaining outcomes and bargaining behavior: bargaining outcomes include
whether the bargaining fails to reach an agreement (Prob. of No Agreement), the bargain-
14Shares of the pie and proportional offers and demands can be also analyzed. However, we decided
to focus on absolute values (Proposer’s Outcome, Offers and Demands) instead of relative ones for two main
reasons: First, the pie varies significantly from matching to matching. It ranges between 100 Euro and
1600 Euro. Second, responders do not know the size of the pie, so they could not possibly care or negotiate
in terms of shares of the pie.
15In all regressions the omitted category is female-female.
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ing outcome for the proposer (Proposer’s Outcome), and the duration of the bargaining
process (No. of Rounds). Bargaining behavior includes offers made by proposers (Of-
fers), demands made by responders (Demands), and their respective probabilities of
accepting (Prob. Proposer/Responder Accepts).
In particular, to test whether female and male proposers behave differently when
choosing the gender of their bargaining partners, we estimate the following regression:
MaleResponderj = α+ βMaleProposeri + γXi + i (2.1)
To test whether gender and gender interactions matter in explaining bargaining
outcomes and behavior, we estimate the following regressions for gender differences
and gender interactions, respectively:
Yij = α+ β1MaleProposeri + β2MaleResponderj + γXij + ij (2.2)
Yij = α+ β1MaleiFemalej + β2FemaleiMalej + β3MaleiMalej + γXij + ij (2.3)
In studying the choice of the gender of the bargaining partner and bargaining out-
comes we use the collapsed data at the responder level, given that these variables, and
indeed the independent variables, remain constant round by round. We therefore have
428 matchings and observations for the Male Responder and Prob. of No Agreement de-
pendent variables. For Proposer’s Outcome and No. of Rounds we constrain the sample to
the matchings that reached an agreement. This results in 377 matchings and observa-
tions. Given that the same proposer is matched with different responders, we always
cluster the standard errors at the proposer level.
When analyzing bargaining behavior in successful negotiations, we exploit the
panel structure of the database, i.e. we use the round by round bargaining data but
specify the identification of the responder as the panel variable, and estimate a ran-
dom effects model. We also cluster the standard errors at the proposer level.16
Two types of control are applied in all regressions: First there are control variables
that refer to the proposers’ and responders’ socio-demographic characteristics. Second
there are controls specific to the bargaining matching, such as the stage, variation in
the pie within the stage and bargaining time. Finally, we also include controls specific
to each dependent variable, such as controlling for previous offers when explaining
the probability of the responder accepting.
16When analyzing bargaining behavior with 0-1 outcome variables and exploiting the panel structure
of the data, such as Prob. Proposer Accepts, Prob. Responder Accepts, we estimate a random effects probit
model. In these cases, we use bootstrapped standard errors.
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2.3 RESULTS
2.3.1 CHOICE OF BARGAINING PARTNER
Proposers choose responders to bargain with. This choice is limited in two important
ways. First, proposers choose responders from among the people on the streets at the
time of the TV show.17 Second, and more importantly, they make their choice under
time pressure, as they have only three minutes to find a responder and negotiate a
prize after they are given the question. Given these constraints, the choice of a respon-
der seems more intuitive than meditated. It is, nevertheless, interesting to analyze the
determinants of the gender of the responder chosen and in particular, whether male
and female participants have different preferences for a particular gender of respon-
der.
As seen above, although the sample of proposers is balanced in terms of gender, the
sample of responders is not. In particular, there are significantly more male than female
responders, which suggests that both male and female proposers show a preference for
bargaining with men rather than with women. The over-representation of men in the
responder sample is also consistent with women being more reluctant to participate in
the show than men. However, given the actual gender composition of the samples of
proposers and responders, the hypothesis that the existing gender combinations of the
matchings are as expected under random matching cannot be rejected.18
We therefore study the determinants of the gender of the responder. In particu-
lar, we test whether the gender of the proposer has any effect on the gender of the
responder chosen. In other words, we test whether male and female proposers have
different preferences as regards the gender of responders. The results of this estima-
tion are shown in Table 2.3. The first column shows the results with no controls, while
the second column shows the results when controls are added.19
Once controls are added, evidence emerges that male participants have a stronger
17Note that the availability of potential responders, and whether the available responder population
shows a balanced gender composition, could be important factors. However, as the show took place in
the main streets of large cities in Spain, we assume that the availability of people is not determinant and
that the gender composition is balanced. Hence, these factors are not a concern in analyzing the choice of
the gender of the bargaining partner.
18With 73 female and 61 male proposers, and 157 female and 271 male responders, under random
matching one would expect 147 female vs. male, 86 female vs. female, 74 male vs. female, and 125 male
vs. male bargaining matchings. In the sample, we end up with 139 female vs. male, 92 female vs. female,
65 male vs. female, and 132 male vs. male actual bargaining matchings. The Chi-Square Goodness of Fit
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the gender matchings are as expected under random matching
(p-value 0.34).
19Estimations with alternative specifications are shown in Table B.1, in Appendix B.1. We also consider
linear probability and logit estimation models (in columns 1 and 2, respectively). Alternatively, we also
treat data as a panel, as we observe the same proposer matched with different responders, and estimate
a random effects probit model (column 3). These three specifications yield results that are similar both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
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TABLE 2.3– CHOICE OF THE SEX OF THE RESPONDER
Prob. Prob.
Male Responder Male Responder
(1) (2)
Male Proposer 0.0683 0.136***
(0.0543) (0.0527)
Age Proposer 0.00222
(0.00333)
Student Proposer 0.108
(0.0746)
Retired Proposer -0.124
(0.189)
Unemployed Proposer 0.138*
(0.0742)
Low-Occupation Proposer 0.00293
(0.0681)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer 0.0534**
(0.0261)
Perc. Status Proposer -0.151
(0.124)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage -0.000261
(0.000789)
Remaining Time 0.000529
(0.000471)
Male Question 0.302***
(0.0520)
Female Question -0.285***
(0.0626)
Stage FE YES YES
Observations 428 428
Notes The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the selected responder is male and 0 otherwise. The table shows the
marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described in the notes of
Table 2.1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
preference for male bargaining partners. Men are more likely to choose a male bar-
gaining partner than women.20 The stronger preference of male proposers for male
responders may be explained by gender differences in preferences, such as taste-based
discrimination (Becker (1971)) or, taking a more rational approach, may potentially be
explained by gender differences in beliefs. First, men and women might have different
beliefs about the likelihood of men and women knowing the correct answer. In partic-
ular, men might assign a higher probability than women to the notion of men knowing
the correct answer. In the sample, we find no evidence that male and female respon-
ders are more/less likely to know the correct answer.21 Second, men and women might
20Note that this cannot be explained by any bias in the gender composition in the sample of available
potential responders, as any limitation by this type should affect both male and female proposers equally.
21Table B.2, in Appendix B.1, shows that when we do not control for the male/neutral/female nature
of the question, men are less likely to know the correct answer (significant at 10%), shown in column
1. However, once that feature is controlled for, men and women are equally likely to know the correct
answer, shown in column 2. Furthermore, responders are less likely to get the correct answers to male
questions.
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have different beliefs about the bargaining behavior of male and female responders. In
particular, men may believe more strongly than women that male responders will be
less aggressive in their bargaining behavior. As shown below, the bargaining outcomes
coming from matchings between different genders indicate that this belief is not cor-
rect. Third, men and women might have also different beliefs about gender differences
in the willingness to participate in the TV show as responders.
As expected, the most important determinant of the gender of the opponent is
whether the question is perceived to be male or female (neutral being the omitted cate-
gory). When presented with a male question (e.g. a sports related question), proposers
look for men, while when presented with a female question (e.g. questions related to
fashion or celebrities), proposers look for female responders. Furthermore, we have
tested whether the male preference for male responders is independent of the percep-
tion (male/female/neutral) of the question, which is supported by the data.22 Also, at-
tractive proposers are more likely to choose male responders. Further analysis shows
that this is not different for male and female proposers.23
From this analysis it is clear that responders are chosen by the proposers, and that
male and female proposers show differences in the gender of their chosen bargaining
partners. This yields an unbalanced sample of different gender combinations (male-
male, male-female, female-male and female-female matchings), and a biased sample
due to selection (male proposers are more likely to choose male responders). Section
4 addresses these two problems by carrying out additional regression analysis. First,
we carry out a regression with probability weights that correct the unbalanced sam-
ple. Second, we carry out regressions in a matched sample using probability score
matching to address the selection problem. Third, we reject the underlying hypothesis
that male and female responders chosen by male and female proposers differ in their
observable characteristics. We show that the main results are sound and robust.
2.3.2 OUTCOME VARIABLES: PROBABILITY OF NO AGREEMENT, PROPOSER’S
OUTCOME AND NUMBER OF ROUNDS
Bargaining outcomes can be described by three main variables: First, whether the bar-
gaining partners reach an agreement or not, summarized by Prob. of No Agreement;
Second, by the amount of money agreed for the proposer, described by Proposer’s Out-
come24; and third, by the duration of the bargaining process, that is, the number of
rounds (No. of Rounds).
22When interacting Male Proposer with the Male/Female Question, the interactions are insignificant. These
results are shown in column 4 of Table B.1, in Appendix B.1.
23When interacting Male Proposer with the Proposer’s Attractiveness, the interaction is insignificant. These
estimation results are shown in column 5 of Table B.1, in Appendix B.1.
24Notice that analyzing the amount of money agreed for the proposer yields the same conclusions than
analyzing the amount of money agreed for the responder.
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Table 2.4 summarizes the regression results for these three outcome variables.25
The first three columns look at the effect of the gender of the proposer and of the re-
sponder, while the last three columns also include the interaction between the gender
of the bargaining partners. When estimating gender interaction effects we also in-
clude the p-values for the hypothesis test that conducts a pairwise comparison of the
effects of different gender combinations, shown at the bottom of Table 2.4. We find
neither gender difference nor gender interaction effects on the probability of no agree-
ment and on the duration of bargaining. In contrast, there are important differences
in terms of earnings. Although there is no evidence for any gender difference in pro-
posers and responders’ behavior (column 2), we find that negotiations between male
proposers and female responders result in about 11 Euro more for the proposer (col-
umn 5). Furthermore, as shown by the hypothesis tests, bargaining between men and
women stands out as the most beneficial for proposers, compared to negotiations with
any other gender combination. This means that while male proposers earn 3% more
when negotiating with women than with men, female responders earn 22% less when
negotiating with men than with women. This result shows that gender interactions
are crucial: it is not just that men and women behave differently when bargaining but,
more importantly, differences depend on the gender of the bargaining partner. Later
analysis of gender differences and gender interaction effects in the bargaining process
clarify whether this is due to male proposers discriminating against female responders,
to female responders behaving differently when interacting with male proposers, or to
a combination of both.
Many controls are significant in explaining the bargaining outcomes. The first offer
made by the proposer has been found to be an important determinant for bargaining
outcomes, i.e. the quantity offered in the first round (see for example Van Poucke and
Buelens (2002)).26 We confirm that this is indeed an important determinant: the higher
the first offer, the more likely it is that a successful agreement will be reached, the lower
the proposer’s outcome is and the shorter the negotiation is. Moreover in terms of the
probability of there being no agreement, the longer the bargaining goes on the lower
the probability of failure is. Also, those negotiations that have more time left are more
likely to fail, given that the proposers have still time to find alternative responders.
Interestingly, older proposers, those who hold low-level occupations, and students,
25For the variable Prob. of No Agreement, we show the estimation results using the probit model while
for No. of Rounds we use a Poisson regression. We also consider alternative specifications, shown in Table
B.3, in Appendix B.1. For Prob. of No Agreement we consider linear probability and logit estimation models
(shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively). For No. of Rounds, we also consider OLS, shown in column 5.
For the three outcome variables, we also consider the data as a panel, as we observe the same proposer
matched with different responders, and estimate a random effects model, shown in columns 3, 4 and
6, for Prob. of No Agreement, Proposer’s Outcome, and No. of Rounds, respectively. All these alternative
specifications yield results that are both qualitatively and quantitatively the same.
26The empirical literature on bargaining highlights 3 different internal reference points that affect bar-
gaining outcomes: reservation prices, aspiration prices and opening offers. It has been found that they
are all positively, strongly correlated, so opening offers -the only observable internal reference point in
our database- may contain the effect of the other two internal reference points.
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TABLE 2.4– GENDER DIFFERENCES AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN BARGAINING OUTCOMES
Prob. No Proposer’s No. of Prob. No Proposer’s No. of
Agreement Outcome Rounds Agreement Outcome Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Proposer 0.0218 1.899 -0.313 MF -0.0447 10.78*** -0.177
(0.0285) (3.641) (0.230) (0.0397) (3.822) (0.337)
Male Responder 0.00286 -3.873 -0.192 FM -0.0397 2.995 -0.0868
(0.0315) (3.111) (0.248) (0.0384) (3.689) (0.332)
MM 0.0160 -0.523 -0.476
(0.0389) (5.037) (0.305)
Age Proposer -0.00764*** 0.170 0.00990 Age Proposer -0.00767*** 0.199 0.0102
(0.00252) (0.236) (0.0130) (0.00253) (0.239) (0.0130)
Student Proposer -0.0641* 6.204 0.520 Student Proposer -0.0553 5.251 0.500
(0.0367) (4.888) (0.351) (0.0377) (4.636) (0.356)
Retired Proposer -3.331 -0.754 Retired Proposer -5.042 -0.981***
(9.903) (0.543) (9.842) (0.325)
Unemployed Proposer 0.0567 -5.383 -0.984*** Unemployed Proposer 0.0618 -5.153 -0.447*
(0.0833) (11.28) (0.325) (0.0838) (11.34) (0.262)
Low-Occup. Proposer -0.0664** -2.643 -0.451* Low-Occup. Proposer -0.0621* -2.545 -0.771
(0.0315) (4.474) (0.262) (0.0320) (4.456) (0.543)
Perc. Status Proposer 0.145* 7.265 0.886* Perc. Status Proposer 0.160* 4.834 0.849
(0.0831) (6.479) (0.530) (0.0820) (6.654) (0.538)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer -0.00758 0.442 -0.153 Perc. Attractiveness Proposer -0.00930 0.708 -0.148
(0.0131) (1.275) (0.103) (0.0130) (1.278) (0.104)
Perc. Age Responder -0.00309 4.311** -0.0310 Perc. Age Responder -0.00596 4.729** -0.0241
(0.0158) (1.848) (0.110) (0.0156) (1.888) (0.112)
Perc. Status Responder -0.0966 -13.91** 0.208 Perc. Status Responder -0.0924 -15.14** 0.189
(0.0592) (6.752) (0.413) (0.0588) (6.607) (0.414)
Perc. Attractiveness Responder 0.00468 3.255 0.0933 Perc. Attractiveness Responder 0.00163 3.981* 0.105
(0.0173) (2.011) (0.113) (0.0176) (2.046) (0.113)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage 0.00122 1.206*** -0.00167 (Pie-Mean) by Stage 0.00110 1.212*** -0.00157
(0.000788) (0.0998) (0.00323) (0.000791) (0.0999) (0.00327)
Remaining Time 0.000663** 0.0829* 0.00601** Remaining Time 0.000653** 0.0835* 0.00602**
(0.000280) (0.0478) (0.00242) (0.000274) (0.0470) (0.00242)
No. Of Rounds -0.0307*** -7.214*** No. Of Rounds -0.0298*** -7.263***
(0.00786) (1.028) (0.00765) (1.039)
First Round Offer -0.00204* -1.116*** -0.0485*** First Round Offer -0.00211* -1.108*** -0.0483***
(0.00120) (0.214) (0.00893) (0.00120) (0.211) (0.00883)
Proposer Starts 19.32*** 0.925** Proposer Starts 19.12*** 0.920**
(6.723) (0.404) (6.930) (0.404)
Proposer Accepts -11.11*** Proposer Accepts -11.41***
(3.330) (3.324)
Constant 62.36*** Constant 54.92***
(17.77) (19.21)
Stage FE YES YES YES Stage FE YES YES YES
Observations 428 377 377 Observations 428 377 377
H0 : MF=FM 0.91 0.05 0.79
H0 : MF=MM 0.18 0.02 0.33
H0 : FM=MM 0.13 0.50 0.17
Notes The dependent variables refer to: the Prob.of No Agreement, which takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise
(column 1 and 3); Proposer’s Outcome, which summarizes the outcome in euro obtained by the proposer from the bargaining (columns 2 and 4); and No. of Rounds describes
the duration of the bargaining process (columns 3 and 6). First Round Offer summarizes the offer in euro made in the very first round. Proposer Starts is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 when the bargaining starts with the proposer making an offer, and 0 otherwise. Proposer Accepts is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
the bargaining ends with the proposer accepting responder’s demand, and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 4 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit
model. Columns 2 and 5 show the coefficients for OLS and columns 3 and 6 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the Poisson regression model. At the
bottom, p-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between
women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and
MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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are less likely to break up the bargaining. As expected, we find that the bigger the pie
is –the higher the stage and the greater the deviations from the mean pie at each stage–,
the bigger the outcome is for the proposer as the responders are unaware of the size of
the pie. Interestingly, the coefficient of the deviation from the mean pie at each stage
is close to 1, which suggests that the increases in the pie are absorbed by the proposer,
who plays the strong role in bargaining given the information asymmetry regarding
the size of the pie. Also, as expected, the more rounds there are the lower the outcome
is for the proposer. When looking at the duration of the negotiation (No. of Rounds) it is
found, as expected, that the longer bargaining goes on the more rounds there are; and
the bigger the pie is, measured in terms of the different stages, the longer bargaining
goes on. Finally, when proposers are unemployed or hold a low-level occupation the
process is shorter.27
Two control variables are of special interest. First, Proposer Starts describes how the
negotiation starts, taking the value of 1 when it is the proposer who starts. Second,
Proposer Accepts describes how the negotiation ends by taking the value of 0 when it
is the responder who accepts the proposer’s offer and 1 when it is the proposer who
ends up accepting a responder’s demand. Estimated coefficients show that initiating
the negotiation pays off, while being the party who accepts the other’s demand/offer
does not. Further analysis, where we split the bargaining outcomes into those that end
with the proposer accepting a responder’s demand (202 cases out of 377), and those
that end with the responder accepting a proposer’s offer (175 cases out of 377) show
that the difference found in the male-female interaction stems from those deals that
end with proposers accepting responders’ demands. This suggests that the bargain-
ing outcome between male proposers and female responders is the most beneficial for
proposers must be driven by females demanding less from male proposers rather than
by male proposers offering less to female responders.
Three final remarks are noteworthy. First, the results shown in Table 2.4 are not
driven by extremely high and low bargaining outcomes for the proposer. We have
replicated the regressions on proposer’s outcome deleting the 5% of highest and low-
est outcomes, and the estimation results remain unchanged (results available upon
request). Second, we have also considered other controls. In particular, we have con-
trolled for whether the question is male or female, as one might consider situations in
which a particular perception affects participants’ bargaining power. We find that they
are never significant, and more importantly, the results on the gender interactions of
Table 2.4 remain unchanged (results available upon request). Third, given that gen-
der interaction effects and the hypothesis testing shown at the end of the tables also
inform about gender differences, from now on we only show the gender interaction
effect regressions.
27The control Retired cannot be estimated in columns 1 an 4 because it turns out Retired predicts perfectly
whether the negotiations ended successfully or not.
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2.3.3 BARGAINING BEHAVIOR: OFFERS, DEMANDS, AND PROBABILITIES
OF ACCEPTING
We now analyze bargaining behavior regarding offers, demands and the likelihood of
accepting them.28 In an alternating-offer bargaining round the proposer starts with an
offer, which can be accepted or rejected by the responder. If the responder rejects the of-
fer, he/she can respond with a demand, which may then be accepted or rejected by the
proposer. This type of bargaining round can be repeated until an agreement is reached.
Hence, the variables of interest in this section are offers, demands, and their likelihood
of being accepted by responders and proposers. We analyze offers, and probabilities of
responders accepting offers in two separate regressions, one for the first round and the
other for subsequent rounds. Opening offers are exogenous and cannot be influenced
by interaction with the responder, as they come first. Furthermore, they are important
determinants of subsequent behavior in bargaining. We therefore decided to show the
regressions for the opening offer and the remaining offers separately. For the rest of
the variables, we test whether behavior in the first and subsequent rounds is indeed
different. This analysis leads us to show regression analysis for the likelihood of re-
sponders accepting separately for initial and subsequent offers, but not for demands
and the likelihood of proposers accepting demands.
Table 2.5 shows the results for offers (columns 1 and 2), for the likelihood of respon-
ders accepting them (columns 3 and 4), for demands (column 5) and for the likelihood
of proposers accepting them (column 6).29
We start by looking at the offers made by proposers and the likelihood of respon-
ders accepting them. Opening offers (column 1) do not show any significant gender-
related effect. This is in sharp contrast with the findings of other authors, e.g. by
Dittrich et al. (2014), who report that offers from men to women are lower. Moreover,
the signs suggest, consistently with previous literature, that women are more likely to
28We have also analyzed gender differences and gender interaction effects in the use of different bar-
gaining strategies, available in Table B.4 in Appendix B.1. We classify four types of bargaining strategy:
First, one can actively make offers or demands or remain passively silent and wait for the other person
to do so. Active bargaining strategies can then be classified into increasing, decreasing or maintaining
offers/demands from round to round. We find no gender differences or gender interaction effects in re-
maining silent when bargaining in either role. Interestingly, we find that men are more likely to increase
their offers from round to round, while women are more likely to stick to an offer. We find neither gender
differences nor gender interaction effects in the use of bargaining strategies among responders. Never-
theless, these findings are not enlightening the main result found in male-female matching being the most
beneficial for proposers and the least for the responders.
29Table B.5 in Appendix B.1 shows the estimation results for alternative specifications. For Offers in
subsequent rounds, column 1 shows the OLS estimation results using collapsed data (RE model yields the
same estimates). Columns 2 and 3 show the probit and RE probit, respectively for Prob. Responder Accepts.
For Demands, Column 4 shows the OLS estimation results using the collapsed data (RE model yields the
same estimates). Finally, for Prob. Proposer Accepts, columns 5 and 6 show the probit and RE probit model
estimation results, respectively. As shown by the estimation results, the magnitudes are slightly lower,
due to collapsing the data, and the weak result on offers loses significance. More importantly, the result
on demands is robust and sound.
58
C
H
A
PTER
2.
W
O
M
EN
A
SK
FO
R
LESS
(O
N
LY
FR
O
M
M
EN
)
TABLE 2.5– GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN OFFERS, DEMANDS AND PROBABILITIES OF ACCEPTANCE
Opening Prob. Responder Prob. Responder Prob. Proposer
Offers (round=1) Offers (round>1) Accepts (round=1) Accepts (round>1) Demands Accepts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MF -0.874 -4.706* 0.0968 -0.0515 -62.92*** 0.00631
(2.872) (2.768) (0.0656) (0.0545) (22.77) (0.08892)
FM -0.214 -3.051 0.0794 0.00532 2.403 0.0189
(1.666) (2.435) (0.0573) (0.0471) (17.79) (0.0731)
MM 0.433 -0.157 0.0742 0.0617 -9.280 0.0629
(2.489) (3.748) (0.0517) (0.0492) (18.88) (0.0911)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage -0.218*** -0.0230 0.00164* 0.000450 0.0800 -0.000563
(0.0496) (0.0523) (0.000841) (0.000450) (0.250) (0.00124)
Bargaining Time -0.00484 -0.0978*** -0.000907*** -0.000390 -0.201 -0.000446
(0.0160) (0.0351) (0.000280) (0.000347) (0.195) (0.000638)
No. of Rounds -1.637*** -1.094** 29.39***
(0.303) (0.492) (6.832)
Round 8.425*** 0.0235 -7.185 0.0851*
(1.407) (0.0160) (15.85) (0.0442)
Demand at Current Round -0.00333**
(0.00188)
Previous Demand 0.0834***
(0.0281)
(Previous Demand)2 -4.57e-05**
(1.95e-05)
First Round Offer 1.277*** 0.00928**
(0.223) (0.00403)
Offer at Current Round 0.00381*** 0.000215 0.977***
(0.000959) (0.000679) (0.234)
Proposer Starts -18.22*** -0.121** -13.62 -0.0573
(5.396) (0.0679) (21.61) (0.138)
No Previous Demand 57.94** -0.0414
(24.12) (0.0549)
Constant 11.40* 29.03** 13.31
(6.648) (14.58) (53.48)
Controls For
Stage FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Socio-Demographics of Proposer YES YES NO NO NO YES
Perceptions about Proposer YES YES YES YES YES YES
Perceptions about Responder YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 357 926 357 926 871 871
Number of Responders 357 316 357 316 321 321
H0 : MF=FM 0.79 0.59 0.74 0.29 0.00 0.89
H0 : MF=MM 0.47 0.24 0.61 0.02 0.01 0.53
H0 : FM=MM 0.74 0.50 0.90 0.16 0.50 0.60
Notes The dependent variable Offers refer to the offers in euro made by the proposer (columns 1 and 2); Prob. Responder Accepts takes the value of 1 when the responder
accepts the offer made by the proposer and 0 otherwise (columns 3 and 4); Demands refer to the demands in euro made by the responder (column 5); andProb. Proposer
Accepts takes the value of 1 when the proposer accepts the demand made by the responder and 0 otherwise (column 6). Columns 3, 4, and 6 show the marginal effects of the
coefficients using the probit model. Except for round 1 regressions (column 1 and 3), we use random effects model. At the bottom, p-values for the hypothesis testing are
shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between
a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men.
Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 3 and 5) and bootstrapped standard errors (columns 4 and 6), in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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accept an offer in the first round when it comes from a male proposer (column 3), but
the differences are not statistically significant. Regarding offers and likelihood of re-
sponders accepting them in subsequent rounds (columns 2 and 4), once initial offers
and past demands are controlled for, show no evidence of important gender differ-
ences nor gender interaction effects. Two minor differences can be mentioned. First, re-
garding offers, men offer to female responders about 5 Euro less than female proposers
do, although it is significant at the 10%. Second, regarding responders’ likelihood of
accepting the offers, offers made by male proposers are less likely to be accepted by
female responders.
We now turn our attention to demands and the likelihood of proposers accepting a
given demand. We find one important gender interaction effect. Consistent with our
findings when looking at raw mean values in demands (Table 2.2), the matching that
shows a difference in behavior is again that of a male proposer and a female respon-
der (column 5 in Table 2.5). Women’s demands differ depending on whether they are
interacting with a male or a female proposer. When conveying a demand to a male
proposer, women demand about 63 Euro less. We find no differential behavior when
looking at the likelihood of accepting demands (column 6).
All controls go in the expected directions. First, negotiations in which there is more
time left have lower offers and are less likely to be accepted initially. Also, on the one
hand negotiations that last longer have lower offers and higher demands, but on the
other hand the more advanced a negotiation is the higher the offers are.30 Third, as
expected, the higher (lower) the offers (demands) are, the more likely it is that they
will be accepted by the responder (proposer). Moreover, the higher the opening offer
by the proposer the more likely he/she is to accept responders’ demand. Also, the
opening offer is an important determinant for subsequent offers, and previous offers
positively affect subsequent demands. Fourth, past demands also prove important in
explaining offers.31 Furthermore some non-linearities appear, as the squared term is
also significant.32 Finally, and interestingly, the size of the pie to be divided up, mea-
sured through the stage variable, is positively related to offers and demands. This
finding is not totally intuitive. Note that responders do not know how big the pie is,
so proposers could pretend to be at the first stage in all negotiations, and offers should
30For the analysis of Offers and Demands we include both the total number of rounds and round vari-
ables as controls. Note that No. of Rounds measures the difference in rounds between different bargaining
processes, while the Round variable measures the variation within the same process. For offers, the deter-
minant variable is Round, while for demands it is No. of Rounds. For the likelihood of accepting we cannot
have them both so we include only Round.
31Note that for responders’ demands and the likelihood of proposers accepting, the control Offers in-
cludes all offers round by round, including those made in round 1, which affect demands and the like-
lihood of proposers accepting in round 1 and subsequent ones, which affect responders’ and proposer’s
behavior in later rounds.
32Although past demands affect current offers, the existence of non-linearities makes the relation be-
tween demands and offers ambiguous. Thus we cannot ensure whether the fact that female responders
demand less from male proposers aggravates the situation of these female responders receiving even
lower offers.
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not therefore depend on the size of the pie. However, proposers do adjust their of-
fers to the size of the pie, and consequently responders do adjust their demands to the
proposers’ offers. Finally, regarding socio-demographics, responder’ perceived status
seem to be positively correlated with demands.
Four comments must be made. First, the main effect is observed when male con-
testants act as proposers, which is the strong role, and female participants act in the
role of responders, which is the weak role. Second, this effect is sizable. As the average
demand in a female-female matching is 113 Euro, female responders demand about
55% less from male proposers. Third, differential behavior depending on gender is
not initiated by the proposer’s opening offers but by the responder’s demands. We
can therefore directly relate this result with the difference found in earnings obtained
from bargaining. Male proposers bargaining with female responders being the most
beneficial for proposers is explained by female responders demanding less from male
proposers. Finally, further analysis on subsequent offers suggests that when there is
a previous demand, the weak effect we found in column 2 becomes slightly stronger,
while when there is no previous demand, that is, when they reject an offer but post
no demand (remain silent), we find no evidence of any gender difference.33 This fur-
ther confirms that the difference in bargaining outcomes is driven by differences in
demands.
2.4 ROBUSTNESS TESTS: UNBALANCEDNESS AND
SELECTION
Contrary to what would occur in a perfectly randomized setting, in our setting pro-
posers and responders are not randomly matched: proposers choose their bargaining
partners. Section 2.3.1 above shows that although both male and female proposers are
more likely to choose male bargaining partners, male proposers show a stronger pref-
erence for male bargaining partners. This results in an unbalanced sample of different
gender matchings and in a selection problem. In this section we perform three robust-
ness tests that address these issues, focusing on the three main bargaining outcome
variables (Prob. of No Agreement, Proposer’s Outcome, No. of Rounds). Columns 1, 4, and
7 in Table 2.6 replicate columns 4-6 in Table 2.4.
First, as can be seen clearly in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the different gender combinations
in the matched partners are represented in an unbalanced way. In particular, female-
male and male-male matchings are over-represented while male-female and female-
female matchings are under-represented. We carry out regressions that weight each ob-
servation within each gender combination by the inverse of its probability in the sam-
ple. The idea behind this analysis is to weight each observation within each matching
33Notice that opening offers and opening demands play quite different roles in our database. First,
very few interactions start with a demand rather than an offer (20 out of 377), so opening offers are the
real starting point of bargaining, while demands come after the first offer has been rejected.
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TABLE 2.6– ROBUSTNESS TESTS: GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN BARGAINING OUTCOMES
Weights Matched Sample Weights Matched Sample Weights Matched Sample
Prob. No Prob. No Prob. No Proposer’s Proposer’s Proposer’s Number of Number of Number of
Agreement Agreement Agreement Outcome Outcome Outcome Rounds Rounds Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MF -0.0447 -0.0475 -0.0485 10.78*** 10.41*** 8.988** -0.177 -0.236 -0.237
(0.0397) (0.0365) (0.0382) (3.822) (3.591) (3.600) (0.337) (0.338) (0.350)
FM -0.0397 -0.0328 -0.0403 2.995 3.217 0.524 -0.0868 -0.0565 0.00804
(0.0384) (0.0367) (0.0385) (3.689) (3.637) (3.990) (0.332) (0.339) (0.367)
MM 0.0160 0.0158 0.0111 -0.523 -0.208 -0.479 -0.476 -0.522* -0.694**
(0.0389) (0.0380) (0.0396) (5.037) (4.886) (5.260) (0.305) (0.304) (0.343)
Age Proposer -0.00767*** -0.00804*** -0.00816*** 0.199 0.111 0.178 0.0102 0.00705 0.00762
(0.00253) (0.00240) (0.00264) (0.239) (0.203) (0.190) (0.0130) (0.0144) (0.0154)
Student Proposer -0.0553 -0.0704** -0.0867** 5.251 4.728 4.404 0.500 0.508 0.458
(0.0377) (0.0343) (0.0354) (4.636) (4.266) (5.731) (0.356) (0.362) (0.419)
Retired Proposer -5.042 -1.642 -5.728 -0.771 -0.697 -0.828
(9.842) (8.247) (7.944) (0.543) (0.598) (0.598)
Unemployed Proposer 0.0618 0.0691 0.0775 -5.153 -4.932 -0.593 -0.981*** -0.943*** -1.082***
(0.0838) (0.0869) (0.0966) (11.34) (10.04) (6.329) (0.325) (0.352) (0.379)
Low-Occup. Proposer -0.0621* -0.0540* -0.0628* -2.545 -2.438 -4.729 -0.447* -0.412 -0.553*
(0.0320) (0.0318) (0.0375) (4.456) (3.878) (5.172) (0.262) (0.279) (0.289)
Perc. Status Proposer 0.160* 0.131 0.178* 4.834 5.705 2.655 0.849 0.804 0.978
(0.0820) (0.0805) (0.0965) (6.654) (6.109) (8.482) (0.538) (0.552) (0.622)
Perc. Attractiveness Prop. -0.00930 -0.00415 -0.00836 0.708 0.209 -1.284 -0.148 -0.210** -0.211*
(0.0130) (0.0122) (0.0141) (1.278) (1.130) (1.147) (0.104) (0.104) (0.120)
Perc. Age Responder -0.00596 -0.00396 -0.0285* 4.729** 4.524*** 4.701** -0.0241 -0.0183 -0.0915
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0163) (1.888) (1.722) (1.876) (0.112) (0.117) (0.130)
Perc. Status Responder -0.0924 -0.0954 0.0108 -15.14** -15.32*** -22.32*** 0.189 0.298 0.227
(0.0588) (0.0607) (0.0686) (6.607) (5.836) (8.263) (0.414) (0.415) (0.457)
Perc. Attractiveness Resp. 0.00163 0.00591 -0.0205 3.981* 4.030** 4.542** 0.105 0.123 0.0324
(0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0175) (2.046) (1.812) (2.199) (0.113) (0.115) (0.126)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage 0.00110 0.000638 0.000288 1.212*** 1.223*** 1.296*** -0.00157 -0.00211 -0.00299
(0.000791) (0.000802) (0.000831) (0.0999) (0.0893) (0.120) (0.00327) (0.00350) (0.00584)
Remaining Time 0.000653** 0.000588** 0.00113*** 0.0835* 0.0864** 0.0504 0.00602** 0.00650*** 0.00737***
(0.000274) (0.000262) (0.000317) (0.0470) (0.0403) (0.0331) (0.00242) (0.00240) (0.00285)
No. Of Rounds -0.0298*** -0.0300*** -0.0324*** -7.263*** -6.614*** -6.563***
(0.00765) (0.00760) (0.00846) (1.039) (0.904) (0.781)
First Round Offer -0.00211* -0.00206* -0.00309** -1.108*** -1.098*** -1.235*** -0.0483*** -0.0494*** -0.0499***
(0.00120) (0.00114) (0.00146) (0.211) (0.194) (0.274) (0.00883) (0.00967) (0.0107)
Proposer Starts 19.12*** 16.94*** 12.10 0.920** 0.862* 0.516
(6.930) (5.913) (7.390) (0.404) (0.463) (0.530)
Proposer Accepts -11.41*** -10.74*** -8.884***
(3.324) (2.965) (3.313)
Constant 54.92*** 58.62*** 73.75***
(19.21) (16.09) (14.56)
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 428 428 314 377 377 278 377 377 278
R-squared 0.994 0.995 0.996
H0 : MF=FM 0.91 0.70 0.85 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.79 0.61 0.51
H0 : MF=MM 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.33 0.36 0.17
H0 : FM=MM 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.50 0.51 0.85 0.17 0.11 0.05
Notes The dependent variables, Prob. of No Agreement, Proposer’s Outcome and No. of Rounds are defined in the notes of Table 2.4. Columns 1, 4 and 7, replicate columns 4-6
in Table 2.4. Columns 2, 5 and 8, show estimation results using a regression that weights each observation within each gender combination by the inverse of its probability.
Columns 3, 6 and 9 show estimation results restricted to the matched sample. That matching is done following a nearest neighbor without replacement, where the treatment
variable is defined as the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the responder is female and 0 otherwise. At the bottom, p-values for the hypothesis testing are shown
where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male
proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered
standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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with a view to balancing the sample in terms of the different matchings.34 Estimation
results shown in Table 2.6 (columns 2, 5 and 8) show that the results are the same in
both quantitative and qualitative terms.
Second, we perform a regression analysis on a matched sample using probability
score matching (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008),
for a practical guide). As there are fewer women in the sample of responders, we define
our treatment variable as having a female responder and we estimate the probability
score using the regression shown in Table 2.3.35 We then use the nearest neighbor
matching method to match the sample of female responders to that of male respon-
ders, such that they have similar propensity scores. The distributions of probability
scores for proposers choosing a male and female responder, both for the unmatched
and matched samples, are shown in Figure B.1.36 We carry out the regression analysis
within the matched sample only. Results are shown in Table 2.6 (columns 3, 6 and 9).37
As expected, some observations are lost when the analysis is restricted to the matched
sample, as some observations cannot be matched. More importantly, the results remain
both quantitatively and qualitatively the same. In particular the effect on the main bar-
gaining outcome, Proposer’s Outcome, remains positive, significant, and very similar in
size.
Third, given we observe important characteristics of both proposers and respon-
ders, we can also check how male proposers who choose female responders differ
from male proposers who choose male responders, and how female responders who
are chosen by male proposers differ from female responders who are chosen by female
proposers. Columns 8 to 10 in Table 2.1 present a comparison of male proposers and
clearly show that those who happen to choose a male responder do not differ signifi-
cantly from those who happen to select a female responder. A similar comparison of
female responders in columns 5 to 7 in Table 2.1 clearly shows that female responders
who happen to be chosen by male proposers do not differ from female responders who
are chosen by female proposers. Finally, an examination of the analysis in the matched
sample shows that the minor differences in all the characteristics of both the proposers
34This approach is successful as long as the coefficient of Male Proposer is insignificant when we regress
the gender of the responder on that of the proposer, and the constant is 0.5.
35We eliminate the independent variables that have to do with the male/female nature of the questions,
as they cannot possibly influence the outcome variables of Prob. of No Agreement, Proposer’s Outcome and
No. of Rounds.
36As expected, if we replicate the analysis on Table 2.3 on the matched sample, we find that the only
determinant of the responder’s gender is given by the male/female perception of the question. Further-
more, when replicating Table 2.1 on the matched sample all significant differences within all matchings
disappear with the exception of the effect of the question’s perception. These results are available upon
request.
37The results shown in Table 2.6 use matchings without replacement. We also used matching with
replacement: Compared to those without replacement for the Proposer’s Outcome, the outcome for male-
female matchings is not significantly different from that male-male matchings, and for the No. of Rounds,
the male-male matching takes significantly shorter than the female-female matching. It is known that
standard errors increase with replacement, which lowers the significance of some results.
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and the responders that appear in Table 2.1 become insignificant when all four differ-
ent matchings are compared. This further confirms that the results are not driven by
male proposers who choose a female responder being of a particular type, or by female
responders chosen by a male proposer being of a particular type, but by women in the
role of responders demanding less from men in the role of proposers. Nevertheless, as
we mentioned in the introduction, we cannot rule out selection based on characteristics
that are unobservable.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
We use bargaining behavior in a TV show, where proposers choose individuals to bar-
gain with, to study gender differences in the choice of bargaining partners, and gender
differences and gender interaction effects in negotiations involving sizable stakes.
We find evidence that men show a stronger preference for male bargaining part-
ners. This is consistent with taste-based discrimination but also with gender differ-
ences in beliefs. First, men might put more weight on the probability that men know
the correct answer. Second, men might put more weight on the notion that they will
get better deals when negotiating with men. Future work should be guided to distin-
guish between these hypotheses. Third, men might put more weight on the notion that
women will be more reluctant to participate in a TV show.
Moreover, we find significant gender interaction effects in both bargaining behav-
ior and bargaining outcomes. The male-female matching is found to be different from
all the others. Contrary to the findings in previous publications, we find no evidence of
differences in opening offers between male and female proposers or male and female
responders. More importantly, it is women who demand less from male proposers.
These results cannot be explained by selection, as male proposers who choose female
responders do not differ from male proposers who choose male responders; nor do
female responders who are chosen by male proposers differ significantly from female
responders who are chosen by female proposers.
Three main conclusions can be drawn: First, gender interaction effects have proved
to be crucial in understanding gender differences. Women demand less only from men.
All these differences result in negotiations that are more favorable to men and less
favorable to women when men negotiate with women. Second, we find no differen-
tial behavior in opening offers. Third, the most relevant gender differential results are
found in the behavior of responders, who hold what is a priori a weaker position in
this setting. Accordingly, it is only when men take the role of the strong player (the
proposer) and women the role of the weak player (the responder) that strong gender
differences are found. This result highlights the importance of the role played in bar-
gaining. Dittrich et al. (2014), using a employer-employee setting, and Andersen et al.
(2013), using a seller-buyer framing, also find gender interaction effects and gender
differences, respectively, that depend on the roles played. Future work should be di-
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rected at understanding the interaction between gender interaction effects and the role
played in bargaining.
Chapter 3
The Role of Gender and
Asymmetries in Alternating-Offer
Bargains
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The gender wage gap has long been an important object of study in economics. Al-
though it has shown a decreasing trend over time, its persistence in developed coun-
tries challenges the classical explanations based on differences in human capital, pref-
erences or statistical discrimination (Blau and Kahn (2000)).
Gender differences in negotiation have been put forward as an alternative expla-
nation for the gender gap. Starting wages are often the result of bilateral negotiation.
Moreover, wages are also affected by negotiations that come later in one’s career, e.g.
for pay increases. If women are less likely to negotiate starting salaries and to ask
for a pay increase, and/or if women obtain worse deals when negotiating, this would
clearly go some way towards explaining the gender wage gap (Azmat and Petron-
golo (2014); Card et al. (2016)). The focus so far has been on gender differences in
the likelihood of starting a negotiation. The influential book by Linda Babcock and
Sara Laschever “Women Don’t Ask" reveals important gender differences in the likeli-
hood of negotiating. A study mentioned in the book shows that among graduates of
Carnegie Mellon University 57% of men negotiated the starting salary offered to them,
while only 8% of women did so. Exley et al. (2016) propose a controlled environment
such as the laboratory to show that women are less likely to start a negotiation.1 Study-
ing gender differences in bargaining is equally important.
This paper seeks to shift the focus onto studying gender differences and gender
1Gender interaction effects have received no attention in studies of entry into negotiation. An ex-
ception is the paper by Eriksson and Sandberg (2012), who find that women are less likely to initiate a
negotiation if they are matched with a female partner.
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interaction effects in alternating-offer bargaining in asymmetric situations. We use a
symmetric bargaining setting as a benchmark, where bargaining parties show equal
strength so that a 50:50 split of the pie emerges, and where we expect neither gender
differences nor gender interaction effects. We then introduce asymmetries, making one
bargaining party stronger (Proposer in our setting) and the other weaker (Responder in
our setting), in such a way that men and women are ex-ante equally likely to be allo-
cated to either the strong or the weak position. The asymmetries are expected to make
the division of the pie shift away from 50:50, giving the proposer a larger share of the
pie. We investigate three types of asymmetry: empowerment (only the proposer has
a positive outside option), entitlement (the proposer is entitled to a greater share than
the responder) and informational power (only the proposer knows the actual size of
the pie). We study gender differences and gender interaction effects both in bargaining
outcomes (probability of reaching an agreement, time taken to reach an agreement and
the responder’s share of the pie) and bargaining behavior (offers and demands).
Our laboratory study consists of three main stages. Subjects first perform a real
effort task, where each subject obtains a productivity which then determined the pie
to be shared. In the second stage, subjects are randomly matched and have 3 minutes
to bargain over the pie. The bargaining stage consists of 10 bargaining periods with
a different matched participant each time. Finally, in the third stage we elicit a set of
beliefs to measure their self-assessed ability in the task and in bargaining, as well as
risk and social preferences.
In the symmetric bargaining benchmark we find that, as expected, the split is not
different from 50:50. Also as expected, we find no gender differences or gender in-
teraction effects. When asymmetries are introduced we find both gender differences
and gender interaction effects. When the proposer is empowered, male responders
do worse than female ones (by 6 percentage points), which is explained by male re-
sponders getting lower initial offers. This is the only exception, as in the other two
asymmetries women obtain smaller shares. When the proposer is entitled, male bar-
gainers obtain a greater share in both roles than female bargainers (4 and 6 percentage
points less for the proposer and responder role, respectively). This is explained by men
tending to offer less and demand more than women. When the proposer has more in-
formation than the responder, male proposers negotiating with female responders get
the greatest share (by 6 percentage points), which shows that gender interactions are
important when there are informational asymmetries. This difference in bargaining
outcomes is explained by the demand side, where female responders demand less only
from men. Interestingly, these gender differences are important and active in the first
half of the experiment (first 5 periods) but vanish in the second half of the experiment
(last 5 periods), so when all periods are considered together the gender differences are
found to be much weaker.
We also find an important deadline effect, given the 3-minute time limit, where
almost 25% of the successful bargains are reached within the last 10 seconds. This is
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consistent with previous findings in bargaining (Roth et al. (1988) and Gneezy et al.
(2003)). We show that those agreements that are closed within the last 10 seconds,
referred to as ultimatums, are indeed different from non-ultimatum deals. Ideally, we
would like to get rid of the deadline effect, as it is more of an artifact given the exoge-
nous time limit implemented in the laboratory.
Gender differences in bargaining have been studied by economists. For example,
male proposers’ behavior has been analyzed in studies of discrimination by carrying
out field experiments in which the gender of potential scripted buyers is varied (Ayres
(1991); Ayres and Siegelman (1995); Castillo et al. (2013)). To study gender differences
in wage negotiation, Säve-Söderbergh (2007) uses wage bids and wage offers of recent
graduates and finds that women post lower wage bids, and receive lower offers. More
recently, Leibbrandt and List (2014), using a field experiment, find that women are less
likely to negotiate wages when they are not described explicitly as negotiable, but that
the difference disappears when they are described as negotiable. Economists have also
studied gender differences in controlled settings such as the laboratory, mostly using
the ultimatum game, which represents a reduced-form bargaining setting, as it allows
for a single offer (or demand) and the response to it. Rigdon (2012) finds that women
demand less than men in a demand-ultimatum-game in the laboratory, and Andersen
et al. (2013) find that gender differences in bargaining depend on culture. More re-
cently, Exley et al. (2016) study gender differences in the choice to negotiate, and in
their baseline treatment, where subjects are forced to negotiate, they find that men and
women achieve similar returns.
Gender interaction effects in bargaining have received less attention. Given that
bargaining requires interaction between two agents, gender differences in one role may
crucially depend on the gender of the interlocutor. Existing studies based on field data
or field experiments do not study gender interaction effects, either because the gender
of the person in one role is not known (e.g. Leibbrandt and List (2014)) or because
there is not enough variation (e.g. Castillo et al. (2013)). Economists are thus limited to
the use of laboratory experiments. Using mostly face-to-face ultimatum games, Eckel
and Grossman (2001) and Solnick (2001) show that offers to women are lower than of-
fers to men and that women are more likely to accept offers.2 Sutter et al. (2009) find
more competition and retaliation between same gender matchings than mixed gender
matchings using the power-to-take game.
Note that all these bargaining settings mentioned above, both in the field and the
laboratory, involve one or more types of asymmetries between bargaining roles, and
they all find some type of gender differences when bargaining, with the exception
of Exley et al. (2016). Two papers are more closely related to our setting because
they allow to test for gender differences and gender interaction effects in asymmetric
2To be precise, Eckel and Grossman (2001) find that women are more likely to accept offers, while
Solnick (2001) finds that women are more likely to accept offers from male proposers than from female
proposers.
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alternating-offer bargaining settings. Dittrich et al. (2014), using a laboratory face-to-
face alternating-offer wage-bargaining game where the firm is empowered, find that
starting salaries offered by men to women are lower than those offered by women to
men, resulting in significant gender interaction effects on wage-bargaining outcomes.
Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2016), using data from a TV-show, where bargaining
parties show major asymmetries in all three dimensions (empowerment, entitlement
and information), find that the matching between a male proposer (strong) and a fe-
male responder (weak) is the only one that differs from the rest, yielding higher profits
for the proposer. Remarkably, we replicate this exact finding but only under the infor-
mational asymmetry, which shows that informational asymmetry is the main source
for this gender interaction effect. This line of research shows that observed gender
differences depend crucially on the gender of the interacting individual, so such in-
teractions deserve equal attention, and that gender differences and gender interaction
effects are directly connected to asymmetric bargaining roles.
This paper offers three main contributions. First, it is the first study that looks at dif-
ferent types of asymmetric bargaining situations in connection to gender differences.
Asymmetric bargaining settings are the rule rather than the exception in economically
relevant situations such as the labor market. The fact that all the studies mentioned
above include some type of asymmetry confirms that the relevant settings indeed in-
volve asymmetries between player roles. Unfortunately, most of the time different
sources of asymmetry are confounded. This paper isolates each of the three sources
of asymmetry in order to study whether gender differences and gender interaction
effects are different for each type of asymmetry (empowerment, entitlement, and in-
formational asymmetry). Second, although gender differences in bargaining outcomes
have been studied using both dictator and ultimatum games, alternating-offer bargain-
ing has received less attention. This paper studies structured bargaining which allows
us to study not only bargaining outcomes but also bargaining behavior such as offers
and demands. Third, studies that can test for gender interaction effects on top of gen-
der differences are scarce. This laboratory study uses gender avatars to inform subjects
about the gender of the bargaining party such that gender differences and gender in-
teraction effects can be studied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the design and
procedures of the laboratory experiment. Section 3.3 describes the data, the identifica-
tion strategy, and the main results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A laboratory experiment was run at the Bilbao Laboratory of Experimental Analysis
(Bilbao Labean) at the University of the Basque Country on a computer based form
using z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher (2007)) to explore gender differences
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and gender interaction effects in asymmetric bargaining situations.3 Subjects were re-
cruited through ORSEE (Greiner (2015)), with a total of 162 participants –80 (49.4%)
men and 82 (50.6%) women– split into four different sessions. Recruiting was carried
out in such a way that the gender balance in each session was assured while subjects
were unaware of this at the time of recruiting.
3.2.1 DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
At the beginning of each session, subjects were provided with written general instruc-
tions which were also read aloud to guarantee that they were public knowledge. In
particular, these general instructions informed subjects that the experiment consisted
of 3 different stages and that the detailed instructions would be displayed on their
computer screens before the start of each stage. A translation of the instructions can
be found in Appendix C.1. Each session lasted for about one and a half hours, includ-
ing payment. Average earnings were 14.7 Euro (s.d. 5.6) including a show-up fee of 3
Euro, and total earnings ranged from 5 Euro to 34.5 Euro.
All sessions included three different stages: a real effort task, an alternating-offer
bargaining task and a set of elicitation tasks. The real effort task and the elicitation
tasks were identical in all sessions, but we varied the bargaining setting form one ses-
sion to another in order to generate four different treatments: Symmetric, Empowerment,
Entitlement, and Information. These treatments differ from one another in the source of
the induced bargaining asymmetry. In the rest of this section we explain each stage of
the experiment in detail and outline the differences between the treatments.
Real Effort Task: Subjects were presented with a matrix filled with “0”s and “1”s
similar to that in Figure 3.1 and asked to count the number of ones.4 Once a number
was entered for a matrix and the subject confirmed the input a new matrix appeared
on the screen. Subjects performed this task for 5 minutes and the performance measure
was the total number of matrices for which the correct number of “1”s was provided.5
This task was not directly incentivized but subjects were informed that their perfor-
mance in this task would determine their earnings in the bargaining stage.6 Consis-
tently with previous findings, this task proved to be gender neutral in performance, in
3The experimental design was registered at the AEA RCT registry before any sessions were run,
under the reference AEARCTR-0002029. The preplan analysis can be checked at https://www.
socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2029/history/15499.
4A similar task was used, for example in Abeler et al. (2011) and Mengel (2015).
5The z-Tree program was designed such that the maximum number of matrices that could be at-
tempted was 60. This was explicitly sated in the instructions. Data show that this constraint is not binding
as the maximum number of matrices that a subject faced was 33 with an average of 22.7.
6As will become clear in the explanation of the bargaining stage, the relationship between performance
and the pie to be bargained over in the bargaining stage may induce competitive attitudes. To preclude
any feeling of competition while subjects performed the real effort task, the instructions for the real effort
explained that higher individual performances increased the pie that would be available in the bargaining
stage on average but did not explain the exact link.
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FIGURE 3.1– EXAMPLE OF A MATRIX SHOWN TO SUBJECTS DURING THE REAL EFFORT TASK
the number of matrices attempted, and in the failure rate.7
At the end of this stage and just before entering into the bargaining stage, subjects
indicate their gender. In particular, they were presented with two avatars represent-
ing the silhouettes of a man and a woman and explicitly asked “Are you a man or a
woman?”. As can be checked in Figure 3.2, these avatars were chosen to elicit subjects’
gender in the most aseptic and neutral wat possible, without giving any further cues
such as facial expressions.8
FIGURE 3.2– GENDER AVATARS
Bargaining Stage: Symmetric. Based on their relative performances in the real
effort task, subjects were assigned a productivity, which determined the pie to be bar-
gained over. In particular, the top third of performers were endowed with a produc-
tivity of e15, the middle third with a productivity of e10, and the bottom third with
a productivity of e5. Subjects were informed about this protocol but no information
about their actual productivity was provided.
Each subject was then randomly matched with another subject. One is assigned the
role of participant A (hereafter the Proposer) and the other that of Participant B (here-
7Moreover, this gender neutrality in performance, effort, and productivity remains within each treat-
ment. In addition, the three measures are similar in all four treatments.
8One potential concern is that this feature of the design could yield some type of experimental demand
effect. Once stage 2 was finished but before the elicitation stage started, we explicitly asked "What do you
think is the objective of this experiment?". This question could be answered using a free format. Only 13%
of the subjects mentioned a gender related objective and there was no gender difference on this. These
two results alleviate any concern about potential experimental demand effects.
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FIGURE 3.3– SCREEN SEEN BY PROPOSERS DURING A BARGAINING IN THE SYMMETRIC TREATMENT
after the Responder). The role of Proposer was assigned to the subject in the matching
with the higher score in the real effort task, although this protocol was not revealed.9
Within each match the pie to be bargained over was randomly drawn from the produc-
tivity of the proposer and that of the responder with equal probabilities. This means
that the potential pie size was 5, 10, or 15 Euro. Once the pie size was determined,
this information was made public and each matching had 3 minutes to reach a deal on
how to split the resulting pie through an alternating-offer bargaining process. During
the bargaining proposers decided on offers to responders while responders decided
on demands from proposers. In other words, the whole bargaining process took place
in terms of the amount of money that the responder would get. During the bargain-
ing, the information available to all subjects consisted of their own avatar and that of
the opponent (their gender and that of their matched partner), the size of the pie to be
shared and the bargaining history of offers and demands. See Figure 3.3 for an illustra-
tion. Importantly, subjects did not observe their own productivity or their opponent’s.
If they reached a deal within the 3-minute limit, the agreed split was implemented.
Otherwise they got 0.
The whole bargaining process was repeated for 10 periods in all, with a different
matched participant each time.10 Importantly, from one period to the next the role in
the bargaining matching (proposer or responder) and the pie to be split could change.
For payment, subjects were informed that the computer would take two periods ran-
domly –one from periods 1-5 and another from periods 6-10– and the resulting out-
comes would be implemented.
9In particular, the subjects were just told that they would be given a bargaining role. Roles were as-
signed in this way in order to facilitate comparison across treatments. In case of ties, roles were randomly
assigned.
10In the Symmetric treatment there was a technical problem and the z-Tree program stopped at the
second repetition. We ran the bargaining module again and everything worked fine the second time.
Thus, for the Symmetric treatment we gather data from 12 bargaining periods instead of 10 but given that
periods 1 and 3 and periods 2 and 4 involve exactly the same matchings, we only consider periods 1-2
and 5-12 for the analysis of this treatment.
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Bargaining Stage: Empowerment. Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment ex-
cept that there was an outside option for the proposer. In particular, if a deal was not
reached within the 3-minute limit the proposer had an outside option while the re-
sponder got 0. The outside option available to the proposer was a random amount
drawn from a uniform distribution of between 50% and 85% of the pie. Both parties
know about the outside option but neither knew its exact value when bargaining.11
Bargaining Stage: Entitlement. Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment except
that the subjects were able to observe their own productivity and that of their partners.
This was public knowledge. This treatment thus informed subjects of whose produc-
tivity determined the size of the pie. This was intended to generate a feeling of positive
or negative entitlement.12 In case of a tie, there is no entitlement effect, so that we do
not consider those bargaining matchings in the analysis in the rest of the paper (note
the lower number of observations in the entitlement treatment).
Bargaining Stage: Information. Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment except
that only the proposer could observe the actual size of the pie, while the responder
only knew that it could be 5, 10 or 15 Euro. This was public knowledge.
Elicitation Tasks. After completing the 10 bargaining periods, subjects entered
the third and last stage of the experiment. In this stage we elicited beliefs about self-
assessed ability and gender differences in performing both the real effort task and the
bargaining task. Regarding the real effort task, subjects were asked to indicate which
quartile of the performance distribution they thought they were in and to state which
gender they believed had performed better (or whether there were no gender differ-
ences). Similarly, for the bargaining task subjects were asked to indicate which quar-
tile of the distribution they thought they were in based on the relative surplus obtained
during the 10 negotiations and to state which gender on average had obtained a greater
share of the pie over the 10 periods (or whether there were no gender differences). All
these measures were incentivized. In this stage we also elicited risk attitudes following
the methodology in Eckel and Grossman (2002) and social preferences via the primary
Slider Measure items described in Murphy et al. (2011) and implemented for z-Tree by
Crosetto et al. (2012). These are used as additional controls.
11We decided not to provide the exact value of the outside option so as not to make that amount too
salient. In addition, we decided to guarantee that the outside option would be at least 50% of the pie in
order to properly implement a bargaining asymmetry through the introduction of an outside option. No-
tice that in this case, the Nash bargaining solution (Nash Jr (1950)) and the deal-me-out solution (Binmore
et al. (1989)) return the same and, more importantly, agree on the effect of the outside option. By contrast,
if the outside option is lower than 50% these two solution concepts disagree on whether the existence of
an outside option has any effect.
12Notice that, by design, the productivity of the proposer is at least as high as that of the responder.
So, we argue that when the size of the pie is the proposer’s productivity the proposer feels a positive
entitlement –the pie is high thanks to the proposer’s productivity– while when the pie size is the respon-
der’s productivity the responder feels a negative entitlement –the pie is low because of the responder’s
productivity.
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At the end of the experiment subjects completed a non-incentivized questionnaire
that asked for standard demographics and for the big five personality traits (Gosling
et al. (2003)).
3.2.2 ASSESSING THE DESIGN
We now check whether the Empowerment, Entitlement, and Information treatments gen-
erated the asymmetry we aimed for, and whether our design generated balanced gen-
der combinations within the bargaining matchings. These two issues will confirm the
validity of our design in testing for gender differences and gender interaction effects
in asymmetric bargaining situations.
We first compare the Symmetric bargaining setting with the three asymmetric treat-
ments. The Symmetric bargaining setting is the natural benchmark as it shows the most
balanced bargaining situation between the proposer and the responder, so bargains can
be expected to end in a 50:50 split. The data confirms this intuition: In the 164 bargain-
ing matchings that reached a deal within the 3-minute limit the responder’s average
share of the pie is 0.502 (s.d. 0.103), which is clearly not statistically different from 0.5.
In addition, the data show that 72.6% of the successful bargains in this treatment end
up in the 50:50 split. We take this as evidence of the symmetry that exists in this treat-
ment.
Table 3.1 shows the average treatment effect of each asymmetric treatment in com-
parison with the Symmetric treatment for the three main bargaining outcome variables:
The likelihood of reaching an agreement within the 3-minute limit (Success), the time
in seconds from the reaching of an agreement to the end of the 3-minute limit (Remain-
ing Time), and the share of the pie that is obtained by the responder in each successful
negotiation (Responder’s Pie Share).13
As intended in the design, the results in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.1 show that
the Empowerment, Entitlement, and Information treatments give significant advantages
to the proposer, enabling her/him to obtain a greater share of the pie. This asymme-
try in bargaining roles is further evidenced by the fact that the proportion of divisions
other than a 50:50 split in each asymmetric treatment is 100% for Empowerment, 75%
for Entitlement, and 72% for Information. The three asymmetric treatments break the
symmetry between the bargaining parties and make the proposer’s role stronger than
the responder’s.
In addition, columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.1 also show that neither the existence
of asymmetries nor their nature seem to have much effect on the probability of reach-
ing a deal within the 3-minute limit, with the exception of a slight difference between
13Alternatively, the number of offers and demands can be used as an indicator of bargaining length
instead of the Remaining Time variable. The results are qualitatively the same.
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TABLE 3.1– AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME VARIABLES
Success Remaining Time Responder’s Success Remaining Time Responder’sPie Share Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Empowerment 0.0293 -30.05*** -0.238*** 0.0381 -25.15** -0.217***
(0.0529) (11.53) (0.0217) (0.0511) (11.31) (0.0250)
Entitlement 0.0634 -21.83** -0.0542*** 0.0616* -19.93** -0.0475***
(0.0439) (9.523) (0.0157) (0.0347) (9.610) (0.0159)
Information -0.0106 -40.13*** -0.109*** -0.0218 -38.44*** -0.0960***
(0.0532) (10.13) (0.0221) (0.0472) (9.613) (0.0207)
Constant 0.880*** 113.0*** 0.550*** 1.005*** 140.9*** 0.569***
(0.0486) (9.883) (0.0209) (0.137) (20.78) (0.0526)
Individual Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 748 626 626 748 626 626
Clusters Prop 42 42 42 42 42 42
Clusters Resp 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.024 0.106 0.394 0.058 0.131 0.446
H0: Emp=Ent 0.4118 0.3936 0.0000 0.5529 0.5925 0.0000
H0: Emp=Inf 0.3271 0.3071 0.0000 0.1036 0.1481 0.0000
H0: Ent=Inf 0.0461 0.0251 0.0353 0.0326 0.0293 0.0529
Notes: OLS for the mean effect of each treatment on the main outcome variables. The omitted treatment is Symmetric.
All regressions control for Pie Size and include Period Fixed Effects. Success takes a value of 1 if the subjects reach a deal
within the 3-minute limit and 0 otherwise. Remaining Time is the number of seconds from the time when agreement
is reached until the three-minute limit expires. Responder’s Pie Share is the share obtained by the responder in each
successful bargain. Entitlement considers only those matchings in which an effective entitlement is implemented,
so ties between subjects’ productivities are disregarded. Individual Controls include subjects’ gender, risk and social
preferences and their self-assessed ability levels in the real effort task and in the bargaining ability, separately for both
Proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the proposer and responder level using two-way clustering.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the Entitlement and the Information treatments. This shows that asymmetries do not
affect the efficiency –measured by the likelihood of failing to reach a deal and thus de-
stroying the pie– of the bargaining. Columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.1 also suggest that
asymmetries do affect the time required to reach an agreement, where all asymmetric
treatments require longer than in the Symmetric setting. This suggests that introducing
asymmetries, whatever their nature, into the bargaining setting increases the conflict
with respect to a symmetric situation.
We now assess whether the matching protocol generated a balanced gender match-
ing distribution. Since this study aims to look at potential gender differences and
gender interaction effects under the presence of different bargaining asymmetries, a
crucial step is to look at whether all possible gender matchings are balanced across
and within treatments. While the treatment assignment as well as the matchings made
are completely random, the role assigned to each party is not. In particular, within
each matching the party with the higher score in the real effort task is the one that is
assigned the role of proposer. However, given the gender neutrality of the real effort
task the ex-ante expectation is that all matchings should be evenly represented. This
is confirmed in Table 3.2, where it can be checked that, within each treatment, each
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TABLE 3.2– DISTRIBUTION OF GENDER MATCHINGS WITHIN EACH TREATMENT
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information Total
FF 24.5% 24.0% 26.1% 27.1% 25.4%
MF 27.0% 22.5% 26.1% 22.9% 24.5%
FM 24.0% 29.5% 22.5% 27.6% 26.2%
MM 24.5% 24.0% 25.4% 22.4% 23.9%
Male Proposer 51.50% 46.50% 51.45% 45.24% 48.40%
Male Responder 48.50% 53.50% 47.83% 50.00% 50.13%
Observations 200 200 138 210 748
different matching accounts for close to 25%, the figure expected under full random-
ization. It can also be checked in Table 3.2 that within each treatment close to 50% of
the matchings have a male proposer and 50% a male responder.
Thus, Table 3.2 shows that the procedure implemented in the experimental design
and the gender neutrality in performance of the real effort task used in stage one gen-
erated a distribution of matchings which was balanced both across and within treat-
ments. In order words, men and women had ex-ante equal probabilities of being as-
signed the strong and weak bargaining roles.
3.3 RESULTS
3.3.1 DATA, VARIABLES OF INTEREST, AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
From the experiment we gather data on 738 different bargains coming from 162 dif-
ferent experimental subjects. This data includes variables of interest of two different
types: Bargaining Outcomes and Bargaining Behavior. Regarding Bargaining Outcomes,
we look at the probability of reaching an agreement within the 3-minute limit (Suc-
cess), the time required to reach an agreement (Remaining Time), and the share of the
pie that is obtained by the responder (Responder’s Pie Share).14 Regarding Bargaining
Behavior we study opening offers (1st Offer), Subsequent Offers, and Demands.15 We dif-
ferentiate between opening and subsequent offers because the very first offer is the
only action in the bargaining process that can be considered to be exogenous: All other
actions in the bargaining are affected by the past bargaining history.
Given this data and the research question of the present study, we performed two
14Needless to say, we could have looked at the share of the pie captured by the proposer. However, we
decided to use the responder’s share because offers and demands were made based on the responder’s
share.
15We have also analyzed the probabilities of offers and demands being accepted. However, given the
higher endogeneity involved in these probabilities, the results are harder to interpret, so we relegate this
analysis to the Appendix (See Table C.1 in Appendix C.2)
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different analyses for each variable of interest Y and for each treatment as follows:
Yij = α+ β1MalePropi + β2MaleRespj + γXyij + yij (3.1)
Yij = α
′+β′1MalePropi+β
′
2MaleRespj+β
′
3MalePropi∗MaleRespj+γ′Xyij+′yij (3.2)
where MalePropi (MaleRespj) takes a value of 1 if the Proposer i (Responder j) is a
man and 0 for a woman and Xyij is a set of control variables specific to variable Y
and the matching between Proposer i and Responder j. Specification (3.1) enables us to
test whether gender differences in bargaining can be detected, i.e. whether men and
women in the role of Proposer/Responder obtain different outcomes from bargaining
and/or behave differently while bargaining. In this specification our coefficients of
interest are β1 and β2. Additionally, for each analysis we show the results from the
specification in (3.2) to test whether the potential gender effect detected under speci-
fication (3.1) is independent of the gender of the other bargainer, i.e. whether there is
any gender interaction effect. In this specification our coefficient of interest is β′3. Thus
in the rest of the analysis we focus on the sign and significance of the coefficients β1,
β2, and β′3.
In studying bargaining outcomes we use an OLS specification and perform a two-
way clustering at the proposer and responder level (Cameron et al. (2011); Thompson
(2011)). When analyzing bargaining behavior in successful negotiations we exploit the
panel structure of the database, i.e. we use the round by round bargaining data but
specify each individual matching as the panel variable and estimate a random effects
model. In this specification we cluster standard errors at the identity of the decision
maker (i.e. at the proposer/responder level when analyzing offers/demands). Two
types of control variable are applied in all regressions: First there are control variables
that refer to the characteristics of the proposers and responders, such as risk prefer-
ences, social value orientation, self-assessed ability in the real effort task, and self-
assessed ability in bargaining. All these variables are incentivized elicited measures
from the experimental design. Second there are controls specific to the bargaining
matching. In this regard, all regressions control for the Pie Size –with the exception of
the responder’s behavior in the Information treatment– and include Period fixed effects
to account for potential common trends in learning.
3.3.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 3.3 shows the results for Bargaining Outcomes (Panel A) and Bargaining Behavior
(Panel B) for the full sample. First, Panel A shows that all the figures in the sym-
metric bargaining setting are closer to zero than the corresponding ones in the asym-
metric treatments. This suggests that gender differences play a more important role
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TABLE 3.3– GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS
Panel A: Bargaining Outcomes
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’sTime Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.00329 -18.78 -0.00920 -0.0581 -23.40** -0.0350 0.00272 -15.32* -0.0194* -0.0824* -1.923 -0.0241
(0.0662) (13.70) (0.0120) (0.0682) (11.56) (0.0294) (0.0607) (8.167) (0.0103) (0.0428) (9.768) (0.0244)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0457 5.110 0.0110 -0.0724* -33.15*** -0.0327** 0.00697 12.96 0.0230 -0.0644 -14.84 0.0394
(0.0691) (9.604) (0.0186) (0.0402) (9.277) (0.0151) (0.0525) (12.85) (0.0229) (0.0549) (10.24) (0.0244)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.0185 38.46* 0.00195 0.0520 10.83 -0.0255 0.00865 7.093 -0.0129 -0.107 -34.89** 0.0179
(0.0762) (21.74) (0.0309) (0.102) (11.45) (0.0280) (0.129) (17.93) (0.0311) (0.101) (16.09) (0.0254)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 200 164 164 200 170 170 138 122 122 210 170 170
Clusters Prop 38 37 37 38 37 37 26 26 26 38 38 38
Clusters Resp 37 36 36 38 37 37 27 27 27 37 37 37
Panel B: Bargaining Behavior
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.0363 -0.0163** -0.00396 -0.0147 -0.0257** 0.00834 -0.0900** -0.00624 -0.0100 0.0112 -0.00218 -0.218**
(0.0305) (0.00751) (0.00693) (0.0372) (0.0114) (0.00805) (0.0377) (0.00977) (0.0125) (0.0409) (0.00852) (0.0972)
β2 : Male Resp. 0.0390 0.00598 0.00246 -0.0584*** -0.00786 0.00720 -0.00991 -0.00145 0.0375* 0.0216 0.00818* 0.367**
(0.0242) (0.00552) (0.00970) (0.0178) (0.00635) (0.00718) (0.0239) (0.00832) (0.0197) (0.0148) (0.00462) (0.144)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.0941* -0.0161 0.0161 0.00259 -0.00308 -0.0163 -0.00124 -0.0120 0.000824 0.0213 0.0115 0.141
(0.0473) (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0298) (0.0109) (0.0143) (0.0424) (0.0173) (0.0292) (0.0357) (0.00855) (0.202)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 164 664 608 170 985 877 122 706 644 170 1,133 1,054
No. Bargains 164 117 109 170 155 146 122 93 86 170 154 146
No. Clusters 37 33 33 37 34 36 26 26 27 38 38 36
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and include Period Fixed Effects. Panel A: OLS for the three main outcome variables for each treatment. Success takes a value
of 1 if the subjects reach a deal within the 3-minute limit and 0 otherwise. Remaining Time is the number of seconds from the time when agreement is reached until the
three-minute limit expires. Responder’s Pie Share is the share obtained by the responder in each successful bargain. Entitlement considers only those matchings in which
an effective entitlement is implemented, so ties between subjects’ productivities are disregarded. Individual Controls include subjects’ risk and social preferences and their
self-assessed ability levels in the real effort task and in the bargaining ability, separately for both Proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the proposer
and responder level using two-way clustering. Panel B: GLS random-effects model for opening offers (1st Offer), Subsequent Offers, and Demands. All variables represent
the Responder’s Pie Share, except Demands in the Information treatment, which shows absolute values. Other Controls include the round and the time remaining in seconds
at the point when the offer (demand) has been made, the previous offer, the previous demand, and the individual controls for the Proposer (Responder). Clustered standard
errors at the proposer level for offers and at the responder level for demands. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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when asymmetries are introduced. Second, there are some common tendencies across
treatments. Having a male bargainer seems to decrease the probability of reaching an
agreement ((1), (4), (7), and (10)) and lengthen the time taken to reach one (columns (2),
(5), (8), and (11)). This is especially true for male proposers. Nevertheless, these coef-
ficients are almost never significantly different from zero. Regarding the share of the
pie (columns (3), (6), (9), and (12)), male proposers tend to get a greater share than fe-
male proposers but this is only significant for the entitlement treatment. In this regard,
Panel B shows that male proposers in the entitlement treatment offer significantly less
from the very beginning. In view of the positive effect that previous offers have on
new offers, this would explain why male proposers obtained a greater share of the pie.
Male responders also tend to get a greater (but not significantly) share of the pie. The
only exception is that of male responders in empowerment, where their share is signif-
icantly smaller than that of female responders. Panel B suggests that the main reason
for this is that male responders receive lower initial offers, so that subsequent offers
also decrease, which would hurt their final bargaining outcome.
Overall, this table shows that gender differences and gender interaction effects
seem to be modest and not significantly different from zero. This seems to be in con-
trast with the more substantial gender differences observed in bargaining behavior, as
we find major gender differences in offers in empowerment and entitlement, and in
demands in the information treatment.
In our experiment, subjects bargain for 10 periods with a different bargaining part-
ner each time. A relevant question is whether gender differences and gender interac-
tion effects show any time trend or difference over different periods, referred here to
as learning or experience effects. The simplest analysis replicates the main results in
Table 3.3 splitting the sample into the first half (first 5 periods) and the second half (last
5 periods).16 Table 3.4 presents the results for both Bargaining Outcomes for the first half
of the experiment (the first 5 periods) and the second half of the experiment (the last 5
periods). Table 3.5 presents the equivalent results for Bargaining Behavior.17
Interestingly, we find that the gender differences and gender interaction effects are
substantial and significant in the first half of the experiment but practically vanish in
the second half of the experiment.18 Most of our important findings are related to
differences in the share of the pie, so we now concentrate on this variable (columns
(3), (6), (9), and (12) in Table 3.4). The previous findings of Table 3.3 are again found
but are now bigger and some new results also arise. When empowerment is in place,
male responders obtain a smaller share of the pie (by 6.5 percentage points), significant
16One potential concern is that gender matchings might not be balanced within each of the two parts.
Table C.2 shows that gender matchings are also balanced within the first and second halves.
17For the sake of completeness, we also look at gender differences and gender interaction effects on the
probability of accepting offers and demands. This data is available in Appendix C.2, in Table C.4.
18The results remain qualitatively the same if the analysis is performed by taking the first 3 and last 3
periods. See Table C.5 in Appendix C.2.
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TABLE 3.4– GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS BY EXPERIENCE: BARGAINING OUTCOMES
Panel A: First Half (Periods 1–5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’sTime Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.0139 -29.89 -0.00892 -0.0902 -35.62*** -0.0400 0.0195 -0.992 -0.0460** 0.0273 3.289 -0.0383
(0.0828) (20.91) (0.0156) (0.0698) (11.77) (0.0363) (0.107) (16.03) (0.0201) (0.0537) (10.55) (0.0320)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0269 6.905 0.0423* -0.0396 -27.24* -0.0647*** 0.0380 17.70 0.0600** -0.105 -18.49 0.0561**
(0.0776) (11.33) (0.0246) (0.0756) (14.96) (0.0206) (0.0660) (14.78) (0.0298) (0.0764) (12.07) (0.0251)
β′3 : Male#Male -0.0920 97.73*** 0.0137 -0.107 16.22 -0.0283 0.141 27.35 -0.00796 -0.283*** -31.75** 0.0555***
(0.138) (23.17) (0.0495) (0.123) (22.20) (0.0485) (0.125) (26.23) (0.0471) (0.0981) (16.00) (0.0152)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 100 82 82 100 90 90 66 58 58 105 88 88
Clusters Prop 35 34 34 34 33 33 24 24 24 35 34 34
Clusters Resp 35 32 32 32 31 31 24 24 24 36 35 35
Panel B: Second Half (Periods 6–10)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’sTime Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. 0.0102 -12.36 0.000650 -0.0383 -10.43 -0.0289 -0.0351 -16.78 0.0157 -0.114 -6.128 0.0216
(0.0709) (11.66) (0.0122) (0.0844) (13.69) (0.0315) (0.0901) (12.67) (0.0198) (0.0712) (10.33) (0.0239)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0439 4.494 -0.0184 -0.0963 -25.47*** 0.0106 -0.0148 6.879 -0.00697 0.0295 -12.11 0.0126
(0.0825) (15.38) (0.0190) (0.0826) (8.542) (0.0236) (0.0687) (11.50) (0.0201) (0.0595) (12.21) (0.0324)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.127 -13.38 -0.00493 0.123 12.60 -0.0109 -0.128 -21.16 0.0191 0.0554 -43.35** -0.0360
(0.155) (30.61) (0.0311) (0.141) (20.04) (0.0416) (0.184) (29.96) (0.0234) (0.166) (18.75) (0.0559)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 100 82 82 100 80 80 72 64 64 105 82 82
Clusters Prop 32 30 30 33 31 31 24 24 24 35 32 32
Clusters Resp 33 32 32 32 30 30 26 26 26 34 34 34
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and include Period Fixed Effects. OLS for the three main outcome variables for each treatment. Success takes a value of 1 if the
subjects reach a deal within the 3-minute limit and 0 otherwise. Remaining Time is the number of seconds from the time when agreement is reached until the three-minute
limit expires. Responder’s Pie Share is the share obtained by the responder in each successful bargain. Entitlement considers only those matchings in which an effective
entitlement is implemented, so ties between subjects’ productivities are disregarded. Individual Controls include subjects’ risk and social preferences and their self-assessed
ability levels in the real effort task and in the bargaining ability, separately for both Proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the proposer and responder
level using two-way clustering.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 3.5– GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS BY EXPERIENCE: BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
Panel A: First Half (Periods 1–5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.0310 -0.0411*** -0.0151 -0.0291 -0.0371** 0.0185* -0.0720** -0.000664 -0.0221 0.0102 0.00303 -0.398**
(0.0432) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0375) (0.0168) (0.00958) (0.0324) (0.00795) (0.0148) (0.0498) (0.0148) (0.200)
β2 : Male Resp. 0.0453 0.0252** 0.00690 -0.0683** -0.0325*** 0.0141 0.0567 -0.00291 0.0419** 0.0268 0.00944 0.353
(0.0360) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0310) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0394) (0.0109) (0.0207) (0.0261) (0.00878) (0.242)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.140* 0.0240 0.0209 0.0353 0.00727 -0.0366* 0.0493 0.00367 0.0243 0.0233 0.00420 0.322
(0.0782) (0.0271) (0.0225) (0.0491) (0.0210) (0.0197) (0.0863) (0.0199) (0.0355) (0.0533) (0.0180) (0.395)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 82 277 250 90 421 359 58 272 245 88 440 402
No. Bargains 82 53 48 90 81 74 58 41 38 88 78 72
No. Clusters 37 33 33 37 34 36 26 26 27 38 38 36
Panel B: Second Half (Periods 6–10)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.0331 0.00512 0.00156 0.0140 -0.0148*** -0.000765 -0.105** -0.00567 0.00202 -0.000535 -0.00197 -0.233**
(0.0342) (0.00755) (0.00801) (0.0502) (0.00453) (0.0101) (0.0494) (0.0128) (0.0151) (0.0469) (0.00709) (0.110)
β2 : Male Resp. 0.0248 -0.0127 -0.0106 -0.0380 0.00598 0.00721 -0.0694** -0.00546 0.0416 0.0231 0.00647 0.349**
(0.0294) (0.00852) (0.0121) (0.0259) (0.00440) (0.00744) (0.0284) (0.0141) (0.0304) (0.0217) (0.00492) (0.160)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.0501 -0.0357* 0.0232 -0.0346 -0.00601 -0.0120 -0.0253 -0.0299 -0.00999 -0.0261 0.0157* -0.0245
(0.0573) (0.0183) (0.0198) (0.0605) (0.00765) (0.0175) (0.0537) (0.0235) (0.0375) (0.0512) (0.00919) (0.237)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 82 387 358 80 564 518 64 434 399 82 693 652
No. Bargains 82 64 61 80 74 72 64 52 48 82 76 74
No. Clusters 37 33 33 37 34 36 26 26 27 38 38 36
Notes: GLS random-effects model for opening offers (1st Offer), Subsequent Offers, and Demands. All variables represent the Responder’s Pie Share, except Demands in the
Information treatment, which shows absolute values. Other Controls include the round and the time remaining in seconds at the point when the offer (demand) has been
made, the previous offer, the previous demand, and the individual controls for the Proposer (Responder). Clustered standard errors at the proposer level for offers and at the
responder level for demands. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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at 1%. This is explained by male responders getting lower initial offers and lower fol-
lowing offers (even once previous offers are controlled for). When the proposer is enti-
tled, male proposers are still observed to get a greater share (by 4.6 percentage points),
which is now significant at 5%. In addition, we find that male responders also get a
greater share (by 6 percentage points), which is significant at 5%. This is explained by
male proposers making lower initial offers and by male responders demanding more.
Finally, when informational asymmetries are implemented we find a strong gender in-
teraction effect, as the matching given by a male proposer and a female responder is the
only different matching. In this matching women as responders get a smaller share (by
6.5 percentage points) when matched with a male proposer than when matched with
a female proposer, which is significant at 1%. Importantly, this male-female matching
is different, not only from the female-female matching but also from any other match-
ings, but all the other matchings are indistinguishable from one another. This finding
is explained by the demand side, as Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that women demand
less only from men.19 Interestingly, this replicates the findings of Hernandez-Arenaz
and Iriberri (2016), who also find that women demand less only from men and that this
is the only matching that is different in the share of the pie. In their bargaining setting
there were three sources of asymmetry (empowerment, entitlement and information),
so this finding suggests that the main driver of their results is the existence of informa-
tional asymmetry.
These results show that gender differences and gender interaction effects are strong
and active among inexperienced bargainers but that they quickly disappear as bargain-
ers gain experience.
3.3.3 DEADLINE EFFECT
One consistent finding when looking at bargaining processes is the so called “deadline
effect”. This has been shown to shift a substantial amount of agreements toward the
deadline, delaying the whole process. This effect has been widely documented both
with field data (see for example Cramton and Tracy (1992)) and in the lab (see for exam-
ple Roth et al. (1988) or Gächter and Riedl (2005)).20 The existence of such a deadline
effect is important, not only because delays in agreements may generate inefficiencies
but also because they seem to be caused by bargainers for strategic reasons (Sterbenz
and Phillips (2001); Gneezy et al. (2003)).
19Although this cannot be fully appreciated in Table 3.5, the analysis for gender interaction effects
shows that the MF matching is different from the FF matching (Coef.: 0.554, p-value=.06), from the FM
matching (Coef.: 0.765, p-value=.02), and from the MM matching (Coef.: 0.533, p-value=.07).
20The deadline effect is not exclusive to bargaining settings. It has also been documented in auctions,
both in the field (Roth et al. (2002)) and in the lab (Ariely et al. (2005)). This is especially surprising
because both Roth et al. (2002) in the field and Ariely et al. (2005) in the lab use data from second-bid
auctions, in which there are no strategic reasons to delay as there could be the case –and indeed are as we
document below– in a bargaining setting.
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FIGURE 3.4– DEADLINE EFFECT
Notes: Distribution of the last proposals (offer or demand) over time in seconds. Total refers to the total number of
matchings that make their last proposal in a given time window. Agreement refers to the number of matchings that
make their last proposal in a given time window and which are accepted (Distribution of agreements over time).
As shown by Figure 3.4, our experimental data shows substantial deadline effects,
which are consistent with previous findings. 37.8% of negotiations (283 out of 748)
are still ongoing in the last 10 seconds –i.e., a bargaining party makes a new proposal
within that time window. As pointed out above, this deadline effect has negative con-
sequences for the efficiency of the bargaining process as delaying the negotiation can
cause it to fail. In particular, our data shows that 41.3% among the bargains that are
ongoing in the last 10 seconds end up failing to reach an agreement.21 The left-hand
picture in Figure 3.4 shows this effect clearly, enabling us to check that there is an atom
of last proposals in the last 10 seconds of the negotiation while otherwise they are more
or less uniformly distributed over time. The right-hand picture in Figure 3.4 confirms
that the above pattern can be recognized even when we zoom-in on the last 30 seconds
of the 3-minute limit.
Notice that as the timing of new proposals approaches the deadline, they can be
considered as equivalent to take-it-or-leave-it proposals, as the chances of effectively
making a counterproposal in the remaining time becomes very small so the receiver
is obliged to accept the proposal or let the bargaining fail. Apart from this intuitive
argument, the left-hand picture and more especially the right-hand picture in Figure
3.4 also support this idea by showing that proposals made within the last 10 seconds
are either accepted or the negotiation ends in failure, while those proposals made with
more than 10 seconds left are either accepted or are not the last proposal of the bar-
gaining. This illustrates that the proposals that are made with more than 10 seconds
left and are rejected give rise to counterproposals. Thus, we identify and refer here to
proposals (independently of whether they are offers or demands) made within the last
10 seconds as ultimatums.
21As expected, most of the failed bargains are ongoing in the last 10 seconds. In particular, only 5 of the
122 (4%) bargains that ended up in disagreement were not ongoing in this time window.
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TABLE 3.6– DISTRIBUTION OF ULTIMATUMS ACROSS TREATMENTS
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information Overall
Friendly 81.7% 75.9% 69.7% 65.9% 73.5%
Ultimatum 18.3% 24.1% 30.3% 34.1% 26.5%
Observations 164 170 122 170 626
Notes: Percentages computed out of the total of successful bargains. Entitled considers only those matching in which
there is actual entitlement.
Table 3.6 shows the percentage of deals reached through an ultimatum and friendly
agreements out of the total number of successful negotiations, overall and separately
for each treatment. The proportion of deals reached under ultimatums is high in all
four treatments although the data suggests that their proportion increases when there
are asymmetries.22
Having established that ultimatums account for a large fraction of the successful
negotiations in our data, it is natural to account for the effects that ultimatums have
on the final bargaining outcome. Table C.3 in Appendix C.2 shows two things. First,
it shows that the Responder’s Pie Share is significantly affected by whether the deal is
reached through friendly agreement or ultimatum agreements. Second, it also shows
that whether the last proposal was a demand or an offer only affects Responder’s Pie
Share when the deal comes from an ultimatum.
Table 3.7 looks at gender differences and gender interaction effects on the propen-
sity for closing a deal via an ultimatum in each of the four treatments.
The results suggest that a bargaining matching in which the proposer is a man is
more likely in general to close a deal of this type. This is consistent with the findings in
Table 3.3 that men as proposers tend to delay agreements longer. The only exception is
the Entitlement treatment, in which the coefficient for male proposers has the opposite
sign, though the size is modest. For responders, as in Table 3.3 with the Remaining Time
variable, evidence is more mixed.23
Finally, we split the sample to test for gender differences and gender interaction
effects separately for those matchings that reach a friendly agreement and those that
reach an agreement via an ultimatum. Table 3.8 shows the results. Interestingly, a look
at friendly agreements reveals, as expected, that gender differences are more in line
with the effects found in bargaining behavior in Table 3.3. In Empowerment male re-
sponders obtain a smaller share, as before and in Information, male responders obtain a
22The proportion of deals closed in an ultimatum situation is similar to that typically found in the
literature. For example, using data from 4 different experiments with a total of 1237 observations, Roth
et al. (1988) found that the percentage of deals closed within the last 10 seconds was 28.3% which is similar
to our overall figure of 26.5%.
23The results remain qualitatively the same if we analyze all last proposals, independently of whether
they end up in agreement or not.
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TABLE 3.7– PROBABILITY OF REACHING AN ULTIMATUM
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Male Prop. 0.134** 0.277*** -0.0545 0.0761
(0.0639) (0.0792) (0.0918) (0.0790)
β2: Male Resp -0.0720 0.121** -0.0458 0.136
(0.0552) (0.0577) (0.0861) (0.0963)
β′3: Male#Male -0.0195 0.201 -0.120 0.0187
(0.125) (0.132) (0.139) (0.130)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 164 170 122 170
Clusters Prop. 37 37 26 38
Clusters Resp. 36 37 27 37
Notes: OLS for the probability of closing a deal within the last 10 seconds. All regressions control for Pie Size and
include Period Fixed Effects. Other Controls include risk and social preferences and self-assessment in the real effort
task and in bargaining for both proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the Proposer and Responder
level using two-way clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
larger share. This last result was not significant before but becomes so when restricted
to friendly agreements.24
To sum up, in this section we have shown that limiting bargaining to a fixed dura-
tion yields an important deadline effect, which shows important consequences in how
the pie is split. Ideally, we would like to get rid of the deadline effect, as it is more an
artifact given the exogenous time limit implemented in the laboratory. Future research
for understanding gender differences and gender interaction effects should be directed
to undermine the deadline effect.
3.4 DISCUSSION
Most, if not all, bargaining situations are asymmetric in economically relevant situa-
tions and it is hard to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in such
real life settings. We thus propose a laboratory experiment to study gender differences
and gender interaction effects in asymmetric bargaining situations.
We find that gender differences and gender interaction effects are absent in sym-
metric settings, where a 50:50 split is the norm, but become important when asymme-
tries between roles are introduced. The biggest differences are found in the role of the
responder, where male responders obtain less when the proposer is empowered and
24Table C.6 in Appendix C.2 shows that if a distinction is drawn between the first and second halves of
the experiment and only friendly agreements are considered then, consistently with the previous section,
strong significant effects are found for the first half while nothing is found to be significant in the second.
More importantly, this analysis of friendly agreements replicates the findings in the Responder’s Pie Share
of Table 3.4. Interestingly, coefficients are typically more significant and of a higher magnitude than in
Table 3.4. This suggests that experience and deadline effects are capturing different things. Notice that
the relatively low number of observations prevents this split from being performed on ultimatum deals.
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TABLE 3.8– GENDER AND INTERACTION EFFECTS BY AGREEMENT’S TYPE: RESPONDER’S PIE SHARE
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Friendly Ultim. Friendly Ultim. Friendly Ultim. Friendly Ultim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
β1: Male Prop. 0.0113 0.0816** -0.0245 -0.0130 -0.0274 -0.0187 -0.0434 0.0119
(0.0188) (0.0372) (0.0315) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0459) (0.0369) (0.0201)
β2: Male Resp. 0.00388 0.141*** -0.0498*** 0.0105 0.00370 0.106*** 0.0450** 0.0160
(0.0165) (0.0442) (0.0155) (0.00819) (0.0183) (0.0198) (0.0222) (0.0229)
β′3: Male#Male 0.00344 0.0703 -0.0492 -0.0459 -0.0390 0.0101 0.0263 0.0218
(0.0280) (0.0500) (0.0369) (0.0583) (0.0310) (0.0565) (0.0384) (0.0434)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 134 30 129 41 85 37 112 58
Clusters Prop. 37 18 35 20 25 17 33 29
Clusters Resp. 36 18 36 24 23 21 35 27
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and for who makes the last offer (Proposer or Responder) and include Period
Fixed Effects. Other Controls include risk and social preferences and self-assessment in the real effort task and in
bargaining for both, proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the Proposer and Responder level using
two-way clustering. Clustered standard errors at the individual level using two-way clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
male responders get a greater share of the pie in both the entitlement and informa-
tion cases. Furthermore, male proposers also obtain a greater share of the pie when
entitled. Finally, when informational asymmetries are introduced, female responders
demand less from male proposers, so they end up with the smallest share (consistent
with Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2016)). Interestingly, the gender differences and
gender interaction effects vanish in the second half of the experiment.
The deadline effect seems to be important and as this seems more of an artifact
given the exogenous 3-minute time limit imposed in the laboratory, ideally we would
like to get rid of it. Self-selection issues in this regard become important; are those
subjects that reach an ultimatum different from others? A similar problem is found in
auctions and some mechanism for avoiding the deadline effect in auctions (Roth et al.
(2002); Ariely et al. (2005)) have proved to be useful. One important avenue for future
research is using mechanisms of these types to avoid such a deadline effect.
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Appendix A
Stereotypes and Tournament
Self-Selection
A.1 TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A.1.1 FORMAL DERIVATION OF EXPECTED UTILITIES
Let qg : r → [1, 0] be a generic strategy profile for agents from social group g ∈ {S,N}mapping
each signal observed into the probability of entering tournament A and let qαg (r) be the corre-
sponding one at equilibrium.
Given any arbitrary pair of strategy profiles (qs(r), qn(r)), the expected entry rate into tourna-
ment A of those agents whose ability is exactly a given the distributional assumptions FS(a)
and FN (a) is
E [λ′qs(r) + (1− λ′)qn(r)|a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
[λ′qs(a+ µ) + (1− λ′)qn(a+ µ)]φ(µ)dµ
where λ′ is the believed proportion of S-agents among those with ability a, which equals λ′ =
λfS(a)/[λfS(a) + (1− λ)fN (a)]. Consequently, among the participants in tournament A, only
those whose real ability exceeds a certain threshold aA holding1∫ ∞
aA
E [λ′qs(r) + (1− λ′)qn(r)|a] dFα(a) ≤ δA (= if aA > −∞)
will expect to obtain a prize, where Fα(a) ≡ λFS(a) + (1 − λ)FN (a) is the CDF of the be-
lieved distribution of abilities in whole population. Therefore, given the pair of strategy pro-
files (qs(r), qn(r)), the believed expected return from participating in tournamentA for an agent
who observes signal ri from social group g ∈ {S,N} is
U [A|qs(r), qn(r), ri, F g] = WA[1− Fˆ (aA|ri, F g)] (A.1)
1By replacing and doing the maths this expression can be transformed into
λ
∫ ∞
aA
[∫ ∞
−∞
qs(a+ µ)φ(µ)dµ
]
dFS(a) + (1− λ)
∫ ∞
aA
[∫ ∞
−∞
qn(a+ µ)φ(µ)dµ
]
dFN (a)
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where 1− Fˆ (aA|ri, F g) is the self-assessed probability of having a real ability level higher than
aA.
Similarly, the expected entry rate in tournament B of those agents whose ability is exactly a is
1−E [λ′qs(r) + (1− λ′)qn(r)|a] so only those with a real ability higher than a certain threshold
aB which holds∫ ∞
aB
1− E [λ′qs(r) + (1− λ′)qn(r)|a] dFα(a) ≤ δB (= if aB > −∞)
will expect to obtain a prize. Therefore, given the pair of strategy profiles (qs(r), qn(r)), the
expected return from participating in tournament B for an agent who observes signal ri from
social group g ∈ {S,N} is
U [B|qs(r), qn(r), ri, F g] = WB [1− Fˆ (aB |ri, F g)]
where 1− Fˆ (aB |ri, F g) is the self-assessed probability of having a real ability level higher than
aB .
A.1.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
First I demonstrate formally that the equilibrium strategy profiles, (qαs (r), qαn(r)), should induce
a situation in which tournament A is necessarily overcrowded. Consider any pair of strategy
profiles (q′s(r), q′n(r)) such that the induced standard needed to beat for tournament A, aA, is
−∞. Then it is easy to see that ∀g ∈ {S,N}
U [A|q′s(r), q′n(r), ri, F g] = WA > WB ≥ U [B|q′s(r), q′n(r), ri, F g] ∀ri
which clearly contradicts the fact that the pair (q′s(r), q′n(r)) represent an equilibrium as all
agents have incentives to choose tournament A. This has two immediate consequences. First,
since tournament A is overcrowded the standard for winning in tournament A at equilibrium
should be given by a value aA ≡ oaα > −∞ holding∫ ∞
aα
E [λ′qαs (r) + (1− λ′)qαn(r)|a] dFα(a) = δA (A.2)
which furthermore implies that aα <∞. Second, since δA + δB ≥ 1 in equilibrium tournament
B should end up with vacancies, i.e.
∫∞
aB
1 − E [λ′qαs (r) + (1− λ′)qαn(r)|a] dFα(a) < δB , ∀aB
which implies the existence of a corner solution at aB = −∞, so U [B|qαs (r), qαn(r), ri, F g] = WB ,
∀ri, g. This means that in equilibrium agents’ decision can be simplified to two options: getting
WB for sure or getting WA if his real ability happens to be greater than aα and 0 otherwise.
Since the believed ability threshold needed to beat at tournament A to get the prize in equi-
librium, aα, is an interior point in (−∞,∞), it can be checked from equation (A.1) that the
boundary conditions for agents’ expected utility in tournament A in equilibrium are
limri→−∞ U [A|qαs (r), qαn(r), ri, F g] = 0 and limri→∞ U [A|qαs (r), qαn(r), ri, F g] = WA.
Moreover, from equation (A.1) follows that U [A|qs(r), qn(r), ri, F g] is differentiable and strictly
increasing on ri for any pair (qs(r), qn(r)) that induce an ability threshold aα ∈ (−∞,∞). This
strictly monotone increasing property of U [A|qs(r), qn(r), ri, F g] together with its boundary
conditions allows us to claim that the group-specific strategy profile in equilibrium must be
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also monotone increasing. In particular, for any pair of strategy profiles (qαs (r), qαn(r)) that
constitutes an equilibrium there must be a signal value rαg for each g ∈ {S,N} such that
U [A|qαs (r), qαn(r), rαg , F g] ≡WA[1− Fˆ (aα|rαg , F g)] = WB (A.3)
so that, by the strictly monotone property,U [A|qαs (r), qαn(r), ri, F g] ≷ U [B|qαs (r), qαn(r), ri, F g] =
WB if ri ≷ rαg . Therefore it can be concluded that, provided aα, the equilibrium strategy profiles
for social group g is characterized by a signal contingent strategy profile such that qαg (ri) = 1 if
ri > r
α
g and qαg (ri) = 0 if ri < rαg . Substituting this strategy profiles into equation (A.2) follows
that the believed real ability threshold at the equilibrium should hold2∫ ∞
aα
λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]fS(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]fN (y)dy = δA (A.4)
that together with equation (A.3) fully characterizes the equilibrium of this game.
A.1.3 EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
We know that the equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff strategy summarized by a signal
value rαg for each social group (see Appendix A.1.2 above). Assume an arbitrary pair signal
threshold r¯S , r¯N . Given imperfect self-knowledge, there are some agents from social group
g ∈ {S,N} who have very low (high) ability levels who received a signal r > (<)r¯g , and thus
mistakenly opted for tournament A (B). Specifically, the probability of an agent from social
group g with real ability a participating in tournament A is conditional on he/she receiving a
signal r > r¯g . This probability can be computed as
Prob(r > r¯g|a) = Prob(a+ µ > r¯g) = 1− Φ(r¯g − a)
Therefore, given an arbitrary pair of threshold signals (r¯S , r¯N ), the mass of agents participating
in tournamentA in equilibrium can be computed as
∫∞
−∞ λ[1−Φ(r¯S−y)]fs(y)+(1−λ)[1−Φ(r¯N−
y)]fN (y)dy. Consequently the distribution of abilities within those participating in tournament
A can be summarized by the CDF
Ar¯S ,r¯N (a) ≡
∫ a
−∞ λ[1− Φ(r¯S − y)]fs(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(r¯N − y)]fN (y)dy∫∞
−∞ λ[1− Φ(r¯S − y)]fs(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(r¯N − y)]fN (y)dy
Thus, an agent with real ability a′ believes (with certainty) that there is, within the agents par-
ticipating in tournament A, a proportion of agents Ar¯S ,r¯N (a′) whose ability levels are lower
than his/her own, while the remaining proportion 1 − Ar¯S ,r¯N (a′) has ability levels strictly
higher than a′.
On the other hand, notice that there is a mass of prizes of exactly δA for participants in tourna-
ment A. As the mass of agents in that tournament is
∫∞
−∞ λ[1 − Φ(r¯S − y)]fs(y) + (1 − λ)[1 −
Φ(r¯N − y)]fN (y)dy, the proportion of agents participating in tournament A who obtain WA is
∆r¯S ,r¯NA =
δA∫∞
−∞ λ[1− Φ(r¯S − y)]fs(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(r¯N − y)]fN (y)dy
> δA
2See footnote 1 for the intermediate step going from equation (A.2) to equation (A.4).
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Thus the probability of obtaining a prize in tournament A is equal to the probability of being
in the top ∆r¯S ,r¯NA of the distribution Ar¯S ,r¯N (a). But as we are working with a continuum of
agents, for any pair (r¯S , r¯N ) there is an ability level a(r¯S , r¯N ) such that
1−Ar¯S ,r¯N (a(r¯S , r¯N )) = ∆r¯S ,r¯NA
In other words, if an agent knows for sure that his/her ability level is higher than a(r¯S , r¯N ),
he/she will think that his/her probability of winning the prize is 1.
Lemma A.1.1. For any arbitrary pair (r¯S , r¯N ) there is a uniquely determined ability level a(r¯S , r¯N )
such that 1−Ar¯S ,r¯N (a(r¯S , r¯N )) = ∆r¯S ,r¯NA . This a(r¯S , r¯N ) solves∫ ∞
a(r¯S ,r¯N )
λ[1−Φ(r¯S − y)]fS(y) + (1− λ)[1−Φ(r¯N − y)]fN (y)dy ≤ δA (= if a(r¯S , r¯N ) > −∞)
(A.5)
Moreover, lim
(r¯S ,r¯N )→(−∞,−∞)
a(r¯S , r¯N ) = a
α,sd, lim
(r¯S ,r¯N )→(∞,∞)
a(r¯S , r¯N ) = −∞ and ∂a(r¯S ,r¯N )∂r¯g < 0
∀r¯g , g ∈ {S,N}.
Proof: The implicit solution for a(r¯S , r¯N ) in equation (A.5) is immediately apparent if we substi-
tute Ar¯S ,r¯N (a(r¯S , r¯N )) and ∆r¯S ,r¯NA by their extended expressions and do the math. On the other
hand, uniqueness is easily proven once it is noted that equation (A.5) is monotonically decreasing in
a(r¯S , r¯N ).
If (r¯S , r¯N )→ (−∞,−∞) equation (A.5) yields that a(r¯S , r¯N ) implicitly solves∫ ∞
lim
(r¯S,r¯N )→(−∞,−∞)
a(r¯S ,r¯N )
λfs(y) + (1− λ)fs(y)dy = 1− Fα(a(r¯S , r¯N )) = δA
from what it emerges that the upper bound for the ability threshold is3
lim
(r¯S ,r¯N )→(−∞,−∞)
a(r¯S , r¯N ) = (F
α)−1(1− δA) = aα,sd
Similarly, if (r¯S , r¯N )→ (∞,∞) equation (A.5) shows that there is no interior solution for a(r¯S , r¯N ) as∫ ∞
lim
(r¯S,r¯N )→(∞,∞)
a(r¯S ,r¯N )
0dy = 0 < δA, ∀a(r¯S , r¯N )
so the corner solution applies, leading to lim
(r¯S ,r¯N )→(∞,∞)
a(r¯S , r¯N ) = −∞.
The last part of the lemma is proven straightforwardly by noting that for any change in the pair
(r¯S , r¯N ) the value of a(r¯S , r¯N ) should also change such that the above equality holds. Thus, the
total derivative with respect to r¯g , g ∈ {S,N}, in the foregoing expression should be zero, i.e.
−[1−Φ(r¯g−a(r¯S , r¯N ))]f(a(r¯S , r¯N ))∂a(r¯S , r¯N )
∂r¯g
−
∫ ∞
a(r¯S ,r¯N )
φ(r¯g−y)f(y)dy ≡ 0⇒ ∂a(r¯S , r¯N )
∂r¯g
< 0
Thus, the mapping a : (r¯S , r¯N ) → a can be represented by means of a monotonically decreasing,
continuous function in both arguments whose codomain is the set (−∞, aα,sd).
3Notice that this value aα,sd is just the ability threshold needed to beat when everyone enters tourna-
mentA. Therefore, it can be thought as to represent the minimum ability an agent should have in order to
consider tournament A a strictly dominant strategy. This value aα,sd also represents the minimum ability
required to participate in tournament A under perfect self-knowledge.
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The above lemma simply states that a(r¯S , r¯N ) can be considered as a function mapping each
pair of potential signal levels behaving as a threshold to exactly one compatible real ability
threshold level. Moreover, it implies that this function is upper bounded at aα,sd and that it is
inversely related to r such that a(r¯S , r¯N ) : R2 → (−∞, aα,sd).
Now fix a(r¯S , r¯N ) and denote it as a¯. Given a¯, the assigned probability of an agent from social
group g ∈ {S,N} observing signal ri for winning the prize in tournament A is just the prob-
ability that he/she assigns –given distributional assumptions– to having a real ability greater
than a¯ conditional on the signal he/she has observed, i.e. 1− Fˆ (a¯|ri, F g).
Lemma A.1.2. For any arbitrary a¯ there is a uniquely determined rg(a¯) that solves
WA[1− Fˆ (a¯|rg(a¯), F g)] = WB (A.6)
Moreover, lim
a¯→−∞ rg(a¯)→ −∞, lima¯→∞ rg(a¯)→∞ and
∂rg(a¯)
∂a¯ > 0,∀a¯.
Proof: The proof is straightforward once it is noted that for any a¯, rg(a¯) should be such that equation
(A.6) holds. Thus, the total derivative with respect to a¯ of equation (A.6) should be zero, i.e.
WA
[
−fˆ(a¯|rg(a¯), F g)− ∂Fˆ (a¯|rg(a¯), F
g)
∂rg(a¯)
∂rg(a¯)
∂a¯
]
≡ 0⇒ ∂rg(a¯)
∂a¯
> 0
The boundary conditions are straightforward and can be checked by applying the limits to equation
(A.6). Thus, the mapping r : a¯ → r can be represented by means of a monotonically increasing,
continuous function.
Summing up, from lemmas A.1.1 and A.1.2 we find that any real ability value established as
standard induces one signal threshold level for each social group that at the same time induce
a new standard. Therefore, in equilibrium we should find that both the signal threshold levels
(induced by the real ability standard) and the real ability level (induced by the signal threshold
levels) should be compatible with the beliefs held by the agents. Summarizing, we are looking
for a value aα that represents a fixed point for the system a(rN (aα), rS(aα)) = aα. Now we can
prove 1.2.2 very easily.
The first thing to notice is that, given the properties on lemmas A.1.1 and A.1.2
da(rN (a¯), rS(a¯))
da¯
=
∂a(rN , rS)
∂rN
∂rN (a¯)
∂a¯
+
∂a(rN , rS)
∂rS
∂rS(a¯)
∂a¯
< 0
and that a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) is continuous on a¯. Thus, if there is aα holding a(rN (aα), rS(aα)) = aα,
it must be unique. Next it can be seen that the limit of a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) when a¯→ −∞ is
lim
a¯→−∞ a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) = lim(rN ,rS)→(−∞,−∞)
a(rN , rS) = a
α,sd
and that the limit of a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) when a¯→∞ is
lim
a¯→∞ a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) = lim(rN ,rS)→(∞,∞)
a(rN , rS) = −∞
Therefore, we find that the function a(rN (a¯), rS(a¯)) : a¯ ∈ R → (−∞, aα,sd) is continuous on a¯
and it is strictly decreasing. Thus there is aα > −∞ holding a(rN (aα), rS(aα)) = aα.
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A.1.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS: REPRESENTATIVITY AND COMPARATIVE
STATICS
Proof of Proposition 1.2.4: Assume that the stereotype is negative so α < 0. By corollary 1.2.3,
rαS > r
α
N so 1 − Φ(rαS − a) < 1 − Φ(rαN − a) ∀a which actually means that the probability of an
N -agent participating in A is greater than for an S-agent with the same real ability. With this it
is easy to check that the denominator of the representativity index shown in equation (1.2) is
∫ ∞
−∞
λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]f(y)dy >∫ ∞
−∞
λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y)dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y)dy
which proves that 1 >
∫∞
−∞[1−Φ(rαS−y)]f(y)dy∫∞
−∞ λ[1−Φ(rαS−y)]f(y)+(1−λ)[1−Φ(rαN−y)]f(y)dy
=
λαA
λ . The analogous analy-
sis for α > 0 proves that λ
α
A
λ > 1
Proof of Proposition 1.2.5: Assume that the stereotype is negative. Since the stereotype is by
assumption false, aα does not represent the real minimum ability necessary to win a prize in
tournament A. Instead, as S-agents are ex-ante more skillful than predicted by the stereotype
the required minimum ability for obtaining WA given the behavior rules (rαS , r
α
N ) is aˆ > a
α.
Thus, the proportion of S-agents who win a prize WA from social group S can be expressed as
ωαA =
λ
∫∞
aˆ
[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y)dy∫∞
aˆ
λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]f(y)dy
so the equivalent index to the one shown in equation (1.2) is ω
α
A
λ . Like the index for participa-
tion, this index reflects under/overrepresentation when ω
α
A
λ 6= 1. As in the proof of proposition
1.2.4 it is straightforward to see that∫ ∞
aˆ
[1− Φ(rαS − y)]f(y)dy <
∫ ∞
aˆ
λ[1− Φ(rαS − y)]fS(y) + (1− λ)[1− Φ(rαN − y)]fN (y)dy
which comes directly from the fact that as rαS > r
α
N so 1 − Φ(rαS − a) < 1 − Φ(rαN − a) ∀a. This
implies that ω
α
A
λ < 1. If the stereotype is positive an analogous analysis takes place, but taking
into account that aˆ < aα and rαS < r
α
N .
Proof of Proposition 1.2.6: Assume that the stereotype is false and negative. Then the actual
distribution of signals for both social groups is the same. In particular, signals are distributed
by a normal distribution with mean MN and variance σ2a + σ2µ. Let the PDF of this distribution
be Γ(r). A negative stereotype, α < 0, implies by corollary 1.2.3 rαS > r
α
N . Notice that except for
a change in λ any comparative statics exercise will only affect the index λ
α
A
λ through a change
in λαA when the stereotype is false.
Therefore the proportion of participants in tournament A who come from social group S, λαA,
can be expressed as the mass of agents from social group S who observe signals greater than
rαS as a proportion of the total mass of agents who enter tournament A, i.e.
λαA =
λ
∫∞
rαS
Γ(y)dy
λ
∫∞
rαS
Γ(y)dy + (1− λ) ∫∞
rαN
Γ(y)dy
=
λ
∫∞
rαS
Γ(y)dy∫∞
rαS
Γ(y)dy + (1− λ) ∫ rαS
rαN
Γ(y)dy
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which after invoking corollary 1.2.3 proves to be
λ
∫∞
rαN+k
Γ(y)dy∫∞
rαN+k
Γ(y)dy + (1− λ) ∫ rαN+k
rαN
Γ(y)dy
with k = rαS−rαN > 0. Clearly this expression is lower than λ, which is what would be expected
under perfect information. Taking the derivative of that expression with respect to rαN we find
that the above expression is decreasing iff∫∞
rαN+k
Γ(y)dy
Γ(rαN + k)
<
∫∞
rαN
Γ(y)dy
Γ(rαN )
which can be shown to hold by using the Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) approximation for
cumulative normal distribution (algorithm 26.2.16).4 Therefore it can be claimed that the rela-
tionship between the proportion of participants in tournament A who come from social group
S and rαN is decreasing i.e.
∂λαA
∂rαN
< 0 (A.7)
Thus, by observing that the direct effect of a change of δA on rαN is null (lemma A.1.2) it can be
seen that
drαN
dδA
=
∂rαN (a
α)
∂aα
∂aα
∂δA
< 0
which establishes that dλ
α
A
dδA
=
∂λαA
∂rαN
∂rαN
∂aα
∂aα
∂δA
> 0 and so d
[
λαA
λ
]
/dδA > 0 as claimed in point one
of the proposition.
In addition, note that the marginal effect of an increase on WBWA on r
α
N is positive, so it can be
concluded that dλ
α
A
d(WB/WA)
=
∂λαA
∂rαN
∂rαN
∂(WB/WA)
< 0 and thus d
[
λαA
λ
]
/d
[
WB
WA
]
< 0 as claimed in
point two of the proposition.
To account for the effect of the proportion of S-agents in the total population, notice that there
is a direct effect and an indirect one such that
d(
λαA
λ )
dλ
=
∂(
λαA
λ )
∂λ
+
∂aα
∂λ
∂rαN
∂aα
∂(
λαA
λ )
∂rαN
> 0
From equations (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7) it can be seen straightforwardly that the indirect effect
is positive (an increase of λ decreases the real ability threshold aα, which lowers the signal
threshold rαN , which increases λ
α
A and ultimately the ratio λ
α
A/λ). It is easy to see from equation
(1.2) that the direct effect is
∫∞
−∞[Φ(r
α
S − y)− Φ(rαN − y)]fN (y)dy > 0.
4More precisely, using the Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) approximation the above holds iff a1t(rαN +
k)+a2[t(r
α
N +k)]
2 +a3[t(r
α
N +k)]
3 < a1t(r
α
N )+a2[t(r
α
N )]
2 +a3[t(r
α
N )]
3 where a1, a2 and a3 are parameters
provided by the algorithm and t : [0,∞) → (0, 1] which is decreasing in its argument. The inequality
presented above holds if the derivative of a1t(x) + a2[t(x)]2 + a3[t(x)]3 with respect to x is negative.
Since t(x) ∈ (0, 1], t′(x) < 0, a1, a3 > 0, a2 < 0 and |a1| > 2|a2| it is immediately apparent that
∂a1t(x)+a2[t(x)]
2+a3[t(x)]
3
∂x
< 0
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Finally, to account for the effect of an increase in the signal informativeness, γ, it is easy to see
that
dλαA
dγ
=
∂λαA
∂k
∂k
∂γ
> 0
since k = −αMN
[
(1−γ)
γ
]
together with α < 0 makes ∂k∂γ < 0 and
∂λαA
∂k = λ(λ − 1)Γ(rαN +
k)
[∫∞
rαN+k
Γ(y)dy
]
< 0.
If the stereotype is positive, the same procedure should be carried out but taking into account
that k < 0 and adapting the analysis accordingly. Notice that although the effects on the ratio
λαA/λ are of the opposite sign, the effects on the representativity problem, |1 − [λαA/λ]|, are of
the same sign.
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A.2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT
A.2.1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1
In this stage you will be asked to perform a task that involves two pictures. The first picture
will show a glass containing some water (like the one in the left picture) and will be located
at the top of the screen. This first picture will be displayed for 3 seconds. After that time, the
picture of the full glass will disappear and, a second picture of an empty glass will appear at
the bottom of your screen with a blue bar at its base (like the picture on the right).
Your task is to indicate on the second picture the water level from the first one. To do this, left
click your mouse on the blue bar in the second picture and drag it until it matches the level
of water shown in the first picture. Once you are satisfied with the location of the bar, press
the “OK” button that will be displayed at the bottom right of your screen. This will take you
automatically to a new picture of glass with water. The place where the bar is when you press
“OK” determines the location of the bar for the purpose of computing your score.
You will perform this task 14 consecutive times with different initial pictures. The score you
awarded for each repetition will be computed according to the following formula:
Score = 100− 5 ∗ distance(Real_Level_Water −Bar_Position)
where 100 is the height of the glass and distance(Real_Level_Water-Bar_Position) is the abso-
lute value of the distance between the water level in the first picture and the level where you
place the bar in the second picture. If you do not understand the formula exactly, don’t panic.
The important thing is that the closer you leave the bar to the actual water level, the higher
your score will be. NOTE: If the distance is greater than 20 your score will be negative.
PAYMENTS:
The computer will choose at random one of the 14 times that you perform the task and you
will be paid according to the following rule
Payment = max(5 ∗ Score/100, 0)
For example, if the distance is 0 in the randomly chosen repetition (i.e. you placed the bar at
exactly the right water level), your score will be 100 (100=100-0) and you will gete5 (e5=e5*1).
If the distance is 4 in the randomly chosen repetition your score will be 80 (80=100-5*4) and you
will get e4 (e4=e5*0.8). If the distance between the water level and the place where you locate
the bar in the randomly chosen repetition is greater than 20 your score will be negative and
you will get e0.
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A.2.2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2 (NOT MANIPULATED)
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to estimate your average score over the 14
repetitions of the task you performed previously.
This average represents your real ability in the task. If your estimation matches your actual
average score you will be paid e1.5. Otherwise you will get e0.
Before you enter your estimation, we will provide you with certain information that may help
you. Please press “OK” to continue.
(INFORMATION_SIGNAL) Now you can see on your screen the score chosen randomly by
the computer from among the 14 times you have performed the task, i.e. the score that you see
is your real score from one of the 14 times that you have completed the “glass task”.
Please, press “OK” to continue.
(INFORMATION_OTHERS) Now you can see the distribution of the average scores have been
distributed for the session in intervals of three. As you can see, this information is available in
both chart and plot form.
Please, press “OK” to continue.
(SELF-ASSESSMENT) Now you can see at the bottom right of your screen a list of options.
All you have to do is choose the group to which you believe you belong from among the 11
possibilities available. If you guess correctly you will get an extrae1.5. Once you have selected
an option press “OK” to confirm your choice. You will then be asked another question that you
must also answer. Once everyone has answered this additional question you will go on to stage
3 of the experiment.
A.2.3 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2 (MANIPULATED)
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to estimate your average score over the 14
repetitions of the task you performed previously.
This average represents your real ability in the task. If your estimation matches your actual
average score you will be paid e1.5. Otherwise you will get e0.
Before you enter your estimation, we will provide you with certain information that may help
you. Please press “OK” to continue.
(INFORMATION_FRAMING)
DESCRIPTION OF THE TASK: The task that you have just performed is closely linked to your
ability to perceive the proportions of one object and transfer them to another. In particular,
the previous task is based in your spatial vision capability and your subsequent handling of
visual information. These abilities are essential for performing tasks in the field of engineering.
According to the description of the BACHELOR’S DEGREE IN ENGINEERING provided by
the UPV/EHU one of the BASIC SKILLS required for engineers is:
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“The capability for spatial vision and knowledge of graphic representation techniques, in-
cluding both conventional methods of metric geometry and descriptive geometry, such as
computer-aided design applications.”
Please, press “OK” to continue.
(INFORMATION_SIGNAL) Now you can see on your screen the score chosen randomly by
the computer from among the 14 times you have performed the task, i.e. the score that you see
is your real score from one of the 14 times that you have completed the “glass task”.
Please, press “OK” to continue.
(INFORMATION_OTHERS) Now you can see the distribution of the average scores have been
distributed for the session in intervals of three. As you can see, this information is available in
both chart and plot form.
Please, press “OK” to continue.
(SELF-ASSESSMENT) Now you can see at the bottom right of your screen a list of options.
All you have to do is choose the group to which you believe you belong from among the 11
possibilities available. If you guess correctly you will get an extrae1.5. Once you have selected
an option press “OK” to confirm your choice. You will then be asked another question that you
must also answer. Once everyone has answered this additional question you will go on to stage
3 of the experiment.
A.2.4 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 3 (COORDINATION)
In this part of the experiment, you will be presented with two options (option A and option
B) under 9 different situations. Your task will be to choose between option A and option B for
each of the 9 situations. Each of these two options will give you the chance to obtain different
prizes. However, each option has a maximum number of prizes for those who choose that
option. The maximum number of prizes awarded under each option varies from one situation
to another but in all the situations the sum of the prizes for A and B is equal to the number of
people in this room. That is, in all the situations the number of prizes from A and the number
of prizes from B add up to —.
If more people choose one option than there are prizes for that option in the situation in ques-
tion, prizes will be awarded only to those subjects who have chosen the option who showed
the highest ability levels in the task on which you worked in the stage 1 (measured as the mean
score over the 14 repetitions). For example, if an option offers 5 prizes and 7 people choose it,
only the 5 with the highest ability levels will obtain the prize.
The prize in option B is always be e1.00. However, the prize available in option A varies in
each of the 9 situations.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will choose randomly one of the 9 situations and
you will be paid what you have won in that situation given your choice and the choice of the
rest of the participants in that situation.
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An example is shown below. Please press“OK” to go through the example.
EXAMPLE: Assume that there are 10 people participating (so the total number of prizes be-
tween options A and B is always 10). In this case, the next screen will show you a matrix
similar to the one below where the 9 different situations are presented:
The first row of the table presents 3 different situations in which there are always 2 prizes in
A and 8 in B. However, in each of the three situations in the first row the prize in option A is
different.
Similarly, the first column shows three situations in which always the prize of option A is
e1.50 and that in option B e1.00. However, the maximum number of prizes in options A and
B change in each of the situations in column 1.
(CONTROL_QUESTION_COOR) To check whether you have understood how your decisions
and those of others determine your payments in this stage, we will now run through an exam-
ple, at the end of which you will be asked to answer some questions.
Once everyone has answered these questions correctly you will move on to the screen where
you have to take the decisions.
Example: Assume that there are 4 participants in this session (yourself and 3 others). Your
ability (average score) in the task was 65 and in the randomly chosen repetition you obtained
a score of 90. The average scores of the other 3 participants were 60, 70, and 80 respectively.
Assume that you are making your choice in a situation in which option A offers 1 prize and
option B offers 3. Based on this information, answer the following questions.
The 4 questions that you must answer are shown below. Once you have answered them, press
“OK”. If your answers are correct you will be moved on automatically to the decision-making
screen as soon as all your partners have also answered the questions correctly.
1. If one of your partners had choose option A and the other two option B, will you win a
prize if you choose option A?
• Yes
• No
• Depends
2. If two of your partners choose option A and the other option B, will you win a prize if
you choose option A?
• Yes
• No
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• Depends
3. If you all choose option A, who will win the prize? (choose as many as you think are
correct)
• Me
• The one whose ability level is 60
• The one whose ability level is 70
• The one whose ability level is 80
4. If you all choose option B, who will win the prize? (choose as many as you think are
correct)
• Me
• The one whose ability level is 60
• The one whose ability level is 70
• The one whose ability level is 80
(CONTROL_QUESTION_OUT) To check whether you have understood how your decisions
and those of others determine your payments in this stage, we will now run through an exam-
ple, at the end of which you will be asked to answer some questions.
Once everyone has answered these questions correctly you will move on to the screen where
you have to take the decisions.
Example: Assume that there are 4 participants in this session (yourself and 3 others). Your
ability (average score) in the task was 65 and in the randomly chosen repetition you obtained
a score of 90. The average scores of the other 3 participants were 60, 70, and 80 respectively.
Assume that you are making your choice in a situation in which option A offers 1 prize. Based
on this information, answer the following questions.
The 4 questions that you must answer are shown below. Once you have answered them, press
“OK”. If your answers are correct you will be moved on automatically to the decision-making
screen as soon as all your partners have also answered the questions correctly.
1. If one of your partners had choose option A and the other two option B, will you win a
prize if you choose option A?
• Yes
• No
• Depends
2. If two of your partners choose option A and the other option B, will you win a prize if
you choose option A?
• Yes
• No
• Depends
3. If you all choose option A, who will win the prize? (choose as many as you think are
correct)
102 APPENDIX A. STEREOTYPES AND TOURNAMENT SELF-SELECTION
• Me
• The one whose ability level is 60
• The one whose ability level is 70
• The one whose ability level is 80
4. If you all choose option B, who will win the prize? (choose as many as you think are
correct)
• Me
• The one whose ability level is 60
• The one whose ability level is 70
• The one whose ability level is 80
A.2.5 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 3 (BELIEF ELICITATION)
Next you will be asked 5 questions regarding this session. At the end of the experiment the
computer will chose one of these questions at random and you will be paide1.5 if your answer
is correct according to the data collected during the session and e0 otherwise.
Question 1: Consider the situation above in which option A offered 16 prizes of e2.00 each
and option B 17 prizes of e1.00 each. In this situation you have chosen option —.
Given your choice and your partners’ choices in this situation, in what range do you think the
minimum ability required to win tournament A’s prize lies?
Note: If you think that in this situation there are fewer participants than prizes in option A,
you should answer “<70”
Available options: <70, 70-73, 73-76, 76-79, 79-82, 82-85, 85-88, 88-91, 91-94, 94-97 and 97-100
Question 2: Consider the situation above in which option A offered 16 prizes of e2.00 each
and option B — prizes of e1.00 each. In this situation you have chosen option —.
Given your choice and your partners’ choices in this situation, in what range do you think the
minimum ability required to win tournament A’s prize lies?
Note: If you think that in this situation there are fewer participants than prizes in option A,
you should answer “<70”
Available options: <70, 70-73, 73-76, 76-79, 79-82, 82-85, 85-88, 88-91, 91-94, 94-97 and 97-100
Question 3: In this session, who do you think has performed better on average in the initial
task?
Available options: Men/No Differences/Women
Question 4: In this session the average ability across all the — participants has been —. In
what range do you think men’s average ability level in the initial task lies?
Available options: <70, 70-73, 73-76, 76-79, 79-82, 82-85, 85-88, 88-91, 91-94, 94-97 and 97-100
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Question 5: In this session the average ability across all the — participants has been —. In
what range do you think women’s average ability level in the initial task lies?
Available options: <70, 70-73, 73-76, 76-79, 79-82, 82-85, 85-88, 88-91, 91-94, 94-97 and 97-100
A.2.6 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 4 (ABILITY ESTIMATION, SINGLE SEX)
This part of the experiment is very similar to stage 3. The difference is that now you will inter-
act only with persons of your own sex
On the next screen you will be asked again to estimate your ability level in the initial task (av-
erage over the 14 repetitions). To that end, you will be shown the distribution of abilities of all
the participants of your own gender. That is, if you are a man all the other participants shown
will also be men and if you are a woman they will all be women.
If your estimation matches your real ability you will get e1.00. Otherwise you will get e0.
A.2.7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 4 (COORDINATION, SINGLE SEX)
In this part of the experiment you will again be presented with two options (A and B) under 9
different situations. The decision matrix that you will see will be similar to the one in stage 3A.
The difference from stage 3A is that now you will only interact with participants of your own
gender, i.e. if you are a man all the other participants will also be men and if you are a woman
they will be women.
In this session there are — participants of your own gender. Therefore, the total number of
prizes between option A and option B will in all cases be —.
As in part 3A, the computer will randomly pick one of the situations and you will be paid
according to your choice and the choices of those with whom you interact.
A.2.8 INSTRUCTIONS STAGE 5 (RISK ELICITATION)
On the next screen you will be presented with 8 different options, each of which offers two
different quantities that you can win by choosing that option. In all the options, each outcome
has a probability of 50%, i.e., the result of choosing an option depends exclusively on luck. At
the end of the experiment the computer will randomly pick one result from the option you
have chosen and you will be paid accordingly.
Below this text you will find the 8 available options. To see in more detail how to read this
table, consider option 5. In this option the possible results are e0.7 and e2.7. Both are equally
likely, which means that the computer will choose e0.7 as the payment on one of every 2 occa-
sions and e2.7 the other.
You must choose one of the 8 possible options. To that end, an empty box will appear where
you must enter the number of the option (from 1 to 8) that you want to choose.
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Probability 50% Probability 50%
1 e1.5 e1.5
2 e1.3 e1.8
3 e1.1 e2.1
4 e0.9 e2.4
5 e0.7 e2.7
6 e0.6 e2.8
7 e0.4 e2.9
8 e0 e3
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A.3 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES
TABLE A.1– ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES FOR RELATIVE ASSESSMENT
Sample: All All+Inconsistent Not Outliers Not Manipulated Manipulated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signal 0.966*** 0.958*** 2.241*** 0.965* 1.070***
(0.195) (0.216) (0.335) (0.556) (0.240)
Female 0.673* 0.0337 0.00431 -0.0248 0.113
(0.340) (0.0421) (0.0409) (0.0537) (0.0699)
Rel.Maleness 0.317*** 0.303*** 0.202* 0.259** 0.550**
(0.0994) (0.113) (0.105) (0.125) (0.228)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.550*** -0.535*** -0.320** -0.593*** -0.728***
(0.141) (0.151) (0.145) (0.208) (0.256)
Taste Comp. 0.0530** 0.0449** 0.0562*** 0.0146 0.0836***
(0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0193) (0.0313) (0.0278)
Risk Pref. 0.00832 0.00356 0.0108 0.00805 -0.00975
(0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0120) (0.0177)
Age 0.0116** 0.0113** 0.0162** 0.00558 0.0146**
(0.00488) (0.00534) (0.00716) (0.00713) (0.00664)
Difficulty -0.0574 -0.0554 -0.0289 -0.101** 0.0134
(0.0361) (0.0335) (0.0367) (0.0400) (0.0480)
Extroversion 0.0202
(0.0204)
Agreeableness 0.0294
(0.0230)
Conscientiousness 0.00780
(0.0159)
Emotional Stability 0.00397
(0.0158)
Openness -0.0207
(0.0242)
Social Risk 0.150**
(0.0596)
(Social Risk)∗Female -0.189**
(0.0941)
Constant -1.235*** -0.497 -1.871*** -0.141 -1.027**
(0.402) (0.346) (0.352) (0.652) (0.415)
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 120 120 96 62 58
R-squared 0.530 0.489 0.570 0.438 0.592
Notes: Inconsistent subjects are those whose state perception and maleness are not compatible. Not Outliers consider
consistent agents between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the signal distribution. Not Manipulated subjects are
those participating in sessions 1 and 2. Manipulated are those participating in sessions 3 and 4. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE A.2– OLS REGRESSION FOR CONFIDENCE IN ESTIMATION
Conf.Est. Conf.Est.
(1) (2)
Signal 2.241*** 0.924
(0.604) (0.695)
Relative Assessment 1.244***
(0.403)
Female -0.351* -0.358*
(0.185) (0.183)
Rel.Maleness 0.377 -0.0468
(0.466) (0.420)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.871 -0.175
(0.599) (0.532)
Constant 2.876*** 3.245***
(0.543) (0.485)
Session FE YES YES
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.158 0.222
Notes: Conf.Est consists of a 7 level scale with higher values indicating greater confidence in estimation. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE A.3– ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES FOR THE PROBABILITY OF ENTERING TOURNAMENT A
Sample: All Marginal All+Inconsistent Not Manipulated Manipulated All
Method: Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Signal 0.404** 0.972 0.467*** 0.591* 0.463** 0.525**
(0.165) (0.720) (0.177) (0.308) (0.185) (0.211)
Female 0.354** 0.404** -0.0198 -0.0318 0.0185 -0.0164
(0.155) (0.170) (0.0409) (0.0535) (0.0655) (0.0426)
Rel.Maleness 0.233* 0.458** 0.221 0.0963 0.656** 0.220
(0.140) (0.191) (0.144) (0.152) (0.271) (0.143)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.391** -0.984*** -0.368** -0.287* -0.765** -0.378**
(0.169) (0.231) (0.174) (0.172) (0.302) (0.177)
Risk Pref 0.0222** 0.00818 0.0191* 0.0207 0.0155 0.0198*
(0.0109) (0.0144) (0.0106) (0.0162) (0.0172) (0.0110)
Min.Ab.Win 0.0150 0.0303* 0.0184 0.0265 0.00417 0.0209
(0.0131) (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.0224) (0.0126) (0.0142)
Taste Comp. 0.0236 0.00375
(0.0201) (0.0302)
Age 0.00365 -0.00802
(0.00603) (0.00802)
Difficulty -0.0409 -0.157***
(0.0315) (0.0389)
Extroversion -0.0213 -0.0555**
(0.0185) (0.0228)
Agreeableness 0.0141 0.00274
(0.0268) (0.0319)
Conscientiousness 0.0305* 0.0357*
(0.0156) (0.0196)
Emotional Stability -0.0120 -0.0335
(0.0177) (0.0213)
Openness -0.00712 -0.0559*
(0.0237) (0.0297)
Social Risk 0.141** 0.185**
(0.0644) (0.0796)
(Social Risk)∗Female -0.132 -0.140
(0.0866) (0.103)
Constant -0.394*
(0.211)
Tournament Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Clusters 120 97 140 62 58 120
Observations 1,080 342 1,080 558 522 1,080
Notes: Inconsistent subjects are those whose state perception and maleness are not compatible. Not Manipulated subjects
are those participating in sessions 1 and 2. Manipulated are those participating in sessions 3 and 4. Marginal effects are
reported. Clustered standard errors at subject level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE A.4– DETERMINANTS OF THE OPTIMAL SIGNAL-CONTINGENT STRATEGY
Sample: All Marginal
(1) (2)
Signal 1.275*** 0.989
(0.251) (1.145)
Female 0.0130 -0.00361
(0.0639) (0.0963)
Rel.Maleness 0.0299 -0.476*
(0.176) (0.247)
Rel.Maleness∗Female -0.200 0.0546
(0.232) (0.367)
Tournament Controls YES YES
Session FE YES YES
Number of Clusters 120 97
Observations 1,080 342
Notes: Marginal effects for the probability of obtaining WA unconditional on the behavior of others (probability that
tournament A represents a dominant strategy). Tournament controls include the allocation of prizes. Clustered stan-
dard errors at subject level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix B
Women ask for less (only from men)
B.1 ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS
FIGURE B.1– PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING A FEMALE RESPONDER
(a) (b)
Notes: (a) Histogram for Probability Score of Proposers choosing a Female Responder in the whole data. (b) Histogram
for Probability Score of Proposers choosing a Female Responder in the Matched Sample
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TABLE B.1– ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR THE CHOICE OF THE SEX
OF THE RESPONDER
LPM Logit RE Probit Probit Probit
Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob.
Male Resp. Male Resp. Male Resp. Male Resp. Male Resp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Proposer 0.142** 0.138*** 0.145** 0.154** 0.0552
(0.0555) (0.0525) (0.0605) (0.0647) (0.153)
Age Proposer 0.00252 0.00257 0.00166 0.00221 0.00212
(0.00356) (0.00339) (0.00372) (0.00337) (0.00338)
Student Proposer 0.117 0.110 0.104 0.106 0.106
(0.0819) (0.0739) (0.0917) (0.0750) (0.0749)
Retired Proposer -0.119 -0.135 -0.0934 -0.133 -0.128
(0.192) (0.192) (0.285) (0.186) (0.187)
Unemployed Proposer 0.146* 0.145** 0.138 0.140* 0.134*
(0.0843) (0.0700) (0.0905) (0.0724) (0.0741)
Low-Occupation Proposer 0.00276 0.00403 0.0103 0.00423 0.00322
(0.0726) (0.0677) (0.0794) (0.0689) (0.0684)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer 0.0534* 0.0551** 0.0537* 0.0539** 0.0433
(0.0277) (0.0272) (0.0306) (0.0265) (0.0285)
Perc. Status Proposer -0.148 -0.157 -0.163 -0.149 -0.152
(0.126) (0.125) (0.151) (0.124) (0.124)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage -0.000435 -0.000434 0.0000334 -0.000277 -0.000274
(0.000779) (0.000773) (0.00105) (0.000773) (0.000786)
Remaining Time 0.000507 0.000491 0.000502 0.000534 0.000543
(0.000486) (0.000482) (0.000504) (0.000473) (0.000467)
Male Question 0.290*** 0.308*** 0.324*** 0.343*** 0.301***
(0.0539) (0.0535) (0.0550) (0.0586) (0.0521)
Female Question -0.303*** -0.282*** -0.314*** -0.275*** -0.289***
(0.0638) (0.0623) (0.0720) (0.0965) (0.0639)
Male Proposer*Male Question -0.154
(0.157)
Male Proposer*Female Question -0.0193
(0.120)
Male Proposer*Perc. Attract. Proposer 0.0249
(0.0419)
Constant 0.274
(0.184)
Stage FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 428 428 428 428 428
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the selected responder is male and 0 otherwise. The table shows
the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described in the notes
of Table 2.1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5) and bootstrapped standard errors
(column 3), in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE B.2– ARE MALE RESPONDERS MORE LIKELY TO KNOW THE CORRECT ANSWER?
Prob. Correct Answer Prob. Correct Answer
(1) (2)
Male Responder -0.0648* -0.0482
(0.0343) (0.0362)
Male Question -0.123**
(0.0612)
Female Question -0.0353
(0.0507)
Observations 427 427
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the responder provided the correct answer and 0 otherwise. The
table shows the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described
in the notes of Table 1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE B.3– ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS FOR GENDER DIFFERENCES AND GENDER INTERACTION EF-
FECTS IN BARGAINING OUTCOMES
LPM Logit RE Probit RE OLS RE
Prob. No Prob. No Prob. No Proposer’s No. of No. of
Agreement Agreement Agreement Outcome Rounds Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MF -0.0624 -0.0521 -0.0440 10.78*** -0.209 -0.183
(0.0471) (0.0407) (0.129) (3.822) (0.375) (0.374)
FM -0.0532 -0.0372 -0.0422 2.995 -0.0952 -0.0851
(0.0499) (0.0403) (0.0462) (3.689) (0.361) (0.361)
MM 0.00145 0.0117 0.0183 -0.523 -0.520 -0.510
(0.0466) (0.0392) (0.0497) (5.037) (0.320) (0.322)
Constant 0.413*** 54.92*** 2.231** 2.198**
(0.137) (19.21) (1.063) (1.073)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 428 428 428 377 377 377
R-squared 0.117 0.160
Number of Proposers 131 131 131
H0: MF=FM 0.85 0.74 0.99 0.05 0.77 0.80
H0: MF=MM 0.19 0.18 0.64 0.02 0.35 0.31
H0: FM=MM 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.50 0.15 0.15
Notes: The dependent variables refer to: the Prob.of No Agreement, which takes the value of 1 when the bargaining
partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise (columns 1 to 3); Proposer’s Outcome, which summarizes the
outcome in euro obtained by the proposer from the bargaining (column 4); and No. of Rounds describes the duration
of the bargaining process (columns 5 to 6). All controls, as shown in Table 3 in the paper, are included. At the
bottom, p-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender
combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and
a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the
bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1 ,2 ,4 ,5 and 6) and bootstrapped
standard errors (column 3), in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE B.4– GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN PROPOSERS’ AND RESPONDERS’ BARGAINING STRATEGIES
Proposers Responders
Increasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing
Silent Offers Offers Maintaining Silent Demands Demands Maintaining
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MF 0.0220 0.0789** -0.0172** -0.0610 0.0410 0.0106 -0.0720 0.0959
(0.0279) (0.0393) (0.00845) (0.0387) (0.0702) (0.0580) (0.0902) (0.0826)
FM 0.00388 0.0259 -0.0336** 0.00381 0.0752 -0.0607 0.0430 0.0278
(0.0170) (0.0389) (0.0142) (0.0372) (0.0635) (0.0467) (0.0815) (0.0730)
MM 0.0119 0.116*** -0.0228** -0.0847** 0.0352 -0.0538 0.0223 0.0659
(0.0214) (0.0372) (0.0103) (0.0393) (0.0612) (0.0431) (0.0797) (0.0812)
Age Proposer 0.000779 0.00109 5.46e-05 -0.00120
(0.000735) (0.00189) (0.000533) (0.00177)
Student Proposer -0.0140 0.0656* -0.0110 -0.0527
(0.0149) (0.0388) (0.00899) (0.0408)
Retired Proposer -0.0266 -0.0436 -0.0153*** 0.0782
(0.0299) (0.105) (0.00437) (0.126)
Unemployed Proposer -0.0101 0.00654 -0.000952 0.000285
(0.0342) (0.0674) (0.0169) (0.0874)
Low-Occup. Proposer -0.00647 -0.0727* 0.00308 0.0667*
(0.0146) (0.0418) (0.0119) (0.0403)
Perc. Age Proposer 0.00322 -0.0232 0.00414 0.0166
(0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0250) (0.0252)
Perc. Status Proposer -0.0483 0.0130 0.00650 0.00499 0.0266 -0.0822 0.128 -0.0600
(0.0317) (0.0662) (0.0259) (0.0649) (0.0883) (0.0859) (0.136) (0.112)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer 0.00592 -0.00121 -0.00329 0.00350 0.0141 0.00453 -0.0158 0.0170
(0.00577) (0.0118) (0.00463) (0.0120) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0255) (0.0216)
Perc. Age Responder -0.00177 0.00610 -0.00785 8.83e-05 0.00421 0.0113 -0.0102 -0.00512
(0.00533) (0.0177) (0.00559) (0.0175) (0.0214) (0.0180) (0.0320) (0.0300)
Perc. Status Responder 0.0171 -0.108* -0.00692 0.0917 -0.135* 0.0812 0.0493 -0.134
(0.0236) (0.0627) (0.0196) (0.0605) (0.0805) (0.0753) (0.109) (0.102)
Perc. Attractiveness Responder -0.00725 0.0153 -0.00941* -0.00317 0.0242 -0.0347 0.00394 0.0297
(0.00663) (0.0175) (0.00531) (0.0172) (0.0253) (0.0222) (0.0328) (0.0328)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage 0.000555 0.000295 -4.86e-05 -0.000334 0.000613 -0.000844 0.00166 -0.000752
(0.000348) (0.000570) (0.000153) (0.000518) (0.000858) (0.000514) (0.00106) (0.000879)
Remaining Time 0.000332** 5.31e-05 0.000132 -0.000132 -0.000441 -0.000370 0.000504 -0.000237
(0.000169) (0.000344) (0.000110) (0.000320) (0.000486) (0.000393) (0.000630) (0.000511)
No. Of Rounds 0.00312 0.0336*** 0.00322 -0.0360*** 0.0558*** 0.0482*** -0.0287** -0.0450***
(0.00345) (0.0127) (0.00241) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.00960) (0.0129) (0.0153)
Round -0.00338 -0.0864*** 0.00220 0.0842*** -0.0945*** -0.0395*** -0.0104 0.0730***
(0.00305) (0.0122) (0.00216) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0148)
Stage FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,349 911 911 911 1,174 551 551 551
Number of Responders 377 308 308 308 354 230 230 230
H0 : MF=FM 0.43 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.64 0.24 0.20 0.42
H0 : MF=MM 0.63 0.30 0.43 0.51 0.93 0.23 0.24 0.71
H0 : FM=MM 0.64 0.02 0.35 0.03 0.49 0.88 0.78 0.60
Notes: Dependent variables refer to the different types of strategies used in the bargaining process. Silent takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder remains
silent. Increasing takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder increases the offer or demand from one round to the next. Decreasing takes the value of 1 when the
proposer or responder decreases the offer or demand from one round to the next. Finally, Maintain takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder maintains the
same offer or demand from one round to the next. All columns show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit random effects model. At the bottom,
p-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women,
MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers
to the bargaining between men. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE B.5– ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS WITH COLLAPSED DATA FOR GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN OFFERS, DEMANDS AND PROBABILITIES
OF ACCEPTANCE
OLS or RE Probit RE Probit OLS or RE Probit RE Probit
Prob. Responder Prob. Responder Prob. Proposer Prob. Proposer
Offers (round>1) Accepts (round>1) Accepts (round>1) Demands Accepts Accepts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MF -0.673 -0.127 -0.127 -42.71*** 0.0446 0.044
(3.090) (0.0960) (0.091) (14.18) (0.0783) (0.0963)
FM -2.959 0.0480 0.048 -6.507 -0.0565 -0.053
(2.445) (0.0887) (0.0892) (12.79) (0.0737) (0.085)
MM -1.815 0.109 0.109 -2.557 -0.120* -0.120
(3.375) (0.0807) (0.0963) (12.48) (0.0685) (0.0874)
Constant 22.21** 87.75
(11.02) (58.13)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 316 316 316 321 321 321
H0: MF=FM 0.50 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.24 0.34
H0: MF=MM 0.70 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04
H0: FM=MM 0.76 0.45 0.41 0.79 0.35 0.43
Notes: The dependent variable Offers refer to the offers in euro made by the proposer (column 1); Prob. Responder Accepts takes the value of 1 when the responder accepts the
offer made by the proposer and 0 otherwise (columns 2 and 3); Demands refer to the demands in euro made by the responder (columns 4); andProb. Proposer Accepts takes
the value of 1 when the proposer accepts the demand made by the responder and 0 otherwise (columns 5 and 6). At the bottom, p-values for the hypothesis testing are
shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between
a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men.
Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1,2,4,and 5) and bootstrap standard errors (column 3 and 6), in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix C
The Role of Gender and
Asymmetries in Alternating-Offer
Bargains
C.1 INSTRUCTIONS
C.1.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE EXPERIMENT!
We are going to start the experiment. From now on you are not permitted to talk, look at what
other participants are doing or to leave your seat. Please switch off your mobile phone. If you
have any questions or you need help, raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you.
If you do not follow these instructions YOU WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT
AND YOU WILL NOT GET ANY PAYMENT. Thank you.
The University of the Basque Country has provided the funds for this experiment. How much
you can earn depends on your decisions, on the decisions of other participants, and on luck.
Stages of the experiment and tasks: The experiment consists of 3 stages:
In the first stage you will be shown matrices with “0”s and “1”s for 5 minutes. Your task is to
count the number of “1”s in each matrix. The number of correct answers that you provide will
determine your productivity which will be relevant for the next part of the experiment.
In the second stage of the experiment the computer will randomly match you with a partner
and your task will consist of dividing an amount of money through a bargaining process. This
quantity depends on your own productivity and the productivity of the participant with whom
you are matched. You will have 3 minutes for each negotiation. There will be 10 bargaining
rounds in which you will be matched with a different participant each time.
In the third stage you will be presented with three short tasks in which you can earn more
money.
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Earnings:
You are guaranteed 3 Euro. In addition, once the experiment has concluded, the computer will
choose two bargaining rounds randomly from in the second stage of the experiment and you
will be paid the amount that you earned in each of them. Finally, in the third stage you can
earn extra money for each of the three short tasks, so at the end of the experiment your final
earnings will be the sum of the 3 Euro that you get for participating, your earnings in the two
bargaining rounds randomly selected, and your earnings in each of the short tasks from stage
3. Your earnings will be paid in cash privately at the end of the experiment.
We will now start the experiment. At the beginning of each stage, detailed information about
the task, about the decisions, and about earning is provided.
C.1.2 REAL EFFORT TASK
In this stage, you will be shown matrices with “0”s and “1”s, similar to the ones displayed
below for 5 minutes.
Your task is to count the number of “1”s in each matrix. The size of the matrices will vary. Once
you have entered an answer for a matrix and clicked on “OK” the next matrix will appear. All
participants will see the same matrices in the same order. There is a maximum of 60 matrices.
Example 1: 8x8 Matrix, Solution = 30 Example 2: 6x6 Matrix, Solution = 16
The number of correct answers that you provide will determine your productivity. The higher
your productivity is, the higher the average amount of money that you have to divide in the
next stage will be.
C.1.3 BARGAINING STAGE: SYMMETRIC
In this stage you will be matched randomly with another participant and your task consists of
dividing an amount of money through a bargaining process. This amount may be e5, e10 or
e15.
HOW IS THE AMOUNT OF MONEY TO BE DIVIDED COMPUTED?
1. The number of correct answers in the first stage determines the productivity of each
participant as follows:
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• Bottom third: Those participants with a fewest number of correct answers will be
assigned a productivity of e5
• Middle third: Those participants with an intermediate number of correct answers
will be assigned a productivity of e10
• Top third: Those participants with the highest number of correct answers will be
assigned a productivity of e15
2. In each round you will be randomly matched with another participant and the amount
to be divided will be:
• YOUR PRODUCTIVITY with a 50% chance
• THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE PARTICIPANT YOU ARE MATCHED WITH with
a 50% chance
For example, if your productivity is e5 and the productivity of the other participant is e15,
there is a 50% likelihood that the amount to be divided will be e5 and a 50% chance that will
be e15. Finally, if you and the participant with whom you are matched have the same produc-
tivity then the amount to be divided will be 5, 10 or 15 Euro, whichever amount you both have.
WHAT DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN DURING A BARGAINING PROCESS?
Before starting, you will be told whether you are participant A or participant B in each match-
ing. During the bargaining you will have to decide HOW MUCH MONEY PARTICIPANT B
WILL GET, so if you are participant A you will make offers to participant B and if you are
participant B you will make demands of participant A.
The negotiation works in the following way:
• Participant A starts the negotiation with an opening offer, deciding how much money
he/she wants to offer to participant B.
• Participant B can accept or reject that offer. If the offer is accepted participant B gets
the amount offered and participant A gets the rest of the pie (i.e. the full amount to be
divided minus the amount offered to participant B).
• If the offer is rejected the bargaining continues and it is the turn of participant B to make
a demand of participant A, deciding how much money he/she wants to get.
• Participant A can accept or reject that demand. If the demand is accepted participant B
gets the amount demanded and participant A gets the rest of the pie (i.e. the full amount
to be divided minus the amount demanded by participant B).
• If the demand is rejected the bargaining continues and it is the turn of participant A to
make a further offer to participant B. And so on.
Offers and demands must be multiples of e0.1 (10 cents). You have 3 minutes to reach a deal.
If you fail to reach a deal within that time, both participants get e0.
There will be 10 different bargaining rounds, in which you will be matched with a different
participant each time. During each negotiation you will be informed of how much money you
have to divide, of whether you are participant A or participant B, of how much of the 3-minute
time limit is left for the 3 minutes, and of the complete bargaining record: offers made by A,
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demands made by B and whether they have been accepted or rejected.
For payment, at the end of the experiment the computer will choose two bargaining rounds
randomly, one from rounds 1–5 and another from rounds 6–10, and you will be paid the
amount of the deal you reach in those rounds or e0 if you fail to reach a deal.
C.1.4 BARGAINING STAGE: EMPOWERMENT
[. . . ] If you fail to reach a deal within that time,
participant A is guaranteed an amount of money, while participant B gets e0. The amount of
money that participant A gets is randomly chosen between 50% and 85% of the amount to be
divided.
That is, if not deal is reached within the 3 minutes, participant A gets:
• Between e2.5 and e4.25 if the amount to be divided is e5
• Between e5 and e8.5 if the amount to be divided is e10
• Between e7.5 and e12.75 if the amount to be divided is e15
The exact amount is randomly chosen by the computer once the negotiation has finished.
[. . . ]For payment, at the end of the experiment the computer will choose two bargaining rounds ran-
domly, one from rounds 1–5 and another from rounds 6–10, and you will be paid the amount of the deal
you reach in those rounds or
a positive amount if you are participant A and e0 if you are participant B if you fail to reach a
deal.
C.1.5 BARGAINING STAGE: ENTITLEMENT
[. . . ]and of the complete bargaining record: offers made by A, demands made by B and whether they have
been accepted or rejected.
In addition, you will be told your productivity and the productivity of the participant with
whom you are matched, so you can learn whether the amount to be divided is that of your
productivity or that of the participant with whom you are matched.
C.1.6 BARGAINING STAGE: INFORMATION
[. . . ] There will be 10 different bargaining rounds, in which you will be matched with a different partic-
ipant each time.
During each bargaining process only participant A observes the amount to be divided: Par-
ticipant B only knows that it may be 5, 10 or 15 Euro, but is unaware of the exact amount.
Participant A cannot accept demands that are higher than the amount of money to be divided.
C.1.7 ELICITATION TASKS
This stage of the experiment consists of three short tasks, with which you can earn extra money.
The first is to answer four questions about this session. In the second and third you must choose
between different options.
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As you progress through this third stage of the experiment, we will provide you with more
detailed instructions about each task.
TASK I:
Next you will be asked 4 questions about this session. At the end of the experiment the com-
puter will choose one of them randomly and you will be paid e1 if your answer is correct
according to the data that we have gathered during the session and e0 otherwise.
QUESTION 1: If all participants in this session are sorted from the lowest to the highest num-
ber of correct answers in stage 1 (counting “1”s), and all subjects are divided into 4 segments
of equal sizes such that the participants with highest scores are in the first segment, the next
in the second, the next in the third, and those with lowest scores in the fourth segment, which
segment do you think you will be in?
Options: 1st segment/2nd segment/3rd segment/4th segment
QUESTION 2: On average, who do you think has performed better in the task in stage 1 (count-
ing “1”s)?
Options: Men/No difference/Women
QUESTION 3: In each negotiation a participant could get between 0% and 100% of the amount
of money to be divided. If all participants in this session are sorted from the lowest to the high-
est share of money obtained on average over the 10 rounds, and all the subjects are divided in
4 segments of equal sizes such that the participants who obtained the highest average share of
the money are in the first segment, the next in the second, the next in the third, and those with
lowest shares in the fourth segment, which segment do you think you will be in?
Options: 1st segment/2nd segment/3rd segment/4th segment
QUESTION 4: On average, who do you think has obtained a greater share of money during
the negotiations?
Options: Men/No difference/Women
TASK II:
On the next screen you will be given 8 different options, each of which offers two different
amounts that you can win by choosing that option. In all the options, each outcome has a
probability of 50%, i.e. the outcome depends exclusively on luck. At the end of the experiment
the computer will randomly pick one result from the option that you have chosen and you will
be paid accordingly.
Below this text you will find the 8 available options. For more details of how to read this table,
consider option 5. In this option the possible results are e0.7 and e2.7. Both are equally likely,
which means that the computer will choose e0.7 as the payment half the times and e2.7 the
other half.
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Probability 50% Probability 50%
1 e1.5 e1.5
2 e1.3 e1.8
3 e1.1 e2.1
4 e0.9 e2.4
5 e0.7 e2.7
6 e0.6 e2.8
7 e0.4 e2.9
8 e0 e3
You must choose one of the 8 possible options. To that end, an empty box will appear where
you must enter the number of the option (from 1 to 8) that you want to choose.
TASK III:
Next you will be matched randomly with another participant in this room. You will be pre-
sented with 6 situations in which you will have to choose one of 9 options. Each option repre-
sents the amount of money that you can earn from this task and the amount that the participant
with whom you are matched can earn.
At the end of the task one participant in the matching will be randomly selected as the Decisor
and the other as Receptor. The computer will randomly select one of the 6 situations and the
payment that you will get is the following:
• If you are the Decisor, you will get what you have chosen for yourself in the situation
selected by the computer
• If you are the Receptor, you will get what the other participant has chosen for you in the
situation selected by the computer
The amounts shown are in Euro cents.
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C.2 ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS
TABLE C.1– GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR BEHAVIOR: PROB. OF ACCEPTING
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.0356 -0.0745*** 0.00744 -0.0351 -0.0133 -0.0298 5.36e-05 0.0480 -0.00264 -0.0350 0.000781 -0.0338*
(0.0604) (0.0271) (0.0389) (0.0413) (0.0300) (0.0266) (0.0498) (0.0398) (0.0361) (0.0376) (0.0189) (0.0197)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0108 0.0278 0.00870 -0.0187 -0.0472 -0.0545* 0.0746* 0.0941* 0.0115 -0.0285 -0.0280 0.0552**
(0.0390) (0.0377) (0.0415) (0.0391) (0.0289) (0.0280) (0.0365) (0.0527) (0.0211) (0.0328) (0.0269) (0.0253)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.110 0.0186 0.0113 0.0978 -0.0449 0.0224 -0.0648 0.0850 0.0398 -0.0304 -0.0758* -0.0668
(0.110) (0.0732) (0.109) (0.0838) (0.0510) (0.0599) (0.102) (0.0777) (0.0501) (0.0784) (0.0426) (0.0450)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 164 664 608 170 985 877 122 706 644 170 1,133 930
No. Bargains 164 117 109 170 155 146 122 93 86 170 154 143
No. Clusters 36 33 32 37 37 34 27 27 26 37 37 37
Notes: GLS random-effects model for the probability of accepting opening offers (1st Offer), Subsequent Offers and Demands. Other Controls include the round and the time
remaining in seconds at the point when the offer (demand) is made, the current offer (demand), the previous offer, the previous demand, and the individual controls for
the responder (proposer). Clustered standard errors at the responder level for the probability of accepting offers and at the proposer level for demands. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE C.2– DISTRIBUTION BY GENDER MATCHINGS BY EXPERIENCE
First Half (Periods 1-5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information Total
FF 24.0% 24.0% 27.3% 28.6% 25.9%
MF 27.0% 28.0% 27.3% 20.0% 25.3%
FM 25.0% 24.0% 22.7% 27.6% 25.1%
MM 24.0% 24.0% 22.7% 23.8% 23.7%
Observations 100 100 66 105 371
Second Half (Periods 1-5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information Total
FF 25.0% 24.0% 25.0% 25.7% 24.9%
MF 27.0% 17.0% 25.0% 25.7% 23.6%
FM 23.0% 35.0% 22.2% 27.6% 27.3%
MM 25.0% 24.0% 27.8% 21.0% 24.1%
Observations 100 100 72 105 377
TABLE C.3– EFFECTS OF ULTIMATUMS ON RESPONDER’S PIE SHARE
Successful Agreements All
(1) (2)
Ultimatum 0.0308* 0.0897***
(0.0176) (0.0195)
Offer 0.00359 0.000326
(0.0106) (0.0124)
Ultimatum#Offer -0.0694*** -0.161***
(0.0201) (0.0216)
Other Controls YES YES
Observations 626 748
Clusters Prop. 138 140
Clusters Resp. 137 139
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and include Period and Treatment Fixed Effects. Offer is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the proposal is coming from the Proposer and 0 otherwise. Other Controls include the following
for both proposer and responder: gender, risk and social preferences, self-assessed ability in the real effort task, and
self-assessed ability in bargaining. Standard errors are clustered at the Proposer and Responder level using two-way
clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE C.4– THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE IN GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS: PROB ACCEPTING
Panel A: First Half (Periods 1–5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. 0.0303 -0.151*** -0.0396 -0.0613 -0.00177 -0.0476 0.0218 0.149** -0.0172 -0.0641 -0.00774 -0.0659
(0.0942) (0.0553) (0.0799) (0.0556) (0.0503) (0.0382) (0.0709) (0.0674) (0.0402) (0.0642) (0.0333) (0.0442)
β2 : Male Resp. 0.0464 0.0123 0.0427 -0.00630 -0.0584 -0.0935** 0.110 -0.00909 0.0710* -0.0271 -0.119** 0.0879**
(0.0701) (0.0517) (0.0892) (0.0508) (0.0424) (0.0389) (0.0681) (0.0872) (0.0418) (0.0513) (0.0500) (0.0447)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.149 0.149 0.202 0.0471 0.0981 0.0569 -0.338** 0.374*** 0.0769 -0.0619 -0.0948 -0.0627
(0.159) (0.167) (0.176) (0.121) (0.0924) (0.0983) (0.139) (0.0927) (0.0994) (0.104) (0.0648) (0.0874)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 82 277 250 90 421 359 58 272 245 88 440 402
No. Bargains 82 53 48 90 81 74 58 41 38 88 78 72
No. Clusters 37 33 33 37 34 36 26 26 27 38 38 36
Panel B: Second Half (Periods 6–10)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent Demands 1st Offer
Subsequent DemandsOffers Offers Offers Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. -0.114** -0.0210 0.0152 0.0182 -0.0198 -0.0180 -0.0285 -0.0195 0.0357 0.0186 -0.0102 0.00880
(0.0498) (0.0336) (0.0545) (0.0728) (0.0365) (0.0278) (0.0657) (0.0578) (0.0566) (0.0424) (0.0185) (0.0230)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0322 0.0199 0.00729 -0.0360 -0.0342 0.0271 0.0195 0.146** -0.0290 -0.0333 0.0323 0.0495***
(0.0446) (0.0587) (0.0507) (0.0572) (0.0404) (0.0479) (0.0572) (0.0583) (0.0386) (0.0282) (0.0261) (0.0178)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.117 -0.120 -0.136 0.151 -0.130** 0.0666 0.217 -0.122 -0.00197 0.00771 -0.0619 -0.0689**
(0.131) (0.0749) (0.158) (0.138) (0.0605) (0.0786) (0.187) (0.131) (0.0481) (0.0984) (0.0406) (0.0339)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 82 387 358 80 564 518 64 434 399 82 693 652
No. Bargains 82 64 61 80 74 72 64 52 48 82 76 74
No. Clusters 37 33 33 37 34 36 26 26 27 38 38 36
Notes: GLS random-effects model for the probability of accepting opening offers (1st Offer), Subsequent Offers and Demands. Other Controls include the round and the time
remaining in seconds at the point when the offer (demand) is made, the current offer (demand), the previous offer, the previous demand, and the individual controls for
the responder (proposer). Clustered standard errors at the responder level for the probability of accepting offers and at the proposer level for demands. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE C.5– ROBUSTNESS: GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS BY EXPERIENCE
Panel A: First Half (Periods 1–3)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’sTime Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. 0.103 -35.41* -0.0394** -0.0262 -45.44*** -0.00414 -0.105 -0.592 -0.0325 0.125 11.02 -0.0816
(0.103) (21.31) (0.0168) (0.0422) (10.97) (0.0400) (0.110) (28.94) (0.0284) (0.0880) (11.75) (0.0500)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.00500 14.61 0.0151 0.0346 -31.20** -0.104*** -0.118 17.84 0.0972** 0.0343 -15.93 0.0580**
(0.110) (13.32) (0.0337) (0.0583) (12.59) (0.0306) (0.0789) (19.93) (0.0406) (0.0818) (14.56) (0.0266)
β′3 : Male#Male -0.0356 71.78** 0.00851 -0.0665 24.03 0.0161 0.0822 15.39 0.00411 -0.261 -31.70* 0.105***
(0.215) (31.20) (0.0397) (0.0987) (20.23) (0.0820) (0.145) (38.94) (0.0599) (0.161) (17.83) (0.0403)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 60 49 49 60 57 57 40 35 35 63 57 57
Clusters Prop 30 27 27 31 31 31 22 21 21 34 32 32
Clusters Resp 30 28 28 30 29 29 21 21 21 35 34 34
Panel B: Second Half (Periods 8–10)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’s Success Remaining Responder’sTime Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share Time Pie Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β1 : Male Prop. 0.0695 -17.74 0.0181 -0.161 -12.54 -0.0268 -0.0105 -12.97 0.0239* -0.139 -36.66** 0.0270
(0.125) (14.30) (0.0248) (0.130) (11.97) (0.0336) (0.0611) (21.53) (0.0143) (0.0935) (14.63) (0.0332)
β2 : Male Resp. -0.0257 19.71 -0.0305 -0.105 -24.79** 0.0181 -0.158 -10.19 -0.0275 -0.0130 5.972 -0.00607
(0.0969) (15.31) (0.0294) (0.0729) (11.65) (0.0260) (0.110) (17.64) (0.0318) (0.0933) (12.47) (0.0519)
β′3 : Male#Male 0.0358 -53.29 0.0239 0.0708 16.01 0.00359 -0.00855 -58.15 0.00951 0.319* -11.96 0.0373
(0.219) (32.97) (0.0571) (0.147) (25.08) (0.0469) (0.268) (44.16) (0.0504) (0.181) (21.84) (0.0824)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 60 50 50 60 48 48 39 34 34 63 49 49
Clusters Prop 28 24 24 28 26 26 22 22 22 33 28 28
Clusters Resp 29 27 27 27 25 25 21 21 21 33 32 32
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and include Period Fixed Effects. OLS for the three main outcome variables for each treatment. Success takes a value of 1 if the
subjects reach a deal within the 3-minute limit and 0 otherwise. Remaining Time is the time left in seconds from the time when the agreement is reached to the end of
the three-minute limit. Responder’s Pie Share is the share that is obtained by the responder in each successful bargaining. Entitlement considers only those matchings in
which an effective entitlement is implemented, so ties between subjects’ productivities are disregarded. Individual Controls include subjects’ risk and social preferences and
self-assessed ability in the real effort task and in the bargaining ability, separately for Proposers and Responders. Standard errors are clustered at the proposer and responder
level using two-way clustering.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE C.6– THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE IN GENDER AND GENDER INTERACTION EFFECTS IN
FRIENDLY AGREEMENTS
First Half (Periods 1–5)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Male Prop. 0.0356 -0.0287 -0.0829*** -0.0561
(0.0278) (0.0439) (0.0320) (0.0424)
β2: Male Resp. -0.000593 -0.0712*** 0.0408* 0.0509**
(0.0224) (0.0245) (0.0231) (0.0259)
β′3: Male#Male -0.0193 -0.0198 -0.0349 0.157***
(0.0470) (0.0633) (0.0431) (0.0443)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 68 75 41 67
Clusters Prop. 32 31 21 32
Clusters Resp. 31 29 21 31
Second Half (Periods 6–10)
Symmetric Empowerment Entitlement Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Male Prop. 0.00500 -0.0157 0.00821 0.00527
(0.0147) (0.0311) (0.0217) (0.0489)
β2: Male Resp. -0.0125 -0.00816 -0.0356 0.000500
(0.0208) (0.0299) (0.0224) (0.0453)
β′3: Male#Male 0.000992 -0.0612 0.0137 -0.0911
(0.0438) (0.0400) (0.0470) (0.0593)
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 66 54 44 45
Clusters Prop. 28 26 21 20
Clusters Resp. 30 28 21 25
Notes: All regressions control for Pie Size and for who makes the last offer (Proposer or Responder) and include Period
Fixed Effects. Other Controls include risk and social preferences and self-assessment in the real effort task and in
bargaining for both, proposers and responders. Standard errors are clustered at the Proposer and Responder level using
two-way clustering. Clustered standard errors at the individual level using two-way clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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